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Abstract of PhD Thesis 
Explaining women's employment under the Islamic state in Iran 
Women, Work and Islamism: Ideology and Resistance 
This study examines women's employment in Iran between 1979-1997, analysing 
the changing position of the Islamic state in reaction to economic circumstances 
and women's responses. In making this assessment the interaction between 
economic circumstances, the institutionalisation of gender inequality and also the 
responses of women are examined. This study demonstrates that economic forces 
and women's struggle for change undermined the Islamic state's gender relations. 
The Islamisation of state and society which followed the 1979 revolution involved 
an attempt by the Islamic state to seclude women within the home in accordance 
with the state's gender and employment policy and practices. The power of the 
state to transform gender relations, however, was constrained by the Iran - Iraq 
war, as the survival of many families depended on women's earnings. The end of 
the war with Iraq and the return of men to the workforce did not result in 
women's return to the home. Economic reconstruction and inflation increased 
women's participation in the workforce. This study demonstrates that in 1997, 
women's participation in the labour force, despite a rigid sexual division of labour 
imposed ideologically by the Islamic state is no less than it was in pre-1979. 
However, the state continued to strengthen patriarchal relationships within the 
home, employment and wider society, thus maintaining that women's participation 
in the workforce is by nature temporary and that ultimately a woman's place is in 
the home. Women of different classes and with different levels of religiosity 
responded to the economic circumstances and the state's gender ideology. Their 
participation in the political movements and their active role in the economy has 
raised gender consciousness. The result is an alliance between religious and 
secular women in urban areas who have demanded reforms and forced the Islamic 
state to return to the position of the reforms of pre- 1979 in relation to women and 
the family, and women's education and employment. 
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Glossary 
Aghaye biroon The master of the outside of the house 
Bazaar Marketplace 
Bazaari Bazaar traders 
Chador Literally means a tent. It is a full-length loose cover worn by women, 
which envelopes the body from head to toe. It is normally held in place by a hand 
under the chin or, if the woman is very strict, under the eyes. In official gatherings 
women usually wear black chador, while in unofficial occasions women choose to 
wear a colourful chador. 
Chadori Women who wear chador 
Dooreh getting together socially on a regular basis 
Eddeh (Idda) A period of celibacy immediately after divorce or the death of a 
husband during which the woman may not remarry. This is normally for three 
menstrual cycles, and its purpose is to determine whether the woman is bearing a 
child from her previous husband. 
Enghelabe Farhangi Eslami Islamic Cultural Revolution 
Farsi The official and dominant language in Iran 
Fesad Moral degeneration 
Ghalibaf Carpet weaver 
Gharbzadegi Westoxication; being influenced by Western culture. The term is 
used to describe those Iranians who embrace Western culture without reservation. 
Gharbzadeh is the person who is Westoxicated. 
Ghesas (Qisas) Retribution for killing or injuring. The law of Ghesas is the penal 
law of the Islamic Republic and is based on the idea of the victim or victim's 
family having the right to retribution against the perpetrator of a crime against 
them. 
Hadith The collected record of sayings and actions of the Prophet and Shia 
Imams. The importance of Hadith is second to that of Quran as the basis of 
Islamic jurisprudence 
Hejab (Hab) Literally means a partition or curtain. It describes a type of 
women's clothing which protects her body from the eyes of men who are 
forbidden to her. Women who did not fully observed the hejab were called Bad 
Hejabi 
Hezbollahi Partisan of God. Fanatical supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini 
described themselves as Hezbollahis, "conveying the meaning that they do not 
belong to earthly political parties and only follow God's word by following their 
leader Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Jahad (Jihad) Islamic holy war against infidels, or to spread Islam. It is a duty of 
every Muslim man to participate injahad if called upon. Women can play a role in 
a defensive jahad but not in an offensive one. Its current usage in the Islamic 
Republic also refers to the endeavour and sacrifices of the people for various 
Islamic and national causes. 
Jahizieh Trousseau 
Jangali Forest people 
Karfarma employer 
Kargahe Khanegi Household workshop 
Kargar Low status workers 
Karmand Middle to high status workers 
Khaharane Zaynab Zaynab Sisters 
Khanome khaneh The lady of the house 
Maghnaeh A large scarf covering head, all hair and shoulders. It is worn with 
roposh as the dominant form of hejab in Iran since 1981. 
Mahr Bride price agreed between the families of the bride and groom and written 
into the marriage contract. It is supposed to be paid by the husband to the wife on 
demand after consummation of the marriage. But the normal practice is for it to 
be paid on divorce. 
Majies (Majlis) The Iranian national assembly or parliament. 
Mujahedeen Warrior for God 
Nafagheh Maintenance or alimony, in Shia Iran a husband is responsible, during 
the whole period of marriage, for the maintenance and keep-up of his wife and 
children. Nafaghe is also payable after divorce by a man to a woman if she has 
child custody. 
Namahram Men or women who are forbidden to each other. 
Rejal Statesmen 
Roposh A long and loose dress with long sleeves, the dominant form of hejab in 
Iran since 1981 
Savak The Secret Police under the Pahlavi 
Shamsi Solar 
Sharia Islamic canonical law. Refers to the totality of Islamic rules, encompassing 
all affairs of the Muslim community. 
Shia A branch of Islam whose founders were partisans and followers of All, the 
Prophet's son-in-law. Shia believe that after the Prophet's death the leadership of 
Islam should have gone to All. 
Shora Workers councils during the 1979 revolution 
Shoraye Negahban The Council of Guardians, established in 1980 as a 
constitutional body in charge of reviewing/vetoing on religious grounds 
Parliamentary Bills. 
Sigheh (Muta) Used as both name and verb for temporary marriage. It is a 
practice which is confined to the Shia branch of Islam, in which every man is 
entitled to have as many sigheh wives as he wishes. It is a form of marriage based 
on a contract, which is bound by a time limit of between one hour to ninety-nine 
years. Its aim is satisfaction of sexual urges, but children born in sigheh marriages 
are legitimate. 
Tabaghe Social status 
Tisab Acid 
Ulama Islamic religious scholars 
Velayat Fagih The Guardianship of the Islamic jurisprudence. It refers to 
Ayatollah Ayatollah Khomeini's thesis about the guardianship of the fagih as the 
head of state, which constitutes the basis of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic. 
Zaifeh Literally means the weak half, a derogatory term used for women 
Zakat Islamic tax 
Zena (Zins) Fornication; adultery, sexual intercourse between men and women 
who are not married to each other. In the Islamic Republic Zena is a crime 
punishable by flogging or stoning to death. 
1V 
Chronology 
1890-1892 Protest against Tobacco Concession given to Britain. Women played 
an important role in cancelling the Concession. 
1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution establishes a Constitution and a Parliament 
Majles. Formation of diverse women's movements, resulting in the establishment 
of girls' schools in 1907. 
1917-1925 Women's participation in nationalist and communist movements 
1925 Reza Khan becomes Shah, beginning of Pahlavi dynasty. 
1935-36 Reza Shah initiates campaign to force women to abandon the veil in all 
public places. 
1938 Women are admitted to Tehran University. 
1941 August Allied forces occupy Iran, forcing Reza Shah's abdication in favour 
of his son Mohammad Reza Shah. 
1951 Mossadegh becomes Prime Minister of Iran. Nationalisation of oil. Rise of 
women's movements in nationalist and communist movements 
1953 Mossadegh is overthrown in a CIA - backed coup. 
1957 Shah's secret service, SAVAK, is created with the help of the CIA. 
1958 State control over women's movements. Various women's organisations are 
grouped into a High Council of Women. Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah's twin sister, 
heads the new organisation. 
1963 Shah declares his 'White Revolution'. Uprising against the Shah, violent 
demonstrations in major cities. Women achieve electoral rights. 
1964 Ayatollah Khomeini sent into exile, first to Turkey then to Iraq. 
1966 State control over women's movements. The Women's Organisation of Iran 
is established. 
1967 Majles passes Family Protection Laws. Women are accepted to the judiciary 
and drafted into the police and the army. 
1971 Price of crude oil increases. 
1971 Fedayeen and Mujahedeen Guerilla Organisations are established. 
1973 In Tehran the Gulf states agree to double their price of oil to $11.65 a 
barrel. 
1977 May A group of leading intellectuals protest against the Shah. 
1977 June Protest of shanty-town dwellers against slum clearances. 
1978 Formation of women's organisations 
1978 January Shah attacks Ayatollah Khomeini in the media. Theology students 
riot in Qom. 
1978 February Mass demonstrations in Tabriz. 
1978 March Spread of mass demonstrations to other urban areas. 
1978 August First wave of industrial strikes. 
1978 September Ayatollah Khomeini calls for the overthrow of the Shah. Martial 
law is declared in Tehran and 11 other cities. Black Friday: hundreds of protesters 
are killed by police in Tehran. Telecommunications and other workers go on 
strike. 
1978 October Ayatollah Khomeini is forced to leave Iraq and goes to Paris. Oil 
workers go on strike. 
1978 November Shah appoints military government. National Television 
employees go on strike. Bank workers go on strike. Ayatollah Khomeini calls for 
Islamic Republic. 
1978 December Millions protest on the streets against the Shah. General strike 
brings the economy to a halt. 
1979 January Shah flees the country. 
1979 February Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran and forms the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government. Armed insurrection. The Shah's Imperial Guard is 
defeated by revolutionaries. Army declares its neutrality. Political prisoners are 
released. Ayatollah Khomeini suspends Family Protection Laws. Formation of 
Workers Shoras. 
1979 March Issuing of decrees appointing women as judges is stopped. Women 
are dismissed from military service. Ayatollah Khomeini announces that women 
must wear the Islamic dress. Thousands of women demonstrate against 
imposition of Islamic dress. Segregation of sports and education is proposed. 
1979 April Women lawyers demand the installation of women judges. A 
referendum decides Iran is to be an Islamic Republic. 
1979 May co-education is banned. Creation of Revolutionary Guards. 
1979 June Married women are banned from attending high schools. The 
swearing-in ceremony of new judges takes place without the participation of 
women nominees. Women occupy Ministry of Justice for five days. Women 
employees of the Communication Corporation protest against the closure of the 
day-care centre at their work-place. They are threatened with mass lay-off. This is 
the first incident in the subsequent series of nursery closures. 
1979 July Many women are flogged in public on charges of swimming in the 
men's section of the Caspian Sea. Three women are executed on charges of 
prostitution and corruption. 
1979 August Government cracks down on the left, Kurds and other ethnic 
minorities. 
1979 September Ayatollah Khomeini declares Velayat Fagih by the Assembly of 
Experts. At the School of Divinity in Mashhad University segregated classes are 
instituted. 
1979 October New family legislation is ratified by the Council of Revolution 
giving right to divorce, sighe and custody of children exclusively to men. 
Women's demonstrations against the new legislation is attacked by Hezbollah. 
1979 November Women occupy Ministry of Justice against the new family law. 
Tehran's prostitute quarter is closed. Over 50 hostages are taken from the US 
embassy. The conference of Women's Solidarity Council is held by candlelight, as 
the electricity supply of Tehran Polytechnic was cut off by the authorities in an 
attempt to stop the conference. 
1979 December The Islamic Constitution is ratified. 
1980 February Wearing of Islamic dress is made compulsory for nurses and 
other women employees of the Ministry of Health. 
1980 March Four women are elected to the new Majles. 
1980 April US imposes economic sanctions. Closure of the 'universities for 
"Islamic Cultural Revolution". 
1980 May Fatimah's birthday (daughter of Prophet Mohammad) is declared as 
Women's Day in Iran. Women are attacked and knifed in urban areas for not 
complying with Islamic dress and shops refuse to sell goods to them: 
1980 June Ayatollah Khomeini issues a decree that women are required to wear 
the Islamic dress. 
1980 July Implementation of compulsory Islamic dress starts. Women who do 
not comply are dismissed from their jobs. Women's demonstrations are attacked 
by Hezbollah 
1980 September The beginning of Iran/Iraq war. 
1981 July The Bill of Retribution is ratified. 
1981 November Maryam Behrouzi, a delegation of Majles representatives 
attends the China Population Conference and declares that abortion and 
sterilisation are against Islamic rules. 
1981 All political organisations, women's organisations and workers' 
organisations are banned and ceased to exist. 
1982 The government presents a draft bill on women's part-time work to the 
Majles. 
1984 Zane Rouz Women's Magazine criticises the state policy on polygamy for 
being lax on men and unjust to women. Three of the existing women Majles 
deputies are re-elected. Women's entry to a whole range of technical, engineering 
and experimental sciences is prohibited. 
1985 January The High Council of Judiciary announces that a special civil appeal 
court has been set up to look into those family disputes which has not been 
satisfactorily resolved by the Sharia courts. This signifies the failure of the system 
and women's growing protest against the system. 
1985 Zane Rouz Women's Magazine continues to discuss the problems of unclear 
law, uncoordinated court verdicts and unsatisfactory treatment of women by the 
courts. 
1986 Iran continues to export Im b/d of oil despite the war. Reagan admits arm 
sales to Iran. OPEC cuts production to increase price of oil, which reaches $13 a 
barrel. 
1987 OPEC agrees to increase production by 5% and maintain $18 a barrel price. 
1988 Iran accepts UN Security Resolution 598, for immediate cease-fire. The 
state initiates a public debate about population control and the dangers of 
uncontrolled population growth. The three existing women Majles deputies are 
re-elected. 
1989 May The policy on women's entry to higher education becomes less 
restrictive. It is announced that restrictions on women's entry to geology and 
agriculture are lifted. 
1989 June Ayatollah Khomeini dies, Hashemi Rafsanjani is elected as President. 
1989 July The Ministry of Health announces the government's policy on 
population control, based on distribution of free contraceptives through health 
centres in rural and urban areas which would cover 90% of the population. 
1989 Women's magazines discuss methods of birth control extensively and 
recommend a wide variety of contraception. An authoritative collection of the 
Islamic Republic's family laws brought together a number of sources of guidance 
on the family including the Civil Code of 1931, The Family Protection Law of 
1967 and 1975, The Special Civil Courts Act 1979, other legislations passed by 
the Majles and the various decrees by Ayatollah Khomeini. 
1990 Iranian President defends his policy of encouraging foreign investment. 
1990 Ayatollah Sanei expresses strong Islamic opposition against polygamy and 
raised the question of the acceptability of abortion as a method of birth control. 
1992 The Office of Women's Affairs is created. Nine women are elected to the 
Majles. 
1992 November-December Zanan women's magazine is published for the first 
time and publishes a series of articles challenging the established view that women 
cannot become judges. 
1993 Autumn Farzaneh women's magazine is published for the first time and 
publishes a series of articles on women's high position in Islam. 
1995 September A large number of delegates attend Beijing Conference on 
Women. 
1996 January The Ministry of Justice appoints 200 women judicial counsellors 
to preserve more satisfactorily women's rights in courts. 
1996 March - April Majles election, one hundred and ninety women candidates 
campaign for change in the law and better education and employment legislations 
for women. Thirteen women are elected to the Majles. 
1996 October The Majles approves a motion presented by women deputies to 
create the Special Commission of Women's and Family's Affairs to reform laws to 
improve the protection of women's rights. 
1997 July Nine women stand for the presidential election as a form of protest 
that women cannot become president. Women's magazines campaign in favour of 
Khatami the pragmatic candidate who becomes president, as oppose to Ayatollah 
Nouri the hard line cleric. Women's votes played an important role for president 
Khatami's victory. 
Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between changes in 
women's employment, Islamic gender relations and the Iranian state. Initially the 
research tried to explain the growth in women's employment in Iran. But in the 
course of the field research it became apparent that this issue cannot be separated 
from the wider issues of the role of the state and economic and ideological factors 
which are historically determined and therefore changing at different periods. The 
contradictions arising from this complex relationship also raises the issue of 
women's resistance and the role of social class in this resistance which involve an 
overlap between secularity and religiosity. in the particular period under 
investigation (1980s-1990s). 
The thesis argues that women's struggle for change has led to a questioning of 
gender relations. This in its turn has challenged Islamic theology and thereby the 
Iranian theocratic state with the result that the state has been forced to adapt its 
ideological position and practices. - It is further argued that, whereas Islamic 
theology and the state treat women as an unitary category, women's responses to 
employment and to the state have been differentiated by their socio-economic 
position and level of religiosity. Women in Iran are not a homogeneous category 
therefore it is necessary to analyse the experiences of employment of women of 
different classes and with different levels of religiosity. This makes it possible to 
assess the nature of their struggle for change and the impact which this has had on 
state ideology and on gender relations in both the public and the private spheres. 
There are two objectives for researching the specific issue of women's experiences 
within the labour market and the labour force: Firstly, my personal interest and 
1 
commitment to, the role of women in Iran. After some years in exile, the 1979 
revolution provided an opportunity for me to go back to Iran and become 
politically active in the revolutionary movement. My activities within the women's 
movement and in particular my involvement with women workers in their struggle 
within workers shoras (councils or grassroots trade union movements) which 
developed in this period in Iran inspired me and created the rationale for 
researching the issue of women's employment. 
My second objective is to solve an academic puzzle - the interaction between 
economic factors, ideological factors and women's responses. Thus, there are a 
number of questions that I am investigating: 
- How women's employment even within an Islamic framework, has undermined 
the Islamic state's ideology of female seclusion and its stated gender relationships? 
- How women responded to economic forces and the ideological under-pinning of 
the Iranian state? 
- How the issue of women's employment is related to the wider issues of the role 
of the state, class and ideology. 
This research is also original in a number of ways: 
Women's employment has not yet been described, identified, analysed and 
included within Iranian women's studies. 
- This omission is the result of giving too much attention to the importance of 
ideology and not taking into consideration the interaction between ideology, 
economy and gender. 
2 
- This field research based on women's life histories and work histories provided 
the ground for identifying research questions and locating different theoretical 
approaches for analysing and explaining the research questions. 
The aim of the research is not purely academic. As an Iranian woman of a specific 
background and experience, I am included in the product of this research. My 
objective is, therefore, to contribute to the debate on women's issues in Iran in the 
hope that this will produce a greater understanding which locates women at the 
centre of the analysis of development, rather than at the periphery, and has a 
practical outcome in terms of showing both women and policy makers the 
importance of this issue. 
1.2 The Iranian revolution and the development of the Islamic state 
In February 1979 the regime of the oppressive modernising Pahlavi rulers of Iran 
(Reza Shah, 1925-1941, and Mohammad Reza Shah, 1941-1979) was 
overthrown by a popular revolution. The large scale participation of women in the 
revolutionary movement raised hopes that the role of women in Iranian society 
would change. 
The state under the Pahlavi, as the agent of economic development, created 
favourable conditions for the expansion of capital. But it strengthened patriarchal 
structures throughout the society. In this thesis I use patriarchy to mean a set of 
power relations which explains women's subordination to men. Therefore, women 
experienced the economic, political and social changes differently to that of men. 
Through women's struggles for change a degree of reforms was achieved. These 
reforms, however, only touched the lives of a minority of women who had access 
to material resources. As a result, women's reaction to these changes were 
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different according to their class and level of religiosity (different levels of 
adherence to religious ideology). Consequently, there were at least two different 
groups of women in the revolutionary movements of the 1978 - 1979. Many 
women were participating because they were dissatisfied with the reforms which 
were made under the Pahlavi system, because they did not go far enough. At the 
same time, there were also many women who supported the revolution because 
they supported the Islamic leaders and their criticisms of the Pahlavi state, 
including their view that the role of women is distinct from that of men. 
In April 1979 a referendum decided that Iran was to be an Islamic Republic under 
the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The reinforcement of Islamic gender 
relations was a major feature of the ideology of the new rulers. For years prior to 
the 1979 revolution, and especially after the establishment of the Islamic state, 
prominent Shia ulama (Islamic Shia scholars) such as Shariati (1990; 1990/1), 
Khomeini (1987/8), Mottahari (1981) and Nouri (1964/5)1 criticised the Pahlavi 
reforms for promoting a capitalist and imperialist culture of consumerism, which 
included, for them specifically, the selling of women's labour. They argued that 
these reforms resulted in fesad (moral degeneration) and the breaking down of 
family values. In contrast they preached the ideology of seclusion, the complete 
withdrawal of women from the public sphere of employment and their 
confinement to the private sphere of the home. At the heart of this position was a 
belief in the biological differences between the sexes, that reproduction is the 
basic law of nature, and that within this process, biological men and women have 
specific roles and functions. They strongly emphasised the natural and biological 
relations between the sexes, arguing that women's primary activity is in the home, 
nurturing and creating an atmosphere of shelter and comfort for their family. 
To assess the state's policies towards women it is important to divide the history 
of the post 1979 period into three different phases of Islamisation. Although there 
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are overlaps between different periods, each exhibited distinct characteristics in 
terms of women's employment. These are: 
(i) - 1979 - 1981, the revolutionary period. 
(ii) - 1981'- 1989, the period of Iran - Iraq war and the war economy. 
(iii) - 1989 - 1990s, the period of post war, post Ayatollah Khomeini and 
reconstruction. 
(i) In the period immediately after the 1979 revolution, the principles of Islamic 
gender relations were implemented as the policy and practice of the Iranian state. 
The state adopted the policy of seclusion of women - restricting women to the 
private domestic domain which required the complete exclusion of women from 
the public sphere. 
During this period the Islamic state attempted to push women back to total 
dependence on men and family by reasserting the importance of the sphere of the 
home for women, family and the role of women and family in producing the ideal 
Islamic society free from the "corruption" and "moral degeneration" of the 
Pahlavi Period. The aim of the state was, therefore, to exclude women from 
economic, social and political activities outside of the home, which were now 
constituted as public activities. Instead the state wanted to confine them to 
reproductive activities inside the home such as the bearing and rearing of children, 
and the care, socialisation and maintenance of the family, which were constituted 
as private. This was reflected in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
which emphasised women's priority in the home (Algar 1980). Also under the 
influence of the ulama, and in accordance with the Quran's view that women are 
only half the worth of men in legal and financial matters (Quran 1955: verse 282), 
and are too emotional and weak to be able to make hard decisions, women were 
excluded from professions such as managers and judges. 
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Women were offered voluntary redundancies, early retirement and part-time work 
in order to have time to fulfil their duty of motherhood. The state also 
implemented the policy of segregation - separate spheres for women in the public 
domain, as another step towards the exclusion of women from the public domain. 
Therefore, a set of practices was established, designed to control women's 
participation in the public sphere of the economy ranging from Islamic dress, 
separate seats and queues for males and females in all public places, to a rigid 
sexual segregation within the law, education and employment -a form of sexual 
apartheid (Poya 1992). 
(ii) However, this period was a very short period. The Iran - Iraq war which 
started in September 1980 required some rethinking of this extreme position. 
Whereas the policy of seclusion which was adopted in the period immediately 
following the 1979 revolution required the complete exclusion of women from the 
public sphere, the policy of segregation accepts their limited and controlled 
involvement on the basis of the physical segregation of the sexes in all public 
spheres of life. 
During the Iran - Iraq war (1980-1988), despite the Islamic gender ideology, a 
number of factors forced women to go out to work to feed their families. These 
factors included economic necessity arising from the flight of men to the war 
zones, inflation and a general level of unemployment as a result of Iran's isolation 
in the world market, intensified by the war and the war economy. Although there 
was a high level of male unemployment, these unemployed men were neither 
trained nor willing to do 'women's jobs' such as nursing, teaching, secretarial and 
administrative work. Women were also absorbed by the growing service sector. 
This was as a result of the nationalisation of banks and insurance companies after 
the 1979 revolution, which extended state employment. The Islamic state also 
confiscated industries and farms owned by the Pahlavi royal family and their close 
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associates which further increased state employment. The number of female state 
employees here also increased in consequence. 
(iii) The end of the war with Iraq in 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1989 ushered in a third phase in the development of the Iranian state, effectively 
ending the policy and practice of "neither east nor west but Islamic republic", 
adopted by the Islamic state in the previous years, although the rhetoric remained 
strong. Opportunities for reducing Iran's isolation in the world market were 
developed by a gradual open door policy to the West. Generally the level of 
employment increased as a result of post war reconstruction. But 'a combination 
of inflation and male inability and unwillingness to perform women's jobs, has 
continued the necessity for women's participation. 
This thesis will argue that the role of the war is also important as an event that 
raised ideological issues. The state used the war to promote the ideology of 
nationalism which played a significant role to legitimise its hegemony. The images 
of Iranian Muslim women became central representations of the politics of 
cultural autonomy and anti-Western and anti-imperialism. But these ideological 
factors interacted with material factors and affected women's expectations, and 
their position within the family and in the labour market. This sheds light on the 
limitation of the importance of ideological factors affecting women's position in 
the economy and society in a situation where economic pressures made a 
particular impact. Thus, this field research challenges the orthodox academic 
debate on this issue and the assumption that either the negative or positive aspects 
of Islamic ideology determine women's position. 
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1.3 The role of ideology 
In each of the three periods outlined above the Iranian state sought different ways 
of reconciling the reality of economic development and women's response to 
employment with Islamic ideology. In the first phase (1979 -1981), an ideal 
Islamic image of Muslim womanhood was constructed on the model of the lives 
of women of early Islam, such as Fatimah, daughter of the prophet Mohammad 
and Zaynab, his grand daughter. 
Their lives were celebrated for representing and symbolising motherhood and 
womanhood: Fatimah, the perfect mother and wife in the domestic sphere, and 
Zaynab, who fought alongside her brothers in the battlefields but who returned in 
peace time to take up her exalted responsibilities as a good wife and mother, 
educating the new generation of Muslim men and women (Khomeini 1987/8). 
This image of Zaynab allowed the Islamic state to justify women's participation in 
the revolutionary period, despite its stated ideology that women's place is in the 
home. Initially, the state exploited the mobilisation of women by claiming that it 
was only a transition period to a truly Islamic state. During the revolutionary 
period the state benefited ideologically from mass participation of religious 
women wearing the chador (long black veil) in street demonstrations. Later 
during the first years of the war with Iraq, the state and the economy materially 
and ideologically benefited from the unpaid work of large number of women in 
the mosques, who communally produced food and medical aid for the soldiers. 
The voluntary nature of the work allowed the Islamic state to continue to use the 
image of Zaynab in justification. Later as large numbers of women obtained 
payment for their work outside of the home, the state still used this form of 
religious moralising to justify what should have been unjustifiable. 
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During the second and third phases (1981-1989 and 1989-1990s) when, as we 
have seen, factors such as inflation, male unemployment and the war economy 
increased women's active participation in the workforce, the state continued to 
use the dual roles of Fatimah and Zaynab to ideologically justify the return of 
women to the workforce in large numbers but it still argued that women's 
activities in the public sphere of life were only justified as a temporary phase, 
similar to the active role of Zaynab in war, compared to her more passive stance 
in peace. However, this temporary phase has been prolonged. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, more and more families have been relying on 
auxiliary or solely female earnings. The new generation has been politically and 
educationally socialised that a woman's place is in the home yet their personal 
experiences are very different. Moreover, in the same way that women who 
participated in the revolutionary, phase experienced the importance of their 
contribution to the political movement, those who of necessity entered the 
workforce during and after the war against Iraq came to realise how important 
their economic contribution was to their families. This experience has raised the 
consciousness of women generally. As a result, the Islamic state has sought to 
reconcile the problem of its stated gender ideology and the reality of women's 
situation by introducing, alongside the dual role for women as Fatimah and 
Zaynab, the concept of segregation. 
The systematic use of the two images of ideal Muslim women (Fatimah and 
Zaynab) and the process of segregation may be seen as a retreat from the ideal of 
seclusion. But I will argue that segregation has been relatively successful as a 
device to reconcile the needs of the economy with that of maintaining the 
ideological basis on which the state depends for its support. Although reluctantly, 
this policy and practice allowed the state to perpetuate women's employment, in a 
way which could be accommodated within its ideology. It has also been a 
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powerful instrument to place women in a disadvantaged position within the 
employment hierarchy. Women are easily, therefore, be excluded from upward 
mobility and are concentrated in low-paid and low-position jobs. 
This change in the position of the state allowed me to establish a conceptual 
framework within which the link between the findings of the field research and the 
academic debate about the relationship between gender and development could be 
analysed. In this thesis I challenge the orthodox debate about the sexual division 
of labour and social relations between women and men2. I have used these 
analytical concepts differently within the context of Iran in the particular period 
under investigation and I have arrived at a different outcome. 
I use the concept of sexual division of labour within the context of Islamisation of 
state, economy and society to show how -women were initially excluded from 
participating in the labour market and the labour force: but later were included as 
a result of the war and change in economic circumstances. However, I will argue 
that, despite women's increasing participation in the economy and society, gender 
social relations place women in a disadvantageous position within the labour 
market and the tabour force. 
I use the concept of social relations between women and men in the context of 
gendered roles in the home and in the wider society, including employment, to 
show patriarchal relations3. But I have used patriarchal relations within the 
context of class relations and level of religiosity to examine the change in the form 
and the degree of patriarchy under the Islamic state by analysing the structure of 
the labour market, the wage gap between women and men, the role of the state, 
the role of men and women within the family and in employment. 
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Furthermore, the analysis of women's employment and Islamic gender relations 
also provided a framework within which to consider the academic debate on state, 
capital and patriarchy in developing countries4. This thesis will argue that the 
Islamic state under economic pressure is committed to development within global 
capitalism, however, under ideological pressure constantly seek effective ways of 
patriarchal domination. This has created contradiction and conflicts between 
genders at the level of family, state and society and women constantly finding 
ways of rebelling against these forms of patriarchal relationships. 
1.4 Women's responses 
This thesis will also address women's resistance through an analysis of class and 
the overlap between class, secularity and religiosity. It will be argued that the 
response of women to state policy has differed according to their class and level 
of religiosity. Through an analysis of gender relations within the context of 
indigenous class formation and class structure I was able to examine the local 
perceptions of middle class and working class women. I will, argue that these 
widely used phrases refer to different socio-economic status, but both groups of 
women have the same relationship to the system of social production. That is they 
are dependent upon the sale of their labour power for survival. The distinction 
between them is the degree of access to material resources and political power, as 
a result of the influence of the state and capital. Another equally important 
distinction is the influence of religion, cross-cutting these divisions, producing 
different levels of religiosity. The resulting form of social division has expression 
in terms of a division of labour within the family and in paid employment; in 
gender relationships within the family and outside in the wider society; in attitudes 
to male and female roles in fertility, sexuality and education, and in power, 
income, wealth and even world view. 
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The fact that class and ideological differences divide women, even though there 
are also issues that they face together, has produced different responses to the 
policies of the Islamic state from two main groups of women, each of which 
experienced internal contradictions. On the one hand, religious women may 
accept the ideology of the Islamic state which emphasises women's place in the 
home, but meanwhile they demand reforms and equality with men in both the 
spheres, of the home and of employment - until the ideal Islamic state and society 
is established and there is no need for women to go out to work. On the other 
hand secular women, or those who may be religious but do not practise religion, 
also demand equality with men and they question the nature of the Islamic state 
and its male dominated gender relations. More importantly, they wish to fulfil 
their potential through active participation in employment and career mobility but 
Islamic ideology is so strong that they have little choice other than to accept the 
hegemony of the state and therefore, to compromise. 
The point of this thesis is to argue that the specific characteristics of the Islamic 
state mean that the way women in Iran have entered the public sphere of life is 
different to that of other women in other societies, and even in Iran, in 
comparison with the period prior to Islamisation of the state. These 
characteristics have also determined a form of state sponsored patriarchy, which 
exploits women's participation in the public arena, meanwhile, systematically 
threatening women's mobility and security through the promotion of the idea that 
women's place is in the home. 
Women's ideas are shaped by both material and ideological factors. Women of 
different classes and with different levels of religiosity have different notions of 
what liberation is and how to achieve it. Working class and middle class women 
who are religious accept the view that Islamic gender relations liberate women 
from exploitation of consumerism, imposed by western capitalism. The majority 
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of these women support the state ideology, including its gender relations but they 
have found a growing conflict between holding on to Islamic ideology on the one 
hand and their economic, social and even personal material interests. 
Some middle class women who may not be religious see the Islamic state as 
marginalising and oppressing women and they, therefore, oppose the Islamic 
state, even though they have no choice other than to comply with its rules and 
regulations. Nevertheless, as economic necessity bites deeper, women, whatever 
their class and levels of religiosity, press harder for reforms and equality with 
men. These struggles, however, take place within the Islamic framework and 
rhetoric, as no form of secularism is tolerated. Nevertheless, women are finding 
ways of raising secular issues within the Islamic framework. Different organs of 
the media, especially numerous women's newspapers and magazines discuss 
feminism, patriarchy, gender relations and even women's position within the 
family, education, law and employment under the Islamic state in Iran. Interaction 
through the media has created a form of unity between women of different classes 
and with different levels of religiosity and they demand change and reform. Within 
this framework, a limited degree of reform is being achieved, similar to the 
reforms made under the Pahlavi period. 
The evidence and the level of success in improving women's status can be found 
through material factors which are measurable such as women's participation in 
politics, reformed laws on family, education and employment and the use of media 
by women. It can also be found in immeasurable factors, affecting the personal 
lives of women and men and their modes of negotiation. It can be noted for 
example, in the way middle class religious women who are constrained by the 
ideology; and poorer women, who are not only constrained by the ideology but 
have less access to material resources, feel about holding onto the ideology but 
behaving differently. Also, the way secular or less religious women who are less 
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constrained by the ideology but have more access to material resources, attempt 
to improve their status, even though their participation in the labour force is 
limited by the ideology which systematically emphasises a segregated labour force 
and labour market where female workers within the Islamic frame work are 
temporary. 
The argument of this thesis, based on a field research in Iran, is of considerable 
contemporary relevance because: 
- The state has the power to transform gender relations but it is also constrained 
by its own strategic imperatives: to expand the economy, to wage war, to reward 
allies and to deflect internal dissent. 
- The patriarchal power of men, even when backed by state power, is never 
unitary: men's interests are divided and contradictory; they cannot unite around a 
policy which inhibits women from economic participation because some men's 
interests will dictate the use of patriarchal power to exploit female labour whilst 
the interests of others demand female exclusion. 
Thus, my hypothesis is to prove that in the particular period under investigation 
(1980s-1990s) women's employment even within an Islamic framework, has 
undermined the Islamic state's ideology of female seclusion and its stated gender 
relationships. This is as a result of women's organised and individual responses to 
economic forces and the ideological under-pinning of the Iranian state. 
1.5 Chapter summaries 
Chapter two will discuss the difficult task of gathering evidence in Iran and why 
the study of feminist critiques of quantitative methods of analysis led me to use a 
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combination of qualitative methods, whilst still using quantitative data to test the 
validity of explanations. This chapter will also discuss the importance of 
interviews and how they helped me to identify different analytical tools to explain 
the interaction between economic and ideological factors which shaped women's 
employment in Iran and women's responses to these factors according to their 
social differentiation. 
Based on interviews and women's experiences of employment under the Islamic 
state I identified two different themes of analysis: first, women's employment and 
gender relations in the home and the society; second, the interaction between 
ideological factors and economic factors in shaping women's employment. 
Therefore, in chapter three I critically review the general debate on the 
relationship between gender and development and the specific debate between 
Iranian secular feminists and Muslim feminists on the impact of Islamic ideology 
on women's participation in the economic sphere. The aim is to constitute a 
rationale for using the relevant theories to analyse the thesis questions and the 
thesis field work. 
In chapter four I will argue that an explanation of women's employment under the 
Islamic state requires a historical analysis of the influence of the state, capital and 
religion. In the twentieth century, the inter-relationships between the process of 
capitalist development under foreign domination; Shia Islam ideology and class 
formation determined the way women were incorporated into the public sphere of 
life. Women actively participated in and responded to economic and ideological 
forces which led to the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s and provided a material 
basis for struggle against their subordination which was reflected in the 1979 
revolution. 
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In February 1979, a popular revolution overthrew the Pahlavi state. In April 1979 
a referendum decided to make Iran an Islamic Republic. Chapter five will discuss 
the Islamic state's economic system in isolation from the global economy, and the 
Islamic gender and employment policy which aimed at excluding women from the 
labour force. In this chapter, I will discuss the way in which throughout 1979- 
1981 the Islamic state strengthened patriarchal relationships by undoing the 
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s and how a process of sex segregation was a step 
towards the exclusion of women form the public domain, especially employment, 
and the way women responded differently to the process of segregation. 
Chapter six will discuss the period of Iran-Iraq war (1981-1988). It will be 
argued that under the pressure from the war economy, the Islamic state had to 
end its isolationist economic policy. Also despite its ideology, the state was 
forced to change its gender and employment policy as the demand for and the 
supply of female labour increased. The state used the process of segregation to 
both accommodate the economic needs of the families to women's earnings and to 
maintain its ideology. Therefore, under economic pressure, the state was unable 
to exclude women from the workforce, but it used different ways of limiting and 
controlling the supply of female labour which placed women in a disadvantaged 
position within the labour market. 
Chapter seven will demonstrate that a comparison of statistical data for pre 1979, 
1980s and 1990s show that despite the initial attempt by the Islamic state to 
exclude women from employment, women's participation in the labour force has 
not changed. Moreover, the state, under economic pressure and women's 
responses had to revert back to the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s and abandon 
the Sharia interpretation of the laws and regulations which were initially designed 
to marginalise women in the economic sphere. The family law, the education and 
employment regulations were reformed and allowed women a greater 
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participation in the public domain. However, despite reforms, the theocratic 
state's foundation remain based on patriarchal relationships at the level of the state 
and the family which influences the structure of the labour market and places 
women in a subordinate position. 
Chapter eight will discuss women's political responses in their varied ways to 
patriarchal gender relations. It will be argued that the reforms which were made in 
the 1980s and 1990s were the result of women's responses to the limitations of 
the state's policy on gender relations. The state, under economic pressure, was 
unable to abolish women's labour, but systematically continued to press hard for 
the ideology of women's place in the home. Women's participation in the labour 
market politicised them and raised gender consciousness to a degree which had 
never been experienced by previous generations. Religious women who 
participated in the making of the Islamic state and the suppression of the secular 
women's movement in the early 1980s changed their position in the 1990s. They 
sought a form of unity with secular women and debated women's issues within the 
media. This organised form of political struggle for change combined with 
women's individual responses to patriarchal relationships at home, at workplaces 
and the wider society has challenged Islamic theology and thereby the Iranian 
theocratic state. 
Notes 
1. The date of publication of sources in Farsi (The official and dominant language 
in Iran) are according to the Iranian calendar. The Iranian Shamsi (Solar) calendar 
year starts on March 21. An Iranian year may be converted to the international 
year by adding 621. For example, the Iranian year 1343 refers to the period 
March 21,1964, to March 20,1965. Thus, throughout the thesis I have used this 
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system of conversion for all the Farsi sources where their date of publication is 
according to the Iranian calendar. 
2. This debate was pioneered by Ester Boserup's study of women in the process 
of economic development in 1970 and is still the dominant debate. For a critical 
review of this debate see Pearson (1994 and 1992). 
3. For this discussion see Wallby (1990); Mies (1986); Elson and Pearson (1984) 
and Mackintosh (1984). 
4. For this discussion see Moghadam (1993b) and Chhachhi (1991). 
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Chapter Two 
Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the methodology used in this thesis. The research data 
includes primary sources: eighty interviews which took place at different stages 
between 1989 -1992 with women across occupations, and a group interview 
consisting of eight men and women in 1996, at the time of the parliamentary 
elections; 500 questionnaires which were distributed in 1990 and were collected 
in 1991 and 1992 and general observation at different stages during 1989 - 1996. 
The research data also includes secondary materials such as volumes of official 
statistics, press reports, legislation, and published and unpublished research on 
women in Iran in general as well as specific data about women and employment in 
Iran. The study of materials in Farsi involved the translation of the appropriate 
materials from Farsi to English. 
The gathering of evidence in Iran between 1989 - 1992 was a problematic task. 
The study of feminist debates on qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis 
helped me to identify the appropriate method of gathering evidence for this thesis. 
In this chapter I will discuss why I used a combination of qualitative methods 
derived from different disciplines: sociology, anthropology, and oral history and 
why I use interviews with women workers, as the most important research 
material. The role of class and the overlap between secularity and religiosity 
played a significant role in the analysis of women's employment. Thus an 
examination of the indigenous class system in relation to the existing literature on 
this issue is necessary. Taking into consideration the local perceptions of class 
differentiation and referring to the debate on gender and class formation in 
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developing countries I will also explain why I use the Marxian categories of class 
to refer to my respondents. 
I will also discuss the role of interviews in constructing the thesis questions and 
arguments and how I found sociological, anthropological and oral history 
methodology useful to eliciting individuals' own personal stories and experiences 
and explaining the conflicts and struggles which my respondents had faced and 
were facing in employment. This method allowed me to be an active participant 
by listening to my interviewees while also attending to my own response and 
trying to learn more from each woman. By using questionnaires and statistics I 
have also accumulated some quantitative data and I have used these data to 
gather and examine evidence in order to test the validity of the qualitative data. 
2.2 Qualitative method verses quantitative method. 
Throughout the last three decades feminist researchers have challenged the way 
social sciences have analysed women's issues. The starting point is the criticism of 
traditional methods of analysis which are male biased. That is, the questions 
which are raised and the ways set up to answer those questions are not from the 
perspective of female experiences. Stanley (1990) and Harding (1987) have 
argued that this approach has structured the creation of a male orientated 
epistemology and has excluded women from being the knowers. Moreover, this 
approach distorts our understanding of social life, as it ignores the ways gender 
shapes the social life of women and men differently. 
Squires also provides a critical but nevertheless important case for using the 
qualitative research method. She argues that the merit of a women-centred 
subjective approach is that it revalues the very notion of objectivity and 
subjectivity. Women's personal and work experience challenges male values and 
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the construction of male knowledge, which does not reveal women's activities and 
contribution. In this context subjective methods are used as an alternative way of 
knowing (Squires 1989: 3 8-49). 
She also argues that females are not one homogeneous category. Feminist 
theories and methodologies can be constructed based on women's experiences of 
material issues at particular historical period which can explain "the social 
relations between the sexes and the patriarchal relationships in relation to class 
and culture" (ibid: 49). 
There are other criticisms. Graham (1983); Morgan (1981) and Stacey (1981) 
have argued that the survey method is limited and is not appropriate for counting 
women's contribution and analysing the social relationships between women and 
men in the home and at work. Jayaratne (1983: 142-43) and Oakley (1981) have 
also argued that the use of qualitative research has the advantage of reflecting 
women's experiences as a whole. 
Jayaratne makes a number of important points about the inadequacy of 
quantitative research for the analysis of women's work. Firstly she argues that in a 
quantitative research process, theory generates hypotheses which are then tested 
by research methodologies. Questionnaires and interviews measure aspects of the 
theory. The validity of the questions is tested by pilot studies. Before analysis, 
responses are quantified to facilitate analysis. Most analyses are statistical 
judgements which in turn test the hypotheses which are generated from the 
theory. This process might be appropriate for some research, but it is limited for 
analysing women's activities which are mostly not counted and are 
unremunerated. Therefore, she suggests that qualitative research allows. a variety 
of methodologies which are more suitable for the analysis of women's activities, 
their paid and unpaid work; in and for the family (1983; 142-43). 
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Secondly in the quantitative or traditional research process, the data are analysed 
as numerical values. The purpose of the research process is to gather and examine 
evidence in order to test the validity of an explanation. This is a continuous 
process and no theory is ever proven correct. To feminist researchers this is 
unacceptable, as feminist theories, grounded in women's experiences, are aimed at 
improving the lives of women (ibid: 141). 
Thirdly if existing theories seem inadequate to reflect the reality of women's work 
and women's lives, we could develop and add to the existing theories by relying 
on our findings based on women's experiences (ibid: 142-43) 
In my research, I have used a degree of quantitative research methods, but not for 
the purpose of generating hypotheses which are then tested by research 
methodology. I have used the numerical data to gather and examine evidence in 
order to test the validity of an explanation. I have also used the existing theories 
to understand women's experiences, aiming to add to the existing theories by 
relying on my findings based on women's experiences. 
As interviews are my most important research materials I found a case study or 
oral history methodology useful to explain the conflicts and struggles (both past 
and present) which my respondents have been facing in employment. In an oral 
history cross analysis; the oral evidence or a detailed analysis of the interviews is 
treated as a quarry from which to construct an argument (Thompson 1988: 238). 
This method has the merit of involving the individual's and groups' emotions and 
feelings and shows the conflicts and struggles that respondents are involved in. 
But it is also open to the criticism that it is too subjectivist. 
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Jayaratne identifies three main criticisms: Firstly, questions are open ended and 
answers could be long descriptions of the respondents feelings. Secondly, this 
qualitative answer is used to formulate a qualitative analysis. Thirdly, case 
histories do not permit generalisation, while generalisation is important for policy 
formation (Jayaratne 1983: 156-7). 
Jayaratne, however, suggests the use of certain aspects of Freudian psychology as 
good examples of generalisation from a non-representative sample which make a 
qualitative method systematic and scientific. She identifies three stages in the 
researcher's analysis: 
In the first stage the researcher is attempting to uncover the structure of an 
experience and therefore takes each bit of the subject's report and 
scrutinizes it to uncover its meaning. Crucial to this process is a way of 
thinking termed imaginal variation, in which a given feeling, thought or 
outcome is compared with other possibilities. The second stage of analysis 
involves construction of analytical categories that emerge from the themes 
identified in the first stage. to the greatest extent possible, one strives to 
allow the categories to emerge from the data themselves, rather than from a 
preconceived theoretical or empirical framework. Finally the research 
attempts to describe the relationships among the various categories in order 
to identify the pattern or structure of the experience - the ways in which the 
elements combine to create a unified whole. This approach is wholly 
qualitative and rigorously systematic (Jayaratne and Stewart 1991: 93). 
I have therefore, attempted to use this method, as I feel that in the first stage, as 
an active participant I was listening to my interviewees while also attending to my 
own response and trying to learn more from each woman. Also as Anderson and 
Jack (1991: 19) have pointed out, each work history taught me a new dimension 
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of women and work. I scrutinised the meaning of different issues which emerged 
from each interview and I tried to understand and compare the experiences of 
each woman with another which were different according to their social 
differentiation. In the second stage, I identified three main themes of analysis 
which emerged from my data: the sexual division of labour; social relations 
between genders and the patriarchal gender relationships at the level of state and 
society, and in the third stage my intention was to find a relationship between 
these analytical concepts and the pattern of women's work experiences in Iran. 
The appropriate use of both quantitative and qualitative methods have also been 
considered satisfactory to promote feminist theory and goals (Harding 1987 and 
Jayaratne 1983). For example, Harding suggests the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods as feminist research tools ie using methods which can best 
answer particular research questions. But always using them in ways which are 
consistent with broad feminist goals and ideology (Harding 1987). 
Taking into consideration the debate over the merits and demerits of qualitative 
and quantitative research methods and my research questions I have used any and 
every means available for investigating the conditions of employment for women 
in Iran. Interviews, however, are my most important research materials. My hope 
is that the findings of the thesis could be used to inform policy proposals, to 
improve women's lives in Iran and to contribute to the larger collectivity of 
women and the link between gender and economy. 
As Chanfrault - Duchet (1991: 90) has argued, interviews with a relatively small 
sample of women can be used in a way which is considered as qualitative, 
systematic and is aimed at theory development. Equally important, this form of 
analysis allows a historical analysis of women as fully historical persons who 
struggle to improve their status. She also argues that this approach is scientific 
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and is in the interest of women for it uses precise notions, theories and processes 
whose results will return to women and ultimately to society. 
It is my hope that my field data relating to oral history will add to feminist 
consciousness, as an exchange for -my respondents' help in producing this 
research, especially if this type of research will eventually lead to change in social 
relations and theoretical assumptions in the interest of women (Finch 1984: 86) I 
hope in the case of Iran this will lead to the promotion of women's status. 
2.3 Specific aspects of sociological, anthropological and oral history method. 
In this section I will discuss a number of specific aspects of sociological, 
anthropological and oral history methodology. This method is about collecting 
and analysing oral evidence about individuals' personal experience of situations 
and events. Oral evidence is the product of human action and is open to criticism 
of being biased. But it provides access to areas of unrecorded stories, power 
relationships, and the social and economic factors that determine decision making. 
The validity of the evidence or aspects of the evidence, however, can be checked 
with the documentary evidence (Bornet 1992). 
Using this method and lessons learnt from oral historians I was able to identify the 
problem with statistical information which are biased against women. For 
example, as will be discussed in chapter seven, according to the official statistics 
in 1993-94, the share of female workers in state ministries was 30%; in large 
industrial enterprises it was 6% and in small firms 6%. However, my interviews 
show that these statistics do not include different categories of women workers 
who work and effectively contribute to their families and to the national and 
international economy. These are: unpaid agricultural workers and carpet 
weavers; petty commodity producers; and a large number of women workers who 
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are employed by many medium to small private enterprises, but their employers 
do not declare them as their workforce to evade tax and insurance. 
Throughout the field research my observation also confirmed the validity of the 
interviews about women's unrecorded contributions. In the two villages that I 
visited in the North and in the East of Iran, all women agricultural workers and 
carpet weavers were unpaid family workers. Those whom I interviewed said that 
they had never been asked by the officials whether they work or not. The officials 
who visit villages ask men as the head of the households about members of 
households' economic activities. They also said that women's contribution is 
considered (by men and women) as natural and part of domestic life rather than a 
particular category of work such as agricultural work or carpet weaving. So they 
do not even appear in the official statistics as the unpaid workers. 
My observation also confirmed my interview with ten petty commodity producers 
and traders that a large number of women are engaged in this occupation. The 
female queues outside the stores and shops which sell ration coupon goods are 
much longer than the male queues. These women make a living by buying cheaply 
from the rationing system and selling expensively in the black market. Many of my 
interviewees who worked for medium to small private enterprises told me that 
none of them were registered as workers. This was confirmed by my observation 
in 1992 when I counted 150 shops, in one street in North of Tehran, selling 
female clothes. They all employed female shop assistance, on average each shop 
employed three female workers at different times of the day, and none of them 
were registered as workers. 
Thus, the oral evidence and my observation enabled me to find out firstly that 
despite the official statistics which show a large number of women work for the 
state, a much larger number of women work for small private enterprises. 
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Secondly, this is despite the pressure of ideology which makes seeking 
employment in the state enterprises desirable for women and men. Thirdly, 
women are working in variety of ways in unpaid and paid employment; to 
generate income or save, expenditure for their families and increase the standard 
of living of their families. Haggis (1990) argues that the use of different research 
methods contributes to the exclusion or inclusion of women or in another word, 
to the production of a feminist knowledge. More importantly, as Pugh (1990) 
suggests on the basis of this feminist principle, I recognised my central role as a 
researcher and sought to use that positively in the research process. 
The oral accounts also revealed the difference between women's level of earnings 
and men's level of earnings. It is recorded in the labour law that the head of the 
house hold and the bread-winner receives more wages, in terms of benefits. But it 
does not record that only a male person is considered as the bread-winner. It also 
does not record how women lose benefits because of their familial responsibilities 
and the absence of child care facilities. Some of these issues are revealed through 
the media and the official documents. But they do not reveal the difference 
between the level of women's contribution to the family in comparison with their 
husbands contribution and the unequal relationship between men and women in 
the family and in society as a whole. 
More importantly they do not reveal whether access to paid employment is 
empowering for women. For this reason I have used four variables: number of 
children; education; male financial control and women's power of decision making 
to assess change in gender relationship as a result of material and ideological 
constraints. My calculation derives from women's words, the way they described 
themselves. Two of the variables, number of children and level of education is 
compatible with the official statistics. But the others are not and can only be 
explored through oral history. 
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Finnegan (1992) argues that in oral history method, the researcher takes an active 
role by drawing sources out from people's existing knowledge and experience- 
Bornet (1992) also suggests that this method involves interpersonal interaction 
and communication skills which allow an understanding of social differentiations 
in relation to gender, class and race inequalities. 
2.4 The field research 
This research is based on eighty interviews with seventy six women in Iran over a 
period of four years (1989-1992) and a group of eight men and women in 1996. 
Four women I interviewed more than once at different times because of changes 
in their employment and personal circumstances. Fifty five women were wage 
earners and twenty five were non-wage earners. 
The wage earners included twenty seven state employees: nine nurses; five school 
teachers; four bank clerks; three secretaries; three nursery school teachers; two 
university lecturers; one Visual Display Unit (VDU) operator and twelve 
employees of private enterprises: four journalists; two VDU operators; two 
managers/supervisors; two electronic engineers; one accountant and one 
secretary/administrative officer. Five nurses, one accountant and one VDU 
operator worked in both the state and private workplaces. Within the category of 
wage earners there were also sixteen assembly line workers: ten in a cooking oil 
factory, two in a pharmaceutical industry, two in a biscuit making factory and two 
in an electronic industry. 
The twenty five non-wage earners included: ten petty commodity producers and 
traders buying cheaply from the coupon rationing system and selling them 
expensively in the black market either directly or by producing food and other 
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petty commodities for sale; nine rural agricultural / carpet weavers who were 
unpaid family workers whose products were sold by the male members of their 
families and six voluntary workers. Two of the agricultural workers/carpet 
weavers moved between unpaid family work and waged employment teaching at 
their local schools. 
2.4.1 Social differentiation amongst women 
Within Iranian studies the phrases 'working class' and 'middle class' are widely 
used without adequate analyses. They are also used by my respondents to express 
their social differentiation. These phrases are similar to the Weberian sociological 
approaches to stratification on the basis of occupation of individuals and their 
family. Although in this thesis I use these established phrases I understand them in 
the context of the broad definition of Marxian explanation of working class in 
relation to exploitation and social relations. This is because my respondents are 
divided into two categories of wage-earners and non-wage earners. Some 
consider themselves middle class and others working class. But in both cases they 
have the same relationship to the system of social production. That is they are 
dependent on selling their labour power for their livelihood. However, what 
distinguishes them from each other is the degree of access to material resources 
and the constraint imposed on them by Islamic ideology (level of religiosity). This 
is important because these distinctions determine women's responses and their 
mode of resistance to state ideology and to employment opportunities. 
In Iran, as in other developing countries, different methods of mobilising and 
organising labour in production are evident; as the wage labour market 
developed, non-wage labour persisted. As it is argued by Bernstein (1994); 
Bernstein, Johnson and Thomas (1992) and Crow, Thorpe et al (1988: 38-41), 
the transformation of developing countries from pre capitalism to capitalism in the 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries took place as part of a global process and led 
to the establishment of forms of production based on proletarian labour (capitalist 
production), semi proletarian (combines production using own means of 
production with wage labour) and petty commodity production (Household 
labour). 
As I explained above, my respondents are divided. into two categories of wage 
earners and non-wage earners. Some of the wage earners are karmand (middle to 
high status workers). Others are kargar (law status workers). Those who are 
categorised as karmand generally identify themselves as 'middle class' and those 
who are categorised as kargar generally identify themselves as 'working class'. 
However, urbanisation and family status can alter the class of individuals or 
families. For example, in my sample there are two teachers in rural areas who 
move between wage labour (as teachers) and non-wage labour (as unpaid 
agricultural workers/carpet weavers). Both of these women consider themselves 
kargar and working class rather than teacher; karmand and middle class. Also all 
the petty commodity producers and traders in Tehran despite their relative level 
of poverty consider themselves as middle class. 
The terms kannand and kargar are local perceptions of economic status and 
occupational categories defined by the labour laws. Individuals and families, 
according to these status and categories, have different degrees of access to 
money, property, education, prestige. These categories also determine the 
tabaghe (social status) of an individual or a family and become social issues 
affecting marriage choices, where people live, how they dress and how they 
furnish their homes. 
These local perceptions of working class and middle class are similar to the 
Weberian explanation of occupational categories. This view has been criticised 
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from a Marxist point of view for being descriptive on the basis of a sociological 
framework of ideas about stratification and not providing a satisfactory 
explanation of the processes of class formation, exploitative relations of 
production and social relations (Callinicos 1983). 
The sociological approach to stratification has also been criticised from a gender 
and class perspective for seeing the family, rather than the individual, as the basic 
unit of class composition based on the occupation of the male headed household 
(Barrett 1988: 124-25; Acker 1973). 
Marx (Capital 1956: 33) and Marxists (for example, Callinicos 1983 and Kay 
1979) define class with reference to relationship of ownership and control of 
means of production. Therefore, from this point of view, the proletariat is defined 
as being completely dependent on wage; and class is a social relationship through 
which one group exploits another within the process of production rather than 
what occupation they have (Cohen 1978: 73-7). 
The expansion of state employees and service industries in relation to 
manufacturing industries both in industrialised and industrialising countries in the 
second part of this century has led to debates within Marxism about the 
underlying relationship between capital and wage labour. For example, Offe 
(1985); Lukes (1984); Bauman 1982); Gorz (1982); Hobsbawm (1981) and 
Poulantzas (1975 and 1987) have argued that state employees and unproductive 
manual workers who circulate commodities and do not create surplus value are 
not part of the working class but of the new petty bourgeoisie. 
Other writers such as Wright (1989); Callinicos (1983); Mandel (1978: 38-46) 
and Bravermann (1974) have argued that both the productive and unproductive 
workers are subject to the same fundamental constraints such as non-ownership 
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of means of production; lack of direct access to the means of livelihood; 
insufficient money to purchase the means of livelihood without more or less 
continuous sale of labour-power. They are also exploited in the same way; both 
have unpaid labour extracted from them. In the case of productive labour, unpaid 
labour time is appropriated as surplus value directly, whereas in the case of 
unproductive labour it is appropriated indirectly. Therefore, all kinds of labour 
which contributes directly or indirectly to the process of social production is 
productive. The rigid application of surplus value as the criterion by which to 
judge labour productive or unproductive ignores the contribution of many 
workers to social reproduction who may not produce surplus value directly (Kay 
1979: 133) 
I will, therefore, argue that this second version of Marxian explanation can 
provide a more satisfactory analysis of class formation in relation to exploitation 
and social relations than the Weberian explanation of occupational categories. But 
from a gender and class perspective Marxist analysis is also open to criticism. For 
example, Marx also aggregates individuals into the family unit in the same way as 
in the sociological theory of stratification (Barrett 1988: 126) as he sees the typical 
wage labourer as male and women and children as substitutes for the male 
labourer (Marx 1980: 395). 
As Mies (1994: 113) argues in the process of proletarianisation "men are defined 
as wage earners and bread-winners". Therefore, a large number of women 
workers in developing countries are dependent on a male bread-winner; their 
work is not remunerated by a wage; their work is invisible in the statistics and is 
not protected by labour law and they cannot be easily unionised. 
Therefore it is important to analyse the nature of women's relationship to the 
wage, domestic work and class structure (Mackintosh 1989: 163-179; Barrett 
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1988: 134; Gardiner 1977; Coulson, Magas and Wainwright 1975). This 
approach allows an historical analysis of gender relations within the context of 
class formation and class structure. From this perspective self employed workers 
and family workers are part of the working class as although they may not be 
involved in the production of surplus value directly they are dependent upon the 
sale of their labour power for survival (Gardiner 1977: 157-8). 
Taking these arguments into consideration, I have borrowed from Marx and 
Marxists the broad definition of the working class which recognises different 
status such as Kargar and Karmand rather than to use these different status 
according to Weberian explanation of strata. 
Those who are karmands earn more than kargars. Marx recognised that some 
kind of labour cost more to produce and that processes of supply and demand 
determined their remuneration. Hence higher paid salary earners could also be 
thought of as wage-labourers because "the value of their labour power and their 
wages are determined as those of other wage earners, ie by the cost of production 
and reproduction of his specific labour-power, not by the product of his labour 
power" (1971: 292). Therefore wage labour may have a variety of relationships to 
the ownership and control of capital, as the state employees may not be in the 
same position as employees of capitalist firms. 
2.4.2 The problems with gathering evidence in Iran 
In summer 1989 I made my first exploratory field work trip to Tehran. My 
intention was to interview female industrial workers and investigate their 
employment status before and after the 1979 revolution. I faced enormous 
problems in the course of gathering evidence. The war with Iraq was ended and 
Ayatollah Khomeini was dead. Politically there was an atmosphere of chaos and 
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fear everywhere. The majority of the people were suffering from economic and 
political crisis. Many who opposed the Islamisation of the state were either 
executed, had disappeared or were still imprisoned. Many, especially those who 
supported the Islamisation of the state were either killed in the war with Iraq or 
were still prisoners of the war and their families were waiting for their return. 
Many of these families were left with mentally or physically disabled soldiers who 
have been sent back home during the war years. 
With the help of a female friend with whom I was involved in the activities of the 
1979 - 1981 women's movement in Iran, I interviewed 2 women from the 
Pharmaceutical industry and two women from the food industry. During 1979- 
1980 we had supported these women outside their factory gates where they were 
locked out for struggling to build workers shoras (councils) We helped these 
women and their colleagues to produce and distribute their bulletins. By 
September 1981 Islamic shoras were consolidated in the factories and any 
independent shoras were liquidated (Bayat 1987: 100-142, Poya: 1987: 143- 
149). It was no longer possible to participate in these forms of political struggle. I 
returned to London in 1982. But my friend worked as a scientist in one of the 
pharmaceutical factories and continued her contact with some of the women 
workers, including the four women that I interviewed in 1989. Without her it 
would have been impossible for me to have access to these women. During the 
revolution and until 1981 class barriers collapsed between those who were 
engaged in political struggles. But it became an obstacle once the political 
struggles were crushed. Therefore, as far as these women were concerned I was 
an outsider, especially since I lived abroad. But they trusted me because of my 
friend, she was working with them and she came from a religious family, so they 
could relate to her. Hence, they were willing to talk to me. 
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This was an informal group interview which took place at my friend's house. I 
used an approach based on the oral history method, described by Thompson. That 
is I did not have pre-set questions which I read out, rather I had a mental list of all 
the areas I wanted to cover in the interview. Throughout the interviews I kept the 
flow of conversation as near to an ordinary conversation as possible. I told the 
respondent about myself, my age, my marital status, the number of my children, 
my occupation, my thesis and the purpose of my interviews. I then said to them 
that for objective purposes I also need some information from them in regards to 
their personal details such as age, marital status, number of children, education 
and their job. 
The data collected from these interviews included women's struggle in the work 
places, during the revolution and after, their condition of work, their domestic 
responsibilities, their other forms of work to increase the family income, their 
relationship to their husbands and other members of their families, their status 
within the workplace, within the family and within the society as a whole. These 
interviews helped me to clarify the research question. (Thompson, 1988; 198- 
200). 
In this field trip, with the help of many friends, I also obtained a large number of 
official statistics from the ministries of Labour and Social Affairs; Budget and 
Organisation and Iran Statistical Centre. On my return to London I carried out 
substantial research on the historical background and the official statistics on 
women and employment. 
This research took place part time during academic year holidays, as I worked fu l 
time as a lecturer in London. I returned to Iran in summer 1990 to continue the 
field research. I found that I had lost contact with the four women from the four 
industrial plants that I interviewed the previous year. My friend had left her job 
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and she no longer had any excuse to contact those women workers. The class 
differences between them could have turned the attention of the authorities to her 
and the women workers. Such a contact could have been interpreted as being 
politically motivated and subversive against the Islamic state. 
I had no way of gaining access and therefore I had to abandon concentrating on 
interviewing female industrial workers alone and decided to interview women 
across different occupations, especially "middle" class women working for the 
growing service sector both in the state owned and privately owned enterprises, 
as I had more access to this group of women through my family, my extended 
family and friends. 
In this field trip I interviewed 10 women. Some of these women were relatives 
and others were friends of my extended family. Some were working in the state 
owned enterprises as teachers, nurses and bank clerks, others in the middle to 
small scale private enterprises as clerks, secretaries or administrative workers. 
These interviews took place in an atmosphere of fear. The majority of women, 
either themselves or members of their families have experienced political 
persecution by both regimes, of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, and have suffered from the wounds of the eight years war with Iraq, 
economically, politically, socially and personally. Therefore they did not feel 
comfortable talking about their circumstances. Although I explained fully my 
intention and explained the purpose of my research as purely an academic exercise 
there were still uncertainties. I began by asking them general questions about their 
work history and the relationship between their paid job outside the home and 
their domestic responsibilities. After a few minutes, conversations became more 
relaxed and the women felt a common bond and gradually, began to talk to me 
and answer my questions more willingly. I divided my two main questions into 5 
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categories: 1) different occupations that women have had throughout their work 
history, 2) their employment status in terms of pay, conditions, retirement, 
pension and their level of education in comparison with men, 3) their marital 
status and the effect of having children on their employment, 4) husband's and 
family's attitudes to their work outside the home 5) the difference between the 
Shah's system and the Islamic system in terms of their employment status. 
Question one allowed me to explore what occupations women are concentrated in 
and why. One important issue which was raised by my respondents was why, 
under ideological pressure, women preferred to work in* large state owned 
enterprises. 
Question two raised the issue of how women are discriminated against by the 
labour law as a result of Islamic gender ideology in Iran which does not recognise 
a woman as a bread-winner. Also how women lose benefits, pensions and years of 
service, because they cannot work late shifts and, in addition to official maternity 
leave, they take time off for long periods to look after their children. 
Question three raised the issue of how women's exclusive responsibility for the 
reproduction and maintenance of the family place them in a disadvantaged 
position within the home and at paid work outside the home. The majority of 
women use their mothers, mothers-in-law, sisters, sisters-in-law, female members 
of their family, extended family and neighbours to look after their children while 
they go out to work. 
Question four raised the issue of how in the majority of cases, husbands and male 
members of the family, under the influence of gender ideology, do not approve of 
the idea of women's work outside of the home. But in cases where a family 
needed the financial contribution of the woman, the man had no choice than to 
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permit her to go out to work. In Iran, by law, women have to obtain permission 
from their husbands or other male kin to go out to work; to study; to choose their 
place of residence or to go abroad. Wherever, permission is granted, it could be 
withdrawn at any time if a man feels that the woman's activities outside of the 
home can jeopardise the family honour. Since the Islamisation of the state, this 
law is practiced more thoroughly in the state owned enterprises than the private 
enterprises. This question also raised how women mobilise the ideological and 
material resources to cope with the conflicts arising from their participation in the 
labour market and how they constantly use every means to improve the standard 
of living of their families and their own status within the workplace and the home. 
Question five made me aware that in the 1980s the general standard of living 
declined in comparison with the 1970s. However, the policy and practice of 
segregation imposed by the Islamic state opened up opportunities for many 
women to enter employment. Even those women who opposed the compulsory 
nature of the Islamic dress agreed with those who supported this policy that 
segregation has created space for women. 
When I started the interviews, I had already carried out substantial research into 
the historical background and the official statistics of the research questions but 
did not know about women's work experiences. My own work experience in Iran 
consists of three years computer programming, in the 1960s and some journalism 
in the early 1980s. 
So each interview added something new to my knowledge. I found women's 
personal and work histories empowering and validating the importance of their 
experience. Gluck and Patai argue that for this reason oral history work with 
women is assumed to be inherently feminist (Gluck and Patai 1991; 2). Also my 
purpose of interviewing women was not just seeking information or evidence of 
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value in itself. My purpose, on the one hand, was to make a subjective record of 
how each woman looked back at her life and work history, what she emphasised, 
what she missed out, the words she used to express a particular feelings 
(Thompson: 1988,196-205), and on the other hand, how women struggle 
between the work in the home and outside of the home in order to improve the 
standard of living of their family and their own status in comparison with men. 
In the course of interviews I made sure that the questions that I asked did not 
shape their testimony (ibid 202). For example I explained that I am not judging 
their political and religious views in itself. I want to use it for objective and 
subjective analyses in relation to women's experiences at work and the effect of 
their domestic responsibilities on their work outside the home and vice versa. 
At this stage I decided to use questionnaires to obtain comparative evidence, 
using the interviews for raising questions and the questionnaires for testing the 
validity of some of the answers to the interviews. Also the questionnaires were 
designed as a comparative measure, alongside the interviews, to analyse women's 
place in the work force; their employment status; their level of education; their 
fertility rate; their class and level of religiosity; the degree of decision making 
within the family; the effect of their domestic responsibilities to their paid work 
and vice versa. The aim was to examine the degree of awareness, struggle and 
change for women of different social groups. 
With the help of my daughters, my sister and female members of my extended 
family, we produced 500 questionnaires. These questionnaires went hand to hand 
from women to women to schools, nursery schools, universities, factories, offices, 
hospitals, banks and the homes of women who were engaged in self-employment 
and voluntary work. At work places the questionnaires had to go through the 
security systems and generally people were more nervous to put their words into 
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writing than to say their words in a conversation. Some completed the 
questionnaires fully and made comments. Others did not fully complete them (see 
appendix 2: Questionnaire). 
In return to London I translated and transcribed the interviews into English. I 
realised that my interviews highlighted the thesis question and the analytical 
categories to explain the characteristics of women and employment in Iran in 
relation to the Islamic state and its gender roles and rules. Also women's 
strategies to struggle against their hostile environment. I decided that my 
interviews in the next field trip would be more structured, they could take a more 
objective/comparative approach. 
I therefore continued with reviewing the literature and statistical work in London. 
In the summer of 1991 I made another field trip to Iran and interviewed 56 
women. In Tehran, the capital city and the largest centre for industry and services, 
I visited a number of schools, banks, hospitals, medium size private enterprises 
and newspapers. These visits were made possible by friends and relatives who 
worked in these places and obtained permission for me through their line 
managers. In these workplaces I interviewed women in the teaching professions 
from nursery school teachers to university lecturers, women as bank clerks, 
nurses, VDU operators, secretaries, accountants and journalists. I also visited a 
number of women, in these professions, and working voluntarily, in their homes. 
All workplaces and individual women agreed to distribute and collect my 
questionnaires. 
I also visited three industrial firms and interviewed a number of women industrial 
workers. These interviews were formal and short and I could not go back to the 
respondents to clarify certain points. These interviews were arranged by the 
authorities, I had limited time, I could only ask limited questions as the interviews 
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took place in the presence of the foreman or the manager. Therefore my 
respondents did not feel totally free to talk to me. However, the result was 
satisfactory. 
One of these firms was The Margarin Company, part of the food industry, 
situated in Varamin, a city in the south of Tehran. On the same day that I visited 
the factory, they also had a visit from the ministry of health to introduce family 
planning and to distribute free contraception to female workers. They took me 
and the health visitors around the factory to observe the different stages of the 
production of cooking oil. Once the health visitors' discussion with the female 
workers about family planning ended, I interviewed fifteen women workers on the 
shop floor in the presence of the health visitors and the foreman. 
My next visit was the Bel Air Company, part of the electronic industry, situated in 
the eastern part of Tehran. I interviewed two women technical engineers, two 
women assembly line workers and a male foreman who was working under the 
supervision of the female technical vice president and in charge of assembly 
workers. I was also allowed to visit the segregated assembly lines where women 
were working on the one side and men on the other side, producing radios and 
televisions. I was also invited to have lunch with female workers in the canteen. 
Women's lunch break was 12.30 - 1.00pm and then they went to the prayer room 
from 1.00-1.30. Men had lunch break from 1.00-1.30 and then they went to the 
prayer room from 1.30-2.00. 
At Iran Hormone Company, part of the pharmaceutical industry, situated in Karaj 
a city in the west of Tehran, I interviewed a female pharmacist. They took me to 
the laboratory and showed me how men and women worked, not in segregated 
places, producing medicine. 
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All three firms agreed to distribute my questionnaires among the workforce and 
return to me. 
Thus, some of these interviews took place at workplaces, they were formal,. 
opportunities were very limited to talk freely, as officials were present. Others 
took place in the homes of the interviewees, were informal and more relaxed. I, 
therefore, used different styles. A friendly, informal, conversational approach with 
women who I knew quite well and the interviews took place in their homes. A 
more formal, controlled style of questioning with women who I did not know and 
the interviews took place at their work places. Finch (1984) and Oakley (1981) 
argue that less structured research strategies which avoid creating a hierarchical 
relationship between interviewer and interviewee are more suitable than formal, 
survey type interviewing because informal interviews do not turn women into 
objects. They also criticise the view that the interviewer is expected to remain 
detached, distant and in control. 
I also travelled to a number of villages in Khorasan province, in the eastern part 
of Iran. This area is one of the biggest centres for carpet weaving and agricultural 
production. It is a very poor area in terms of climate and resources, water is 
extremely scarce as the area is close to the desert, people's standard of living is 
poor and the level of education and health is very low. This six days long journey 
and interviews were organised by a friend whose family come from this area. We 
stayed with my friend's aunt and his cousins, in an old village, where the houses 
are built of mud. Our hosts were medium size land owners and produced grapes, 
pistachio nuts, cumin, Saffron, cotton, wheat and barley throughout the year. Men 
and women worked on the land. Women were also carpet weavers. Men were the 
head of the households, they dealt with officials; middlemen; buying and selling of 
materials. Women hardly went out of the village. The carpet weaving was mainly 
the job of women and young girls. Boys who fail school usually end up doing 
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some carpet weaving. The carpet weaving takes place in the houses. In each 
house there is a room for carpet weaving which is also used as the sitting room. 
These rooms are called Kargahe Khanegi (Household workshop). Men are the 
Karfarma (employer) and women are ghalibaj (carpet weavers). These villages 
were self-sufficient, there were no shops, women produced all the family's clothes 
and daily food (bread, butter, cheese, vegetables and fruit). Women also did 
animal husbandry which was mainly to sell the animals or their products in the 
market by men. 
To compare the condition of women carpet weavers/agricultural workers of this 
area with carpet weavers and agricultural workers of a comparatively richer area I 
also travelled to a number of villages in Mazandaran, in the north of Iran, where 
the climate is good and resources are not so scarce and people have a 
comparatively better standard of living and a higher level of health and education. 
This was a three days long journey which was organised by a friend who was 
working in the area as a civil engineer. Through this contact I was able to visit a 
few families and interview two female carpet weavers in their homes. In this area 
women are also engaged in the production of rice and tea. 
In these interviews I added a number of questions to the previous questions: 1) 
What different tasks women have in their jobs 2) what is the difference between 
their jobs and men's jobs 3) how important their contribution is to their family 4) 
what do they do when they go home 5) what part of housework is carried out by 
men (if any) 6) what does it mean for women to work, does it mean more 
autonomy in decision making about themselves, their children and the family's 
expenditure. - 
These questions emerged from the previous years interviews. This time I used 
these questions explicitly while at the same time I allowed new points to be 
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developed out of each conversation. This restructuring of the questions allowed a 
more objective/comparative approach which was very fruitful as it allowed me to 
compare experiences and strategies of different women with each other. 
I thought about the questions that I wanted to ask, the sequence of topics. I built 
a shape in my mind and let questions lead naturally from one to another- 
Questions one, two and three allowed a more detailed understanding of the sexual 
division of labour and the benefits of women's work to their families. I learned 
that women of all classes and with different levels of religiosity are exclusively 
responsible for domestic work. The neglect of this responsibility is socially and 
culturally unacceptable within the family and the society. As a result women's 
hours of work are very long, sometimes up to 14 hours a day. 
Questions four and five allowed a more detailed exploration of the social relations 
between men and women and question six gave some insights into the ways in 
which women of different classes and with different levels of religiosity chose 
material and ideological resources to cope with gender ideology. Most 
importantly, how they struggled to improve their status within the home, at work 
and the wider society. 
So the oral history method of using the detailed memories of the interviewees 
(Thompson: 1988,201) proved to be very fruitful. I learned how women's work 
histories had a dimension of a female struggle against a hostile environment 
(Borland 1991; 67). Although only a few would identify themselves with 
feminism and feminist ideas the questions that I asked encouraged women to 
think about their status (Gluck 1991; 205) and the discrimination against them. 
They welcomed the idea that my intention is to raise the question of how 
important women's work is to their families and to the Iranian economy and 
society. 
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In this trip I collected 200 questionnaires. I did not know many women who 
helped me to distribute the questionnaires. They agreed to do so as friends of my 
family, my extended family and friends. So I had to rely on this network for 
collection of the questionnaires. 
In April 1992 1 went back to Tehran. In this trip I interviewed a group of ten 
women who were engaged in buying cheaply and selling expensively in the black 
market. There are a large number of women who are engaged in this work. This 
was a group interview which took place in Tehran in the home of one of my 
interviewees. She asked nine other women in her neighbourhood to join her in this 
interview and tell their stories as petty commodity producers and sellers. I asked 
them the same questions which were raised in the previous interviews. I learned 
that their earnings and their contribution is indispensable to their families. They do 
not count in the statistics, while without their contribution, their families would 
not survive the inflation and male unemployment. 
On this trip I also collected 148 questionnaires. These together with the 200 
questionnaires that I collected in 1991 represented: 31 voluntary workers; 35 self- 
employed; 50 industrial workers; 40 VDU operators; 28 nurses; 53 women in 
teaching profession; 55 administrative workers and clerks and 56 technicians; 
engineers, scientists and librarians. The remaining questionnaires were either not 
collected or they did not reach me. 
When I started my interviews, because of political constraints, I did not know 
how many women and in what occupations I would have access to. So I took my 
chances wherever possible. But this wide range of interviews with women across 
different occupations, identifying themselves as belonging to different classes and 
with different levels of religiosity proved to be useful. A combination of 
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interviews and the questionnaires brought the best results for me. I learned from 
different points of views and picked up ideas and information which helped me to 
define the problem of women's participation in the labour market and the labour 
force in Iran. More importantly, examining the change in women's employment 
made me aware of the relationship between the role of state, economy and 
ideology. 
This enabled me to locate different theoretical approaches for analysing and 
explaining the research questions (Thompson 1988: 196-205). A purely 
quantitative approach would not have allowed me to capture the most important 
features of the lives of women at work and at home. Throughout the interviews I 
found an interdependence between women's paid work and their contribution in 
the home, produced by economic and ideological factors. 
I did not use a tape recorder, as my interviewees did not feel comfortable. Even if 
I could have recorded the interviews it would have been impossible to get them 
out of the country. No recorded materials would be allowed out of the country 
without being checked and obtaining permission from the Ministry of Islamic 
culture. I therefore, wrote the questions and answers in my notebook in Farsi and 
transcribed them into English, when I returned to London. Wherever possible I 
took photographs, some work places did not allow me to take photographs. 
I also studied volumes of official statistics from the Ministry of Labour, Ministry 
of Budget and Plan Organisation and Iran Statistical Centre. I extracted from this 
information, statistics in relation to women's employment, education and fertility 
rate. My aim was to analyse to what extent this information supported the 
questions raised in the interviews. In addition, I produced statistics from my 
questionnaires and interviews in relation to women's fertility rate; education; 
employment status; hours of work and the level of their earnings relative to men's 
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indicators of women's status in comparison with men and to what extent access to 
paid employment or the lack of it affect the degree of their autonomy and decision 
making. 
The statistical data that I have used is from different periods. In chapters four and 
five I have used the statistics which were published by the Pahlavi regime in 1978. 
In chapters six and seven I have used the statistics which were published by the 
Islamic state in the 1980s and 1990s. Statistics based on gender distribution are 
not available systematically by either the Pahlavi or the Islamic regimes. 
Therefore, I have used the available statistics in the selected years for the state 
sector and the private sector of the economy which show gender distribution. 
Furthermore I used a large volumes of daily newspapers and women's magazines, 
published under the Pahlavi; under the Islamic state and by the opposition to each 
regime both in Farsi and in English. The study of daily newspapers and weekly 
magazines involved the translation of the appropriate materials from Farsi to 
English. The data collected from this source included change in women's 
education; employment; fertility rate; Islamic laws and regulations in relation to 
women and family and women's reaction and attitude to these changes. In the first 
eighteen months after the 1979 revolution the media was independent of the state. 
Once the state consolidated its power the media was totally controlled by the 
state. However, as will be discussed in chapter eight, in the 1990s a form of 
pluralism came into existence within the Islamic framework. Some of the media 
expresses this pluralism. Different socio-economic and socio-political issues are 
published and produced, with the exception of blasphemous issues which are not 
tolerated and are subject to severe punishment. 
The study of the constitutions (1909 and 1980) and the labour laws of the Pahlavi 
and the Islamic state, together with other researches in Farsi and in English were 
47 
also essential. This study enabled me to collect information about women's 
position generally and specifically in relation to employment in different periods 
and from different points of views. The similarities and differences between the 
period under the Pahlavi state and the Islamic state made me aware of the 
problem of continuity and change in relation to gender and employment. 
Between 1989 and 1992 was the period that I carried out the field research and 
since then I have visited Iran regularly. In these visits I have observed the general 
changes in the socio-economic and socio-political situation and especially the 
effect of these changes on women, in particular in relation to women and 
employment. I have also visited some of my respondents on different occasions 
and observed the change in their attitudes to the Islamic dress; their domestic 
work; their paid work outside of the home; their standard of living; working 
conditions and men's attitude to women's contribution to the well being of the 
family. I have also observed an increasing interest in women's issues throughout 
the society which is expressed in the media, especially through television and 
radio which are widely used even in villages. I observed women's and men's 
attitude to media and political changes in relation to women's issues such as the 
role of women in the 1996 parliamentary election and change in legislation in 
relation to women and work. 
This combination allowed me to construct the reality of women's employment; to 
understand the social relations between the genders from the point of the 
participants and their strategies to cope with the ideological constraints. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical and practical issues which have been 
raised in the production of this study. It has argued that, considering the problems 
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of gathering evidence in Iran, I had to use any and every mean available to me to 
investigate my research question. However, interviews are my most important 
research materials. I have argued that this research may be open to the criticism of 
being biased, on the grounds that it is based on a small sample of women's words 
in different occupations in Iran. But the validity of the evidence has been checked 
as much as possible with the documentary evidence. More importantly it is the 
product of women's unrecorded experiences and it aimed to capture the most 
important features of the lives of women at work and at home, which has affected 
- and been affected by - the state ideology, economic circumstances and gender 
relations in Iran as far as women's employment is concerned. 
I used a combination of open-ended and semi structured interviews and structured 
questionnaires. These different types of interviews were time consuming and 
costly, but each have their own characteristic features. Most of my interviews 
were informal. In the first few interviews I used less structured questions which 
were broad but the results provided useful information which fitted into a more 
specific picture. This had a snowball affect as they conveyed women's experiences 
and views which led to new ideas and dimensions. 
The semi-structured interviews provided some scope for the interviewees' 
interpretations, but it also allowed comparability with others. Interviews with 
women across occupations and with different levels of religiosity minimised the 
effect of the bias because they represent different types of experience in relation 
to women and employment in Iran. 
Also through my structural questionnaires to 500 women and statistical analysis, I 
was able to collect considerable factual and standardised information which 
allowed comparison and generalisation. However, I am aware that the pre set 
questions in the questionnaires, could be misunderstood. For this reason, I tested 
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the reliability of the answers by firstly looking at the answers which are given to 
the same question in the interviews and secondly how often the same answer is 
repeated. 
A purely quantitative approach would not have allowed me to capture the most 
important features of the lives of women at work and at home. Throughout the 
interviews, both formal and informal, I found an inter-dependence between 
women's paid work and their contribution in the home, produced by economic 
and ideological factors. Most importantly the use of different approaches has 
enabled me to put forward an alternative point of view to the existing view of 
women and employment in Iran. 
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Chapter Three 
Islam, gender, employment and ideology: a review of literature 
3.1 Introduction 
In considering the relationship between Islamic ideology, gender and the 
employment of women in Iran, it is necessary to consider the debates which are 
central to two different bodies of literature. The first of these is the general debate 
on the relationship between gender and development where those who emphasise 
the role of the sexual division of labour are contrasted with those who see social 
relations between women and men as the most important factor because the form 
of gender relations which impacts most on women's employment is patriarchy. It 
will be argued that there are a number of materially grounded analyses of women 
in Muslim societies which have included women in the process of development. 
However, this debate has not been adequately applied to the study of Muslim 
societies because too much attention has given to the importance of the role of 
ideology and very little analysis to economic factors. 
The second is the specific debate between Iranian secular feminists and Muslim 
feminists in respect of gender roles and relations in economy and society, under 
the Islamic state in Iran. A critical examination of this debate is important as it 
has concentrated on the negative and positive aspects of Islamic ideology in 
relation to women's position generally. A specific study of women in the 
economic context is relatively absent from this debate. From a secular position 
and as a critic of the Islamic state gender relations, I started this research with the 
view that Islamic gender ideology leads to the marginalisation of women within 
the workforce, in comparison with Pahlavi period. However, through the process 
of my field research, I learned that in the 1980s and 1990s economic factors led to 
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the growth in women's employment in Iran and to some women beginning to 
question gender relations. Therefore, my aim is to assess the extent to which 
gender ideology played a role in determining women's employment in Iran, in the 
period under investigation (1980s and 1990s) and to judge the relevance of these 
debates to this thesis. 
3.2 The debate on gender and development 
The debate on women and development is useful for the explanation of women's 
employment in Iran. It involves an analysis of the sexual division of labour which 
identifies women within the labour force and the labour market as wage earners 
and non wage earners; hence women's role in social production. It also involves 
an examination of the gendered structures of social relations both in work and in 
the home which also helps to explains women's subordination within the home, 
employment and the wider society. 
Before discussing this debate, it is important to define the concepts of gender and 
feminists and feminism. In feminist literature, the term gender is defined to mean 
culturally and socially constructed categories of male and female, as opposed to 
sex, which is biologically given (Elson and Pearson 1984; Mackintosh 1984; 
Rubin 1975; Oakley 1972). Gender roles and gender relations are connected to 
the distribution of power within society (Kandiyoti 1996: 6-7). 
I use the terms feminists and feminism in their broadest sense. Feminists are 
activists, scholars and writers who are concerned with the oppressive, unequal 
man-woman relationship in the home, at work and in society because of their 
gender and who want to change it (Paidar: 1996; Mies 1986: 6-43). Feminism is 
used to refer to a number of school of thoughts: Secular feminism; Muslim 
feminism; Socialist feminism; Marxist feminism; Radical feminism. 
52 
The debate about women and development in developing countries during the 
1960-1980s was dominated by two different approaches: 
Boserup (1987), Sautu (1980) and Saffioti (1978) explained women's limited 
industrial participation in many developing countries as the result of Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) where this strategy focused on the production 
of consumer goods, relying on imported technology. The aim was to replace 
imported manufactured goods with locally produced goods. These writers argued 
that as household and workshop commodity production was transferred into 
capital intensive factory production, using wage labour, jobs tended to go to 
menl. 
In opposition to this view, Lim (1990; 1989; 1983), Foo and Lim (1989), Joekes 
(1987) explained high involvement of women in many other developing countries 
as the result of Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) where the pattern of 
industrialisation shifted from industrial production for supplying domestic markets 
to exports for the markets of industrialised countries. These writers argued that 
this strategy modified the structure and composition of the industrial labour force, 
as a result, a large number of women workers were employed in labour intensive 
techniques, particularly in textiles, garments and electronics production. 
Pearson (1992 and 1994) has criticised both approaches for giving too much 
importance to the analysis of the sexual division of labour. She argues that an 
examination of the dynamics of industrialisation; the growth of wage labour; 
different industrial strategies and the way in which the labour force is selected and 
managed is important. Also the inclusion or exclusion of women from the 
industrial workforce is significant, because women's access to employment could 
enhance their standard of living, their contribution to the upward mobility of their 
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families and their independence from men. However, the social setting in which 
work takes place is also important. In many developing countries where women 
are involved in industries as the result of EOI women are low-paid, over-worked, 
exposed to health hazards with no job security and social benefits. This is because 
social relations are created between men and women in a wide range of 
interactions from within the family to workplace and the wider society. Therefore 
she argues that: 
A fuller understanding of gender would also incorporate the gendered 
structures of social relations both in work and outside it - in political 
structures, intra-household relations and in a wide range of social 
interactions in which gender is an important, if not determinant factor, in 
determining the relative power and autonomy of different individuals to 
determine outcomes (1994: 339). 
Other writers have also stressed the importance of the relationship between 
women's employment experience and gender relations in the home and the wider 
society. 
In the field of gender and development in India, Kabeer (1994: 57-58) emphasises 
the deeply rooted effect of gender identity in men's and women's sense of their 
place in the home and outside of the home. Beneria and Sen (1981) have argued 
that even when women have access to material resources their process of 
socialisation has emphasised male domination. Therefore, women are not given 
the opportunity to control their sexuality, fertility or labour. Whitehead (1979) 
describes how ascribed gender relations places women in the sphere of the home 
and men out of the home which leads to different allocation of resources to men 
and women in law, tradition, family, society and even national and international 
policy malting. 
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Humphrey's study of Brazilian process of industrialisation (1987: 36-51) shows 
that women are often recruited on the basis of their sex rather than their skills and 
are treated differently from men in terms of wage rates, and promotion practices 
and, despite economic development, the majority of women remain poor and the 
minority of women Who have not been marginalised and have benefited from 
education and health policies have not been empowered. Humphrey, therefore, 
argues that the issue of gender and employment is influenced both by the sexual 
division of labour and by the social relations between women and men. However, 
the form of gender relations and women's subordination to men is not static, it can 
be changed under conditions of economic and technological change. But any real 
change in women's subordination must come from changes in social relations 
rather than change in the law (ibid: 174-175). 
The publication of Marriage and the Market, Women's Subordination 
Internationally and its Lessons (Young et al 1984) contributed to a general 
theory of gender subordination. The authors suggested that in the process of 
development women are not marginalised but they are integrated into the 
workforce differently from men, because of the social relations of gender. 
Therefore it is important to examine the question of power relationship between 
genders and how the domestic arena determines gender relations and then is 
articulated with the broader economic arena. 
3.2.1 Capitalism and patriarchy 
The debate on gender and development is linked to the debate on capitalism and 
patriarchy. That is because, in the process of economic development and market 
integration patriarchy is seen as a set of power relations between genders which 
has great impact on women's employment. As Elson and Pearson wrote "There is 
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no way that capitalist exploitation of women as wage workers can simply replace 
gender subordination of women" (1984: 31). I, therefore, use the term patriarchy 
in this thesis to mean a set of power relations which explains women's 
subordination to men at home and in the wider society, including employment 
which is not fixed and given, but changeable through men's and women's 
responses to lived realities (Walby: 1990: 1-24: Mies 1986: 1-43: Mackintosh: 
1984: 3-17). 
During the 1970s and part of the 1980s three feminist theories dominated the 
debate on patriarchy: Radical feminism, Marxist feminism and Socialist feminism. 
Radical feminists believed in the importance of patriarchal sex oppression as the 
basis of women's subordination which is the foundation for divisions of labour by 
class and race. Marxist feminists believed in the importance of capitalist 
exploitation as the basis of women's subordination, which results in division of 
labour by sex and race. They began to analyse women's role in reproduction 
(domestic labour) as an arena of theoretical analysis within Marxist categories of 
capitalist and class analysis. Socialist feminists agreed with the concept of 
patriarchy but argued that there has to be class analysis in order to understand 
different forms of oppression. A demarcation between Marxists and socialists 
feminism was due to Marxism giving priority to capitalism and class. Therefore 
the distinctive socialist feminist project became the analysis of capitalism and 
patriarchy and the relationship between them (Evans 1995: 108-124; Sargent 
1981: xx - xxi). 
The publication of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism by 
Hartmann (1979 and 1981) raised questions about whether capitalism and 
patriarchy are two different and separate systems (dual system theory) or one 
system (single system theory). 
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For example, Young (1981) criticised Hartmann for giving too much importance 
to the Marxist theory of production relations over the feminist theory of gender 
relations. She argues that this suggests that there are two distinct systems of 
social relations, capitalism and patriarchy, which have distinct structures, 
movements and histories. She argues that if the material base of patriarchy lies 
fundamentally in men's control over women's labour power and if men maintain 
this by excluding women from access to productive resources, this proves that 
patriarchy and capitalism are not two different systems. Especially if patriarchal 
relationship goes beyond family relationship and exist within all institutions such 
as law, education and employment. Thus patriarchal relationships are not 
separable from social relations of capitalism. She suggests that capitalism and 
patriarchy constitute one single system in which the oppression of women is at the 
centre. 
Harding's contribution is also important (1981). She agrees with Hartmann that 
the economic aspects of the division of labour by gender in the family maintain 
both patriarchy and capital. But she emphasises that the material base of 
patriarchy and capitalism is not only rooted in the economic aspects of the 
division of labour by gender in the family. It also emerges from an explanation of 
the historical and material conditions under which gendered interests are 
reproduced. 
This debate contributed to the understanding of the relationship between 
capitalism and patriarchy, but was challenged by writers on developing countries 
for its Western ethnocentricity. They highlighted the specific experiences of 
women in developing countries. For example, Tinker (1990); Ward (1990); 
Agarwal (1988); Nash and Fernandez Kelly (1985) studied these issues in relation 
to international division of labour and Sen and Grown (1987); Beneria and 
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Roldan (1987), and Mies (1986) discussed these issues in relation to gender and 
class within the context of developing countries. 
Walby argues that "in order to deal positively with these issues it is important to 
distinguish between degrees and forms of patriarchy" (1990: 174). The degree of 
oppression can be measured on a specific dimension such as the size of the wage 
gap between men and women. She also suggests that the form of patriarchy can 
be defined by the specific relations between the different patriarchal structures 
such as patriarchal relations in paid work; patriarchal relations in the state; 
patriarchal relation in sexuality; patriarchal relations in religions institutions, 
media and education (ibid: 174-179). Walby also distinguishes between patriarchal 
control in the private sphere and the public sphere of life. (ibid: 179-185). 
3.2.2 The state, capital and patriarchy 
The relationship between the state, capitalism and patriarchy in developing 
countries is also important, because of the impact of colonialism and imperialism. 
Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) have studied the state's policies in a variety of 
societies and demonstrated that the state constructs men and women differently. 
Women are assigned status as mothers and revered as symbols of national and 
communal identity. Although their contribution is significant to the understanding 
of the relationship between state and women's subordination, it lacks an analysis 
of the relationship between the structure of patriarchy, the state and the economic 
system. 
Chhachhi's study of India fills this gap. She argues that the relationship between 
patriarchy, the state and the economy of different developing countries, after 
decolonisation, has taken different forms. "But the transition from colonial to 
post-colonial nation states in the twentieth century has been along the Gramscian 
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model of'the passive revolution"' (1991: 150). This is a concept used by Gramsci 
(1971: 106) to describe the Marxist explanation of the process of change from 
one social order to another. Chhachhi argues that the states in their post-colonial 
period are "interventionist only in the sphere of production, to create conditions 
for the development and expansion of capital" while they preserve the "traditional 
patriarchal family through the maintenance of separate personal laws" (ibid). She 
therefore, argues that the post-colonial states' commitment to capitalist 
development has led to the undermining of traditional patriarchal structures, but it 
has generated contradictions between capital and patriarchal interests. The 
evidence for this can be seen in India where Hindu, Sikh and Muslim 
fundamentalist groups exert pressure on the state to reassert traditional 
patriarchal controls. Therefore, the state as the manager and the negotiator 
between the old forces and the new forces is subject to the contradictory 
pressures from different social groups that seek power to guarantee their interests 
within the state. More importantly, Chhachhi examines the importance of these 
contradictory pressures on women. She argues that women's experiences of 
economic, political and social changes are different and they react to these 
changes differently according to their class, race, caste and community identities. 
(ibid: 147). 
Therefore, an examination of the dynamics of the relationship between state, 
capital and patriarchy is important to the understanding of the institutionalisation 
of women's subordination. Women are neither homogenous nor passive victims of 
patriarchal domination. 
3.3 The debate on gender and development in the study of Muslim societies 
There are a large number of materially grounded analyses of women in Muslim 
societies which have included women in the process of development. For 
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example, Kandiyoti (1990,1977) on Turkey; Myntti (1984) on Yemen; Nath 
(1978) on Kuwait; Schaefer Davis (1978) on Morocco; Gran (1977) on Egypt 
and Hijab (1988); Hammam (1981,1980) and Yousef (1978 and 1974) generally 
on Muslim societies. Similarly, studies by Afkhami and Friedl (1994); Friedl 
(1991; 1983; 1981); Aghajanian (1991); Moghadam (1988); Afshar (1985); Bauer 
(1983); Kaveh-Mlrani (1983); Gulick and Gulick (1978); Tapper (1978); Sedghi 
and Ashraf (1976) have analysed the material activities and experiences of women 
in Iran. These studies have investigated women's labour force participation, 
demographic behaviour, education and political activities in different countries at 
a particular historical period. 
However, the debate outlined in part I of this chapter has not been adequately 
applied to the study of Muslim societies. This is partly because of the difficulty in 
obtaining data. But more importantly there has been a consensus that in these 
societies religious and ideological factors have determined women's position more 
than economic factors. Studies by Moghadam (1993a; 1988) and Afshar (1989) 
on Iran; Ramzi (1988) on Egypt; Altorki (1986) on Saudi Arabia; Marshall (1984) 
on North Africa and generally on Muslim societies by Clark, Ramsbey and Adler 
(1991); Boserup (1990); Ahmed (1986); Morgan (1984) and Walter (1981) have 
concluded that women's share of the labour force in different Islamic societies, in 
the period 1960-1980 has been less than other societies because of the 
pervasiveness of Islamic patriarchal gender relations. 
Moghadam (1995) in her study of gender and development in the Arab World, 
has analysed the impact of the EOI strategy to the growth of the female labour 
force in Tunisia and Morocco in the 1980s. She argues that in the Arab region, 
only Tunisia and Morocco moved away from ISI to EOI and this contributed to 
the growth of female labour force. But she also confirms that much of this 
employment was in garment industries which were home-based or in small 
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unregistered workshops where wages were low and social security nonexistence 
(ibid: 29). 
The relationship between state, capitalism and patriarchy has received more 
attention in the study of Muslim societies than the development strategies adopted 
by states. Within this context, Moghadam (1993b) attributes the low level of 
female labour force participation in Muslim societies of the Middle East to the 
patriarchal family relationship and the state. She argues that the state as the agent 
of economic development reinforces patriarchal structures throughout society 
which adversely affect female labour force participation. 
Moghadam (ibid), uses the term "neopatriarchal" state, which was originally used 
by Sharabi (1988) to describe various types of political regimes in the Middle 
East. She argues that despite their differences, the state in Islamic societies shares 
the essential features of neopatriarchy: 
This is the product of the encounter between modernity and tradition in the 
context of dependent capitalism; it is modernized patriarchy. Whatever the 
outward (modem) forms of the contemporary neopatriarchal family, 
society, or state, their internal structures remain rooted in the patriarchal 
values and social relations of kinship, clan, and religious and ethnic groups 
(ibid: 112). 
Al-Hibri's discussion of capitalism and patriarchy as one single system in Muslim 
societies (1981) is also important. She argues that patriarchal social relations are 
part and parcel of processes of economic development in Muslim societies. But 
these patriarchal social relations are dynamic. This is apparent in the diverse 
attitude of Muslim women towards Islam. On the one hand Islam provides a firm 
foundation for patriarchy and on the other retains an active, powerful and even 
61 
dangerous image of women. Mernisi (1987: 27-65) has also argued that in Islam, 
women are feared because of their potential sexual power over men. Therefore, 
all sexual institutions such as polygamy, repudiation, sexual segregation can be 
perceived as strategies for containing their power. Al-Hibri, therefore, argues that 
such a society is dynamic because men constantly seek more effective ways of 
dominating women and women constantly finding ways of rebelling. 
3.3.1 Bargaining with patriarchy 
In the context of women's responses to patriarchal relationship Kandiyoti's 
analysis of the form of male domination in Muslim societies is important. She 
argues that in north Africa, the Muslim Middle East (including Turkey, Pakistan 
and Iran) and southern and eastern Asia (especially India and China) the form of 
male domination is "classic patriarchy" (1991: 31). The characteristics of such a 
patriarchy lies in the operation of the patrilocally extended household. The 
processes of economic development have limited the actual predominance of 
three-generational patriarchal households. However the culture of the authority of 
the senior man over other members of the family is strongly prevalent and is 
incorporated into state control over the family. Under classic patriarchy young 
girls are married at a young age and are subordinated to all the males and the 
senior females of her husband's household. Cousin marriage is encouraged. 
Women have no claim on their father's patrimony, whether the prevalent marriage 
payment is bride price or dowry. Their dowries are transferred directly to the 
bride groom's kin and do not take the form of productive property. Moreover, a 
proportion of bride price is retained by the bride's father. Women's access to and 
control over property is limited. Young brides often enter their husband's 
household effectively dispossessed and their survival lies in producing male 
offspring (ibid: 31-32). 
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She further argues that class or caste has an important impact on classic 
patriarchy but because access to resources is mediated through family, the 
observance of restrictive practices is important in the reproduction of family's 
status. Therefore, women will resist breaking the rules, as observing the rule will 
guarantee the honour and breaking the rule entails shame for them (ibid: 33). 
Thus women in areas of classic patriarchy are unable to resist unfavourable labour 
relations to the extent which this results in devaluation of their labour. "In this 
instance ideology acts as a material force that results in a lucrative export 
commodity product by conveniently cheap labour" (ibid: 34). In some cases it 
appears that women participate in their own oppression by accepting male and 
state control over their lives because this enhances their self-worth. However 
women respond to the process of economic development and market integration 
differently. For some women these changes open up opportunities to step out of 
norms and for others these changes could be threatening because "they see the old 
order slipping away from them without any empowering alternative". As a result, 
women according to their class, caste and ethnicity adopt different strategies to 
"bargain with patriarchy" (ibid: 36). 
Shukrallah's (1994: 16) account of women's experiences in Egypt also confirms 
that for many women, the rise of Islam in Egypt filled the gap for those who did 
not benefit from the process of economic development. Shukrallah argues that in 
Egypt, Islamic organisations try to convince and encourage many other women to 
conform to Islamic roles and rules of behaviour and as they press harder for the 
terms of gender relations, women are placed in a weaker negotiating position to 
improve their status within the family and the public sphere of life. But they are in 
a continuous process of renegotiation of the terms of their subordination (ibid: 
30). 
f 
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3.4 The debate between Iranian secular and Muslim feminists 
Within the subject of gender and Iranian studies, the economic context is 
relatively absent (de Groot 1996). In the 1980s a large body of literature 
concentrated on the effect of Islamic gender ideology on women's lives. In this 
context, there was a similarity between the secular and Muslim feminists. 
Both groups analysed Sharia to arrive at different conclusions. The secularists 
had mainly concentrated on the repressive nature of Islamic ideology and its effect 
on women's position within family, employment and the wider society. The 
Islamists, on the other hand, have responded by defending Islam as liberating 
women from consumerism of capitalism. In the 1990s the reality of women's 
situation in Iran changed this position. A number of secular feminists began to 
take into account women's struggle for change in Iran. Nevertheless, material 
issues such as the Iran - Iraq war and its aftermath which affected women's labour 
force participation and their struggle to improve their status was largely ignored 
by the secularists. 
I use the term secular feminists to refer to those feminists who see religious 
influence in society as a negative aspect of today's societies and demand an end to 
the hegemony of religion on civil society and separation of religion from the state. 
I use the term Muslim feminists to refer to those feminists who within the Islamic 
framework in variety of ways (intellectually, politically or as activists) demand 
women's rights through reforms of Islamic laws and regulations (Tohidi 1996: 
280). 
Following the 1979 revolution and the establishment of the Islamic state, two 
opposing arguments dominated the debate about women's position. The secular 
feminists, mostly writing from exile, (Moghadam 1994; Moghadam 1993 a and b; 
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1991; 1988, Afshar 1991; 1989; 1987; 1985, Sanasarian 1986; 1982, Azari 1983, 
Nashat 1983, Tabari and Yeganeh 1982), challenged the Islamic state and its laws 
and regulations with regard to women's position both within the home and outside 
of the home, arguing that the Islamisation of the state had marginalised women's 
activities in the economic, social and political spheres of life. Inside Iran, on the 
other hand, Muslim feminists (Rahnavard n. d., Hashami 1980; 1981, Etezadi 
Tabatabai 1979; 1981) argued that the Islamisation of the state has liberated 
Iranian women from being treated, as under the Pahlavi, as commodities and sex 
objects. 
The opposing views of secular feminists and Muslim feminists had one common 
feature, in that they were dominated by an examination of Islamic ideology, the 
role of religious leaders and institutions in Iran, but they arrived at different 
conclusions. At the centre of the secularists' arguments was the view that the 
position of women in Iran has been deeply affected by the writings and attitudes 
of Shia ulama towards women and their role in society (Khomeini 1987/8; 1979; 
Mottahari 1981, Majlesi 1979, Tabatabai 1979/80, Nouri 1964/5). They pointed 
to a number of areas such as: bread-winning in the family, Islamic family law; 
biological differences between the sexes; differential process of socialisation of 
the sexes and the importance of the honour of the family as evidence of 
marginalisation of women in the public sphere of life. 
Moghadam (1988: 223-228); Nashat (1983: 37-60) and Afshar (1987: 70-89; 
1982: 75-90) argue that the interpretation of Quranic verses by the Iranian ulama 
constitute the rationale for putting men entirely in charge of household 
expenditure and is therefore' responsible for the socio-economic inequality which 
exists between the genders. As a result of this interpretation a woman has to be 
protected, looked after and controlled. The man is obliged to provide food, 
shelter and clothing for his wife and children. In return the woman has obligations 
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towards her husband including obeying his sexual needs. Men, as a result of their 
economic struggle, are given authority by Islamic ideology to manage the affairs 
of women and even to punish women if they do not comply with their rules. Thus, 
women's rights to own and hold personal property and possess income becomes 
irrelevant, as they are not allowed to dispose of them without their husband's 
permission. 
Moghadam, Nashat, Afshar and Yeganeh (1982) also argue that there is a strong 
assertion by the ulama that biological differences determine the psychological, 
intellectual and legal status of women. Therefore, from the moment of birth, girls 
and boys are raised and treated differently. This given identity constructs different 
gender roles within society. Child bearing and child rearing are the woman's 
uniquely important contribution to society. Thus, marriage is an important 
institution to give a woman the identity which she deserves. 
Furthermore, Afshar, Nashat and Yeganeh argue that the allocation of the sphere 
of the home to women, according to women's biological and intellectual 
differences has expression in the Islamic family law which clearly emphasises 
gendered socio-economic inequality and highlights the economic root of male 
superiority and male social and economic hegemony over women. For example, 
inheritance law specifies a female inheritance share half of the male's. The 
rationale for this is that the woman gets Mahr (bride price) and nafaghe 
(maintenance) from her husband. 
Moghadam points out that the Quran does not discriminate explicitly against 
women's participation in the job market (1994). However, Quranic regulations 
concerning female sexuality lay the grounds for various forms of legal 
discrimination and occupational segregation of female labour. Women are treated 
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as a quasi-commodity which sets limitations on the non-sexual aspects of their 
lives, including participation in the labour market. 
These issues raised by secular feminists were debated, written about and 
published outside of Iran to show the way women were marginalised by the 
Islamic state, both at home and outside of the home. Although these publications 
were banned in Iran, over the years they raised important questions about 
women's oppression in relation to changes since the 1979 revolution and the 
Islamisation of the state. They also raised questions for women in Iran who found 
themselves caught between the Islamic ideology advocating women's place in the 
home while-the practical reality of their situation was that they had to go out to 
work in order to feed their families. 
It was under these circumstances that the Islamists responded. In response to the 
secularist interrogation of Shia Islam ideology on women, the Muslim feminists 
constructed an ideal Islamic image of Muslim woman in the late 20th century, to 
oppose the image bound up in the culture of capitalism and imperialism which 
spread throughout the society under the Pahlavi period. 
Rahnavard (n. d.: 50-85), Hashemi (1980 and 1981) and Etezadi Tabatabai (1979 
and 1981) were the first Muslim feminists in Iran to argue that Islam is the only 
socio-economic and socio-political system which does not exploit and marginalise 
women because it specifies the sphere of home to women without confining 
women to the home. In this context they argued that under both capitalist and 
communist systems women are exploited as cheap workers; oppressed as sex 
objects and have lost their identity of femininity. Under Islam, a woman is 
encouraged to participate in economic activities, she gains and keeps the fruits of 
her labour and is free to invest or spend it in any way she wishes. Her work inside 
and outside of the home is regarded as valuable and is confirmed by her 
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entitlement to nafaghe - she can even charge her husband for nursing her own 
babies. At the same time she does not have any obligation in regard to supporting 
other members of the family or the society. 
These writers acknowledged the Quran's view of women that men and women are 
biologically, psychologically and intellectually different. They agreed with male 
Islamic scholars that the cyclic nature of menstruation in women does disturb 
women's ability to testify and make judgement. Therefore, they argued, it is 
meaningless to demand equal rights for basically unequal beings: They stressed 
that the Quran has given different rights and responsibilities for the different 
creations of God. Thus, in their view the Islamic laws and regulations of marriage, 
divorce, custody of children, mahr and nafaghe were justified. They endorsed the 
Islamic constitution which emphasised that motherhood is the primary task of 
women. But by emphasising the role of Zaynab, they argued that women are not 
prohibited from working outside of the home, provided it is strictly within an 
Islamic framework. 
A comparison of these two opposing views show that both Secularists and 
Muslim feminists concentrated on ideological rather than material issues. The 
Secularist emphasised the repressive nature of Islamic ideology and its effect on 
women's position within family, employment and the wider society. The Islamists, 
on the other hand, responded by defending Islamic ideology as liberating women 
from the consumerism inherent in capitalism. Material issues such as the Iran - 
Iraq war and its aftermath, which affected women's labour force participation and 
their struggle to improve their status, were largely ignored. 
In the 1990s, however, a number of studies (Kian 1997; Paidar 1997; Mir- 
Hossein 1993; Afshar 1994; Haeri 1994; Najmabadi 1991) indicated a shift in the 
position of the secular feminists. Paidar's study of women and the political process 
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in twentieth-century Iran showed that far from being marginal, the position of 
women was central to the political discourses of Iran under the Islamic state. Kian 
argued that women in Iran, through their involvement in politics, have forced the 
state to present a different reading of Islam and Islamic laws which is more 
attentive to the condition of women. Haeri argued that many Islamist women in 
Iran have used the institution of temporary marriage as a way to escape their 
marginal, restrictive, and unfavourable status. Afshar argued that although barred 
by prejudice and patriarchal power, women in Iran struggled on and their struggle 
has enabled them to negotiate better terms in education and employment. Mir- 
Hosseini suggested that women in Iran used the institution of Mahr to negotiate a 
better bargaining position in marriage and divorce. Najmabadi argued that women 
in Iran, despite strict moral codes of behaviour imposed by the state, had turned 
to feminism in order to carve out a social space of their own. 
A comparison of these writings with the 1980s studies of women's issues in Iran 
shows that in the 1980s there was no dialogue between Muslim feminists and 
Secular feminists. But in the 1990s a form of dialogue is taking place between the 
Muslim feminists and Secular feminists which has led to a change in the position 
of a number of secular writers. In the 1990s, the parliamentary and presidential 
elections in Iran showed that gender had become a part of Islamic politics and 
that, women played an important role in shaping this discourse. In the 1990s, 
women in Iran managed to alter the religious understandings of women's position. 
This was reflected in the reforms of family law, education and employment 
policies in relation to women. Most importantly, these changes had been made 
possible by the collaboration between secular women and religious women in 
Iran, who despite their disagreement on the nature of the Islamic state had a 
shared experience: the contradictions inherent in religious thinking on gender 
roles and relations and the reality of their lives. These factors, combined with the 
activities of secular feminists (both inside and outside of Iran) in opposing the 
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Islamic state's position on women, made gender, a political issue which was 
constantly discussed and debated. All these factors raised gender consciousness in 
Iran and led to women's struggle for change. As a result secular feminists had to 
review their position and acknowledge the changes in Iran. 
These studies are very important and this thesis has benefited from them greatly. 
But an analysis of women, gender, ideology and economic life is missing from 
these analyses. This is a serious omission because throughout the 1980s and 
1990s there has been unprecedented socio-economic and socio-political changes 
in Iran which have affected the Islamic position on women's employment. 
3.5 The relevance of these debates to this thesis 
In part I, within the field of women and development, I have reviewed the debates 
and discussions on the sexual division of labour and social relations between the 
genders. This analysis is relevant to the study of women and development in Iran, 
because the Iranian process of industrialisation was based on Import Substitution 
Industrialisation and an attempt to export promotion under the Pahlavi and under 
the Islamic state (Nomani and Rahnema 1994: 160-184; Rahnema and Nomani: 
1990: 273-299; Halliday 1979: 173-210). This means that technology was 
imported to develop the oil industry, the revenue from which funded the creation 
of other industries for the production of consumer goods. I do not agree with the 
view that ISI development strategy marginalised women in the labour force. I will 
argue that this process, even though uneven, improved women's status in 
comparison with the previous generations in terms of life expectancy; fertility 
rate; literacy rate and labour force participation. Despite these relative changes, 
however, only a small minority are real beneficiaries of the process of economic, 
social and political development and even they are not empowered. 
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An analysis of the sexual division of labour under the Islamic state is important 
because it identifies women within the labour force and the labour market as wage 
workers, as unpaid family workers and as petty commodity producers. In other 
words, the sexual division of labour for women depends on the social relations of 
production under which the work is performed. I will also argue that an analysis 
of the social relations between women and men is equally important to assess the 
way men and women are integrated to the workforce differently. Only through an 
analysis of social relations of gender I have been able to account for women's 
subordination in work, in the home and in society as a whole. 
Also a critical study of the literature on capitalism and patriarchy, the state, 
capital and patriarchy and women's resistance to and struggles against patriarchal 
gender relations enabled me to make use of the major insights gained from these 
feminist theories whilst attending to the issue of women and employment in Iran. 
For example, Al-Hibiri's analysis of a single system of patriarchy and capitalism in 
Muslim societies (1981) can be applied to Iran, as patriarchal social relations are 
part and parcel of the process of economic development. Within this context as it 
is suggested by Walby (1990) I have distinguished between the form and the 
degree of patriarchal relationship by analysing the wage gap between men and 
women workers as well as the patriarchal relationship within the education, 
employment and the law. 
Kandiyoti's analysis of classic patriarchy (1991) is also relevant to Iran in two 
different ways. Firstly the characteristics of classic patriarchy have been apparent 
in Iran, despite economic transformation. These characteristics have been 
particularly strengthened under the Islamic state. Secondly, women have been 
responding to economic, political and social changes in different ways using 
material resources and ideological constraints. The power of Islamic ideology, 
leadership and institutions may have reduced women's bargaining position, but 
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within the Islamic framework a larger number of women are exposed to gender 
conciseness and unfavourable gender relations and are struggling to improve their 
status. I, therefore, disagree with the view that ideological factors imposed by the 
Islamic state determined women's employment. On the contrary, I will argue that 
in the period under investigation, material factors as well as women's responses 
have been equally important, if not more important, than ideological factors. 
Chhachhi's (1991) and Moghadam's (1993b) analysis are also important to 
understand the role of the state as the agent of economic development and social 
control. I therefore, use this analysis to assess the Islamic state in Iran which in 
the 1990s has been seeking further integration and incorporation into the world 
market. For this purpose, it has abandoned its fundamentalist slogans to a great 
degree. It has also reformed laws and regulations in relation to women and family, 
women and education and employment. Nevertheless, the state protects and 
regulates the family and male domination, throughout the society by exercising 
control over women. This is to ensure that the increase in the number of working 
women does not lead to the break down of patriarchal control. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have critically surveyed two different bodies of literature to help 
explain the conceptual framework and the main themes of this thesis. 
Firstly, the field of women and development, I have reviewed the debates and 
discussions on the sexual division of labour and social relations between the 
genders. I have argued (and as will be argued throughout the thesis) that this case 
study of Iran demonstrates that women's employment is determined by the sexual 
division of labour and the social relations between men and women; in other 
words, by social relations of production and by social relations between women 
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and men. I have also used the socialist feminist analysis of capitalism and 
patriarchy to explain women's subordination within family and employment and 
society. Furthermore, I have used the debate on the state, capital and patriarchy 
and women's responses to patriarchal gender relations to analyse women's 
resistance and their struggle for change in Iran. 
The use of these concepts and theories and their application to the specifities of 
the Iranian situation revealed the importance of the role of the state. As will be 
argued in the following chapters the role of the state was crucial in determining 
the sexual division of labour and patriarchal gender relations. Nevertheless, the 
role of the state was dynamic and contradictory, as under economic pressure and 
women's resistance it had to change its ideological position. 
Secondly, I have reviewed the debate between the secular and Muslim feminists 
on women's participation in the public sphere of life. I have argued that the 
secularists interrogation of Islamic organisation, leadership and ideology has had 
the great merit of drawing the attention of scholars and activists both inside and 
outside of Iran to the oppressive nature of Islam on women's issues. However, the 
impact of material changes and women's varied responses are absent from these 
analyses. Therefore this thesis will analyse women's resistance and the role of 
class in this resistance which explain change in gender consciousness and gender 
relations. 
Therefore, a critical analysis of these debates in the context of women's 
employment in Iran allowed me to study the conceptual relationships between 
state, capital, class and gender ideology. 
Notes 
1. These studies from different perspectives - Boserup's study based on a market 
oriented theoretical model and Saffioti's study based on Marxist dependency 
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theory - are important because they draw attention to the issue of development, 
industrialisation and women's employment situation. 
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Chapter four 
Continuity and change, a historical approach 
4.1 Introduction 
The experience of the 1979 revolution and the process of Islamisation of the state 
and society resulted from the processes of socio-economic and socio-political 
development of Iran in this century. The economic and political structures which 
developed during the Pahlavi period entailed an inter-relationship and inter- 
dependency between economic development and religious ideology. 
Industrialisation created new social classes and increased the process of 
proletarianisation. Female paid employment became crucial for the families, 
especially in the 1960s - 1970s. But cultural values based on Shia Islam ideology 
continued and created conflict and obstacles on the path of women's participation 
in the public sphere of life, in particular paid employment. 
This chapter will assess the way gender is historically implicated in the political 
economy of Iran. The early stage of capitalist development, changing class 
structure, social and political reforms, and how women related to these changes in 
the pre-Pahlavi period, are important factors, as they laid the foundation of 
continuity and change in the pre and post Pahlavi era. The chapter, however, will 
concentrate on the Pahlavi period and analyses how males and females have been 
incorporated differently into economic, political and social processes. Thus, the 
pre 1979 period has been divided into two periods of socio-economic and socio- 
political development (1925-1960 and 1960-1979). The focus is on two different 
aspects of the same historical periods (gender and the economic processes and 
gender and politics). 1925-1960 is the period of rapid integration of Iran into the 
world economy under Reza Shah and the British and later American domination; 
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and 1960-1979 is the period of the oil boom economy under Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi and American domination, ending with the 1979 revolution and the 
establishment of the Islamic state. The aim is to analyse the role of the state and 
its social and political institutions in determining gender relations within the 
economy and the society of Iran by looking into the processes of continuity as 
well as change. It will be argued that at different points in the modern history of 
Iran, the interaction between the state, Shia Islam, capitalism and imperialisrn 
affected gender relations. Women of different classes and with different levels of 
religiosity participated in economic and political activities and at different levels 
struggled against the patriarchal state and its institutions. They achieved a great 
degree of change. However, as a result of the inter-dependency and inter- 
relationship between economic development and religious ideology and despite 
economic and political changes the state, perpetuated female subordination. 
4.2 Early capitalist development, class structure and women's responses 
Capitalist development in Iran was the result of the need of the European 
capitalist market to import Iranian goods, and to export European manufacturing 
goods into Iran in the nineteenth century. Iran was never colonised or formally 
ruled by a foreign power. The rivalry between Russian and British empires left 
Iran to maintain its independence (Tabari 1983: 53). Nevertheless, Iran's 
integration to the world system, although had its own characteristics, shared those 
features of uneven economic development experienced by countries colonised by 
foreign powers. 
For example, in this period, the population of Iran was classified into four social 
groups: the landed aristocracy; the propertied middle class; urban wage earners 
and the vast majority of the rural population (Abrahamian 1982: 33-34). 
However, the British and Russian trading activities in Iran led to the decline of 
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landed proprietors as they gradually became large scale profiteers, disposing of 
cash crops such as cotton, opium, silk, dried fruits and nuts in foreign markets. As 
a result the economy was transformed from being largely based on transactions in 
kind to a monetised economy. Thus, the influence of western capitalism meant 
that the old industries were destroyed through trade and imports of foreign goods 
but, on the other hand this influence resulted in higher growth of the urban 
population, the growth of non-agricultural activities and commercial agriculture. 
Therefore the change in the organisation of production, under the influence of the 
global market changed the pre-existing patterns of economic and social life 
through the introduction of new organisation of labour consisting of proletarians, 
semi proletarians and petty commodity producers. These diverse forms of labour 
organisation still persist today characterising uneven development in the context 
of global capitalism. 
As it is argued by Bernstein, Johnson and Thomas (1992: 193-194): 
If we view the global history of capitalism, we see that it has absorbed, 
created and combined many diverse social forms in the course of its uneven 
and contradictory development. For example, capitalism is usually 
characterized by the employment of wage labour (or full proletarianisation) 
but other labour regimes can and do co-exist under capitalism. 
In this period, women played an important role in the process of economic 
development. Before the discovery of oil in 1914, the main exports of the country 
were agricultural products and handicrafts. In rural areas, rice, butter, dried fruits, 
and tea were exclusively produced by women and women had an important role 
in the production of other goods such as wheat, barley, tobacco, cotton, hides, 
skins, raw silk, drugs, dyes and manufactured silk, woollen and cotton (Issawi 
1971: 132-34). In urban areas, capitalist relationships between the weaver and 
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those who ran and controlled carpet-making emerged. The mass of the workers, 
mainly women and children were paid a wage below subsistence and controlled 
neither the raw material nor the finished product (Seyf 1994/95: 190-201). Thus 
women worked as part of the early proletarians, semi proletarians and petty 
commodity producers. 
Towards the end of the century, carpet weaving became an important 
manufacturing industry, employing a large number of the urban workforce. But 
the most common form of organisation remained small scale domestic production, 
where women were the main labour force. Nevertheless, women also remained 
solely responsible for the reproduction of the family and the household despite 
demand for their labour in a product which brought cash for their families, created 
profits for the foreign and indigenous owners and revenue for the country (Seyf 
ibid: 143-156; Issawi 1971: 304-05). 
In 1914 the economic organisation of Iran began to change. With the discovery of 
large quantities of oil, Britain began to exploit Iran's oil through the activities of 
the Anglo-Persian OR Company (Issawi, 1971: 316-322). Although gradually Iran 
benefited from a share of its oil production, export and income, a significant 
contribution to Iran's economy still came from agriculture and handicrafts 
produced largely by women (Kazemi 1980: 32-3). 
In this period, Clara Rice, a member of a Christian mission who travelled widely 
in Iran recorded the importance of women's unpaid work in rural areas, as 
agriculturalists, pastoralists and carpet weavers as well as producing food and 
clothes for their families. (Azad 1987/88: 46-49; 63; 171-181). 
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4.2.1 Social and political reforms and women's responses 
The process of economic development in Iran, led to social and political changes. 
A number of students, government officials and merchants associated with the 
landed aristocracy and the propertied middle class travelled to Europe and were 
impressed by the achievements of Europe's Industrial Revolutions. This 
interaction, therefore, instigated social and political changes, as these middle 
classes pressurised the Qajar Shahs to centralise and strengthen the state; creating 
a new army; secular courts and schools on the European model (Bakhash 1978: 1- 
3). However, the ulama (religious leaders) who were themselves a part of the 
landed aristocracy and the propertied middle class, opposed the process of 
modernisation of education and the courts as these changes would have 
undermined their traditional role including the collection of religious taxes, and 
their position as judges, educators and guild leaders. Hence a conflict and 
separation of class interest was created within this social group. The former was 
in favour of modernisation of the economy and society, the latter was against the 
modernisation processes and in favour of the return to religion and the Sharia. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century Britain and Russia, both forced 
their own banks upon Iran and imposed indirect exploitation by acquiring 
"concessions" to collect taxes, and extract and market raw materials and 
agricultural products, in exchange for an often paltry sum paid to the Qajar 
Shahs, In 1890 a British company obtained the monopoly over production, sale 
and export of tobacco from Iran, and this concession produced a massive wave of 
popular discontent. Two opposing forces were united against foreign domination 
with two different objectives: The producers of tobacco and the merchants who 
exported it were in favour of Iran's integration to the world market without 
foreign domination; and the ulama who objected to foreign domination, because 
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their economic, political and social power were declining as a result of Iran's 
integration to the world market (Algar 1969; Keddie 1966). 
This alliance called for a boycott of the use of tobacco. Strikes and street 
demonstrations made the anti-concession campaign highly successful. Women 
participated in street demonstrations for the first time in the agitation over the 
tobacco concession. Even the wives of the Shah and the women in the harems 
were influential as part of this mass anti-imperialist movement. They boycotted 
the smoking of tobacco and broke their pipes. As a result the Shah was forced to 
cancel the concession (Hendessi 1990: 5; Bahar 1983: 172; Bayat Philipp 1978: 
297). 
The experience of the anti-tobacco uprising led to the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1906-1911 which had an important influence on the development of women's 
political participation. The Constitutional Revolution was also won out of the 
alliance of the two opposing forces: Secularist merchants (who were involved in 
trade, money lending and establishment of industries and were supported by 
liberal intellectuals) demanded a fair chance against foreign capital and 
fundamental economic, political and ideological change; whilst the ulama 
demanded an end to foreign domination and the return of religious power and 
tradition (Keddie 1966; Browne 1910). In the literature, the former is referred to 
as the modern middle class and the latter as the traditional middle class 
(Najmabadi 1991: 49-66; Abrahamian 1982: 58-69). Each of them sought the 
support of women across the society. As Paidar (1997: 73) writes: 
Women, were considered as significant to the nation because of their role as 
biological reproducers of the nation, educators of children, transmitters of 
culture and participants in national life. Their position in any society, it 
followed, was central to the definition of that society. A social and political 
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redefinition of Iranian society, therefore, had to entail a reorganisation of 
women's position. 
This gave rise to a diverse women's movement in Iran, as some women supported 
the modernists and others supported the ulama. Nevertheless their collective 
political actions created a space and opportunity for women to organise 
themselves and participate in political movements (ibid: 74). 
The Shah's reaction to the constitutional struggle was to disrupt this alliance and 
construct an alliance of his own with the ulama - offering the closure of the 
western-style schools that educated girls. (Sanasarian 1982: 18-24 Nashat 1983: 
22-24). These schools became centres for the raising of women's consciousness in 
iran. Through these schools a small number of young women from upper and 
middle classes learned about the French women's involvement in the Paris 
Commune, British women's fight for the vote and Russian women's struggle 
against the Tsar. These stories had great importance for women in Iran during this 
period and were repeated from woman to woman, in family circles, in mosques 
and even in public baths (Nahid 1981: 16). 
During the constitutional movement women graduates of these schools 
established girls' schools themselves. Although they were opposed by the Islamic 
clergy, the struggle for the establishment of girls' schools continued and greatly 
developed women's consciousness in Iran (Sanasarian 1982: 39; Nahid 1981: 19). 
Women wearing the chador participated in sit-ins and demonstrations and fought 
for women's rights (Bahar 1983: 174,188; Abrahamian 1982: 109). Women's 
organisations and newspapers also played an important role for the establishment 
of a constitutional government and an end to foreign intervention and domination 
(Paidar: 1997: 66,92; Hendessi 1990: 6; Jayawardena 1986: 64-5; Sanasarian 
1982: 21; Bayat-Philippl978: 298,307). 
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For many women the constitutional movement was to bring about their 
emancipation through economic development and progress associated with 
western democracy. The demands of women were education for women, and the 
abolition of seclusion and early marriage. This early women's movement was a 
secular movement which viewed Islam as traditionalism and backwardness 
(Paidar 1996: 52). 
The majority of these early feminists, took sides with their men and avoided direct 
confrontation with Islam. Instead, they blamed men within the family and society 
for women's subordination (Adamiyat and Nategh 1978: 20-27) and glorified pre 
Islamic Iran and Babism, a reformist movement (1820-1850) which had 
challenged Shia Islam, demanded greater social justice; freedom of trade and 
rights of personal property; the reduction of unjust taxes; a higher status for 
women; limits on polygamy; a prohibition on violence against women and 
measures for their education (Jayawardena 1986: 61; Bahar 1983: 171; Keddie 
1981: 50; Bayat Philipp1978: 296). 
The constitution was won and the Qajar dynasty was defeated. But as a result of 
the persistence of the power of Islamic ideology and the secularists' concessions 
to the Islamists, women's rights were sacrificed. Alongside the insane and 
criminals, the female population of Iran was denied the right to vote. But women's 
struggle continued through establishment of girls' schools, women's newspapers 
and societies (Nashat 1983: 23-24; Sanasarian 1982: 42-43). 
With the outbreak of the First World War, British and Russian troops occupied 
almost all of Iran, creating widespread, popular opposition to the occupying 
powers. During this period, political organisation, women's groups, trade union 
organisations and radical newspapers appeared throughout the country. In the 
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north of Iran, popular support for nationalist and communist movements 
expanded rapidly. After the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks rapidly 
abandoned Tsarist privileges in Iran. This concentrated popular anger against the 
British, who retained control in oil-rich South Iran (Zabih 1966: 1-35; Degras 
1950: 28-29). Women supporters and activists in the nationalist Jangali (Forest 
people) and Communist movements organised women's groups and produced 
several women's publications and newspapers during this period of anti-imperialist 
agitation (Abrahamian 1982: 128; Sanasarian 1982; Nahid 1981: 111-113). 
The women's movement of the 1920s was different to the constitutional women's 
movement. During the constitutional period the women's movement was part of 
the nationalist movement. In the 1920s the women's movement in Iran achieved a 
degree of independence from the political parties (Paidar 1997: 91). The women's 
movement in this period was a small secularist movement pioneered by modern 
middle class women in association with the nationalist and communist 
movements. This movement was diverse in its ideological struggle; but through 
their political activities they demanded equal opportunities in education and 
political rights for women; were against child marriage and polygamy; against the 
Chador and Islamic laws, as well as participating in the fight against imperialist 
domination. Although they were a minority, they achieved a degree of reform 
especially in the area of female education which was beneficial to the majority of 
women. But the unholy alliance between the religious clergy and secularists made 
it impossible for them to develop fully and achieve more. 
To conclude, the process of economic development and class formation was part 
of a global process which took place under foreign intervention; imperialist 
domination and Shia clergy's influence. This created uneven socio-economic 
development. The new social classes which emerged remained differentiated on 
the degree of economic integration and level of religious influence. All these 
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different factors affected gender issues. Women played an important role in the 
economy. Nevertheless, in rural areas, they remained predominantly unpaid 
workers and in urban industrial centres they constituted the low-paid workers, 
even though their products were sold on national and international markets and 
the state and the family benefited from their economic participation. A small but 
significant number of women actively participated in nationalist and communist 
movements. They raised feminist issues in relation to women and family, women 
and education and veiling. Their activities laid the foundation for future women's 
movements and struggle for women's emancipation. 
4.31925-1960 
4.3.1 Gender and economic processes under the Pahlavi 
This section will examine socio-economic development under the Pahlavi and the 
position of women in this processes. 
In December 1925, the Qajar King was deposed and Reza Pahlavi declared 
himself the Shah of the Pahlavi Dynasty. Under the influence of the British he was 
committed to building a modern state and economy. Iranian economic 
development in this period largely centred on development of the infrastructure. 
These developments were linked to the Shah's desire effectively to control the 
country through the army and to the desire of British capital to exploit the oil 
resources with greater ease, but they also laid the foundation for industrial 
development in this period. Industrial development under Reza Shah began during 
the global depression of the 1930s, when the terms of trade were in Iran's favour, 
as oil was exported in return for the imports of capital goods. The 
industrialisation drive increased government revenue which was financed through 
taxation and by the growth of oil revenue. The government introduced high 
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tarifs, income tax and imposed state monopolies in some consumer goods, to 
increase state revenue (Abrahamian 1982: 135-165). 
Rapid integration into the world economy created new social classes. The landed 
aristocracy and the propertied middle class declined in economic, social and 
political power. The modern middle class who were in favour of secular changes 
were attracted to Reza Shah's modernisation of the economy and society and 
became the new bourgeoisie and the professional salary earners. They were 
encouraged by Reza Shah actively to participate in the growing state bureaucracy. 
The traditional middle class which was opposed to modernisation lost much of its 
economic and political power and this created intense hatred for Reza Shah. 
In this period women were encouraged to go to universities, become teachers and 
work for the growing state sector of the economy. The state bureaucracy grew 
fast and absorbed a small number of modern middle class women (Najmabadi 
1991: 54). However, the process' of industrialisation and the development of a 
market economy which might have required female labour force participation was 
limited. In the 1920s - 1930s, 79% of the population still lived in the rural areas 
(Momeni 1977: 335). Agriculture and household centred industries remained 
important economically and women's unpaid work in agriculture and pastoral 
nomadic activities continued (Halliday: 1979: 14). 
In this period, the economic depression reached Iran. Low wages, long working 
hours and bad labour conditions caused widespread industrial discontent. Reza 
Shah's state increasingly faced gender, class and ethnic opposition. In 1941, 
Britain and Russia invaded Iran in favour of the allies, fearing Reza Shah's pro- 
German attitude. The occupying powers forced the Shah to leave the country and 
to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza. 
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Industrialisation and economic development, especially in the 1940s-1950s, which 
involved the provision of better health and education, led to decrease in the death 
rate while the birth rate remained high which meant a rapid increase of the 
population. Iran's population increased from 9,860,000 in 1900 to 19,880,000 in 
1955 and the urban population increased from 21% to 30% in 1955, as a result of 
industrialisation and migration from rural areas to urban areas (Momeni 1977: 
335). 
Sectoral statistical data only exist from 1956 onwards. Very little detailed 
information about women's economic participation is available, but there is a 
general consensus that in the 1940s - 1950s, 90% of the population were either 
nomadic pastoralists or were engaged in agricultural work (Halliday, 1979: 14). 
Only 200,000 people worked in industries of whom 120,000 were working with 
modem technology (Razaghi 1988-89: 24). In this period, 40% of revenue came 
from the agricultural sector, 10% from the oil industry, 20% from other industries 
and the rest from unspecified sources (Behnam 1977: 47-48). Therefore, until the 
1950s, the significant contribution to Iran's economy came from agriculture, 
where women played an important role in the production of food and labour 
intensive goods in household centred industries. According to statistics, in 1956- 
57 over 50% of the population lived in rural areas. As a result of the high birth 
rate, lack of sanitation and malnutrition the female mortality rate was higher than 
the male. As in most developing countries the female population was 2% less than 
the male population (Iran Statistical Year-book 1996: 35). 
In 1941, within the paid labour market 13,000 women workers were counted. 
This figure increased to 573,000 in 1956. Although child labour was prohibited, 
many children, the majority of them girls, worked in factories. Child labour in 
1956 did not differ much from the 1930s. Women were mostly employed in 
carpet weaving, textile and spinning factories; in factories making matches, glass 
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and cardboard boxes, in tea factories, cotton cleaning and gunny sack factories 
and in the embroidery industries. In the service sector they remained in the lowest 
grades of cleaning, catering, education and health. These women were 
categorised as unskilled labourers and therefore received a much lower wage rate 
than male workers (Afshar 1989: 43-44; Sanasarian 1982: 97). 
To conclude, under Reza Pahlavi, economic development took place through 
state-building and the modernisation of economy and society. Development 
indicators such as provision of health, education and employment reflected a 
change in the social and economic make-up of the Iranian society. Women were 
encouraged to participate in paid work, especially in the state sector. Nevertheless 
in the 1940s and 1950s Iran's economy was still based on agriculture and women 
constituted the majority of the unpaid workforce in rural areas and in urban areas 
they remained low-paid workers. 
4.3.2 Gender and politics 
Under the early years of Reza Shah's rule, some women's organisations and 
publications continued their activities. Afaghe Parsa, a member of Anjomane 
Nesvane Vatankhah (Patriotic Women's League) represented Iranian women at 
the International Congress of Women in Paris in 1926. Alame Nesvan (Women's 
Universe) magazine was published in 1930 and encouraged Iranian women's 
participation and representation at the Asian Women's conference to be held in 
India in 1931. In 1927 in Rasht in the north of Iran, four women, among them 
Roshanak Noodoost set up Anjoman Payke Saadat (The Messenger of Prosperity 
Organisation) published a magazine and established a girls' school both called 
Payke Saadat, and for the first time declared the 8 March as Women's Day in 
Iran. In the same year Zandokhte Shirazi, a poet and writer founded the Majmae 
Enghelabe Zanan (Revolutionary Women's League) in Shiraz, in the south of Iran, 
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and in 1931-32 published Dokhtarane Iran (Iranian Women) newspaper 
(Sanasarian 1982: 54 and Nahid 1981: 111-113) 
The founders of these organisations and publications were middle class women 
but they were conscious of the degrading conditions of working class women and 
worked hard to change these unfavourable circumstances. Under the dictatorial 
regime of Reza Shah the power of the Islamic clergy declined. However, the 
power of Islamic ideology on issues relating to women and the family remained 
strong (Paidar 1997: 120-123). Therefore, most feminists in this period 
concentrated on female education, health, unequal marriage and divorce laws. 
They only indirectly argued about the question of the veil and women's right to 
vote. Some of the leading members of this period were from Muslim families and 
considered the teaching of Islam necessary. But they were critical of the way 
women were treated. They argued that child marriage and not allowing women to 
be educated and to participate in the public sphere of life was unlslamic. Other 
leaders and organisations such as Nesvane Vatankhah under the leadership of 
Mohtaram Iskandari, who was a socialist, mobilised rallies and demonstrations 
against the clergy and the Islamic law (Sanasarian 1982: 46-47 and 54; 
Abrahamian 1982: 128). 
Soon Reza Shah's power was consolidated and with it all organisations, including 
women's organisations, were suppressed. In 1935 he ordered the establishment of 
the Kanoone Banovan (Ladies Centre). The aim was not to promote equal rights 
for women but to create one women's organisation under the control of the state. 
He only allowed charity work, sports clubs and adult literacy for women. During 
1935-36, as part of his modernisation of society, he campaigned to force women 
to abandon the veil in all public places. In 1937, the celebration of the 8 March 
was prohibited and 7 January was declared Women's Day, the first official day of 
the public unveiling campaign. Women responded to these actions differently, 
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many considered this to be not in support of women's emancipation but of police 
repression. But many celebrated the occasion. For example, Parvin Etesami 
(1907-1941) a well known woman poet who lived long to see it happening 
celebrated the occasion with a famous poem (Jayawardena 1986: 69; Bayat- 
Philipp 1978: 306). 
There was very little resistance to Reza Shah's autocratic state. Partly because 
individuals feared for their lives and organisations feared repression. Also because 
many feminist leaders of the previous period were disappointed with the secular 
constitutionalists who made concessions to the ulama and as a result, female 
suffrage and reform of female education and employment was sacrificed. Thus 
many welcomed Reza Shah's limited reforms of education and generally the 
modernisation of the economy and political and social changes. Seddighe 
Doulatabadi, the founder of Sazeman Sherkate Khavatin became the president of 
the Kanoone Banovan in 1937 and Fakhrozma Argum a member of Nesvane 
Vatankhah also joined the centre and edited two periodicals Banonan (Ladies) 
and Ayandeh Iran (Iran's future). For these women who for long struggled for 
female education and employment, on their own and without the support of their 
male counterparts, Reza Shah's limited reforms were a blessing (Najmabadi 1991: 
57-58). For example, by 1933 the number of girls' school had increased from 41 
in 1910 to 870 and the enrolment of girls increased from 2167 in 1910 to 50,000 
(Sanasarian 1982: 62). 
Reza Shah's reforms were based on massive repression of all political groups from 
communists to liberals and to protesting clergy, and trade unions, women's 
organisations and nationalities (Najmabadi 1991: 52 and Abrahamian 1982: 135- 
165). Iran's population has always been only two thirds Persian and Farsi (the 
official language) speakers with a third comprised of other nationalities and ethnic 
groups (Abrahamian 1982: 12). 
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Under Reza Shah's state these minorities were denied linguistic, cultural and 
national rights as well as other civil rights denied to the majority of the 
population. As a result there has existed a long tradition of fighting against the 
central state authority. 
The aim of Reza Shah's reform was to centralise state power which also meant 
keeping the clergy and religious institutions under strict control. Despite this, the 
reforms in relation to women and family remained ambiguous and not necessarily 
in contradiction with the basic Sharia law. For example the age of marriage was 
left to the interpretation of the age of puberty; a woman had the right to object to 
her husband marrying another wife and the man had to inform his wife if he 
intended to marry another woman. But, in many parts of the country civil courts 
did not exist and the local clergies remained in power and dealt with marriage and 
divorce issues according to their own interpretation of the law. The law continued 
to regard men as superior and they retained their Muslim privileges of having as 
many as four wives at a time and divorcing at will. Men were still recognised as 
the legal head of the family and enjoyed more favourable inheritance rights. 
Women remained deprived of the right to vote and could not stand for election. 
Nevertheless, these limited reforms led to a long lasting political conflict between 
Shia Islam leaders and the Pahlavi regime. At the heart of this conflict was the 
issue of women's unveiling and their participation in the public sphere of life 
(Sanasarian 1982 60-61; Yeganeh 1982: 32) 
After Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, the power of the state declined. As a result 
in the 1940s and early 1950s women's publications and organisations flourished 
and women's role in social and political activities expanded: Zanane Pishraw 
(Progressive Women) was published by Sedigheh Ganjeh; Ghiayme Zanan 
(Women's Revolt) was published by Soghra Aliabadi; Hoghughe Zanan 
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(Women's Rights) was published by Ebtehaj Mostahag; Azadi Zanan (The 
Emancipation of Women) was published by Zafardokht Ardalan; Zane Mobarez 
(Militant Women) was published by Kobra Saremi; Banu (The Lady) was 
published by Nayereh Saidi; Banuye Iran (Iran's Lady) was published by Malekeh 
Etezadi (Paidar 1997: 125-128). 
Badrulmoluk Bamdad founded Jamiyate Zanane Iran (Iranian Women's League) 
and published Zane Emruz (Today's Woman); Safiyeh Firuz founded Hezbe 
Zanane Iran (Iranian Women's Party) and Published Zanane Iran (Iran's Women). 
Fatimah Sayyah, the first woman professor from Tehran University, worked as a 
writer and a journalist and represented Iran at the United Nations. She edited 
Zanane Iran and raised issues for women's suffrage and their right to education 
and employment (Bahar 1983: 180). In 1945 Hezbe Zanane Iran- was transformed 
into the National Council of Women. These organisations and publications 
campaigned for women's education, legal rights, equality of rights in marriage and 
divorce and women's suffrage. The representative of these organisations attended 
international conferences in Paris (1946); in New York (1946) in Delhi (1947); in 
Beirut (1949) and Geneva (1953). Besides these a number of professional, 
religious and charity organisations were also established to promote health and 
education of women (Paidar 1997: 128). 
Tashkilateh Zanane Iran (The Organisation of Iranian Women) was the biggest 
women's organisationl and later became known as Jameheye Demokratike Zanan 
(the Society of Democratic Women). Its leading members were Zahra and Taj 
Iskandari, Maryam Firouz, Khadijeh Keshawarz, Akhtar Kambakhsh and 
Badrimonir Alavi, associated with the secular women's movement of the previous 
period. It published the monthly magazine of Bidarie Ma (Our Awakening). It 
had branches in major cities and their active members travelled to rural areas. 
They organised public meetings and through consciousness-raising activities 
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raised issues in relation to prostitution; unpaid work of women and child labour 
and demanded women's rights to social and political participation; education; 
health; employment; child care facilities and equal pay (Baliar 1983: 180; 
Yeganeh 1982: 33). 
During 1951-1953 women supporters of the nationalist movement and activists 
within Jebhe Melli (The National Front) played an important role in support of the 
nationalist government of Mossadegh by selling national government bonds to 
raise funds. Jebhe Melli's members and supporters consisted of both the modern 
and traditional middle classes. These women organisations were independent of 
the state. But they were closely related to different political parties. Therefore 
their political activities ranged from campaigning and raising issues in relation to 
Iran's independence from foreign domination to socialism and to promoting 
specific feminist issues. 
Despite their diversity, their collective activities influenced the reform of the 
labour law, which if it was implemented, could have been beneficial to female 
workers who constituted a large number of agricultural and handicraft workers. 
For example, in 1946 factory work was limited to 48 hours a weak. Overtime was 
made voluntary. Children could not work more than six hours a day and no child 
less than ten years old was allowed to work in factories. Women were to have 
twelve week paid maternity leave. A minimum wage was established based on 
subsistence costs for a family of four (Keddie 1981: 121). 
In 1952 the National Council of Women which was a confederation of various 
women's groups wrote a petition demanding political and economic rights for 
women, especially the right to vote. They collected 100,000 signatures and sent 
them to Prime Minister Mossadegh, the Majlis and the United Nations. But under 
pressure from the religious wing of the Jebhe Melli and the clergy women were 
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not granted the right to vote under Mossadegh's premiership. (Sanasarian 1982: 
75; Abrahamian 1982: 336). 
Nevertheless, during the CIA coup d'etat of 1953 and overthrow of Mossadegh, 
many women, under the leadership of different women's organisations, fought 
side by side with men, against the government's forces and some were killed. 
After the defeat of the nationalist and communist movements Mohammad Reza 
Shah crushed all opposition including women's organisations and publications. In 
1958, Shoraye Aliye Jamiate Zanan (The High Council of Women's Organisation) 
was formed under the presidency of Ashraf Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah's twin 
sister. Some of the feminist activists of the previous period joined this 
organisation in order to be able to carry on the pressure for reforms on women's 
issues. For example, Nurol Hoda Manganeh who was a member of the old 
Nesvane Vatankhah joined this organisation and edited Bibi magazine in 1955 and 
wrote for various periodicals and journals on women's issues (Sanasarian 1982: 
83-85; Yeganeh 1982: 32). 
A number of women's publications continued to be produced under the 
supervision of the state: Ettellaat Banovan (Women's Information); Nedaye 
Zanan (Women's Call); Banuye Iran (Iran's Lady) and Zanane Iran (Women of 
Iran). A number of women's organisations also continued their activities with the 
general consent of the government: Jamiyat Rah Now (The New Path League); 
The League of Women Supporters of the Declaration of Human Rights; The 
Association of Women Lawyers and Federation of Women's Organisations. These 
organisations, despite political repression campaigned for women's rights, 
especially for women's rights to vote (Paidar 1997: 134-137). 
To conclude, during 1925-1960 the authoritarian state of Pahlavi did not allow 
women's independent organisations and actions. However, at any opportunity 
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women used the weakening of the state to set up women's organisations and 
struggled for reforms. Despite a drive to secularisation of the state Sharia 
remained untouched in laws concerning women, especially in the area of morality, 
marriage, divorce, and family relationships. 
4.4 1960 -1979 
4.4.1 Gender and economic processes 
This section will assess the process of economic development in the 1960s and 
1970s. These two decades transformed Iran's economy and society on a much 
greater scale than previous periods. Nevertheless women were incorporated into 
the economic processes differently from men. 
The years 1960 - 1965 were years of massive economic and political changes. In 
June 1963, after months of mass strikes, demonstrations and university 
occupations, where thousands were injured and some were killed. Mohammad 
Reza Shah, hereafter referred to as the Shah, launched a programme of reform, 
known as the White Revolution of the Shah and the People. 
The White Revolution further transformed Iranian economy and society. Its 
programme (land reform; industrialisation; nationalisation of natural resources; 
female suffrage; formation of a literacy and health corps) was to provide a stable 
social, economic and political system. Two important social groups: medium 
sized capitalist farmers and entrepreneurs, emerged who had an interest in 
maintaining the regime. The vastly expanded numbers of state employees, mainly 
in the cities, also benefited from the reforms. 
Land reform did not re-distribute the land on a massive scale, but it established 
capitalist relations of production in agriculture. Over 100,000 individuals owned 
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and controlled five to six million hectares of land and a small number owned and 
controlled medium size lands. The land reform also created 1.5 million small 
holdings and landless agricultural workers This was done by the introduction of 
money through rents and loans. The land owners were provided with capital in 
order to employ wage labourers and produce for the national market (Moaddel 
1991: 318). 
Land reform, limited the economic power of the clergy, who for centuries, had 
relied on donations from large pre-capitalist landowners as well as donations from 
the Bazaar (market place). Land reform ended a main source of their revenue, 
leaving them dependent on the Bazaar which was itself being undermined by the 
industrialisation of the economy. The establishment of a Literacy Corps, under 
which young men were conscripted into the army and sent as teachers into the 
rural areas expanded secular education and totally undermined the role of the 
clergy in education. 
In 1960 when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was 
formed, Iran was the smallest producer and exporter but by 1970 it had become 
the second largest in the world. Iran's share of its oil increased to 96%. Iran 
gained ownership and control over the price and the level of its production 
previously controlled and owned by the oil majors. As a result oil revenue 
increased to $22 billions (Halliday, 1979: 143). 
The oil money was the instigator of economic development. As the recipient of oil 
revenues the state became the main force for industrial growth. The Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of Iran increased ten fold between 1962 and 1974. 
Industrial production accounted for 15% of the GDP and employed around 
20% of the economically active population. By 1975,60% of all industrial 
investment was directed by the state. The state also undertook the building of 
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infrastructure. The private sector subsidised by the state concentrated on light 
industries whilst foreign capital invested in areas of technology and management 
in both heavy and light industries. Official policy on foreign investment under the 
Shah's regime favoured joint ventures. 
In this period, Iran's economic development was compared with that of Mexico 
and was seen as potentially able to become a major industrial power by the end of 
the century (Halliday 1979: 167-8). The state, as the recipient of the oil income 
and the main agent of economic development was closely linked to the western 
powers, especially the USA which had both economic and political interests in 
Iran and throughout the region. The bourgeoisie, consisting of one thousand 
families, controlled key sectors of the economy and was also closely tied to 
international capital and with the Pahlavi family. They owned 85% of the major 
private firms involved in agribusiness, banking, manufacturing, foreign trade, 
insurance, and urban construction and occupied positions such as senior civil 
servants, and high ranking military officers (Moaddel: 1991: 317). The process of 
industrialisation relatively declined the role of the Bazaar. But still a large number 
of merchants were engaged in the bazaar as wholesale traders and retailers and 
controlled a third of imports and two thirds of retail trade (ibid: 318). The 
commercialisation of agriculture and the growth of manufacturing industry 
speeded up the process of proletarianisation. However, semi proletarianisation 
and petty commodity production as other forms of labour organisation persisted. 
Economic growth led to the improvement in material welfare, especially in the 
areas of health, education, provision of new types of consumer goods, and the 
strength of the labour force. (Abrahamian 1982: 426-435; Halliday, 1979: 138- 
173). However, the process of economic development was uneven, modem 
technology did not reach the majority of industries. In textile industries where 
women constituted the majority of the workforce, production remained labour 
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intensive and productivity remained low (Bartsch: 1977: 323-24). The process of 
proletarianisation intensified. However, the multiplicity of ways of using labour 
discriminated against female labour who constituted a greater share of semi- 
skilled, unskilled and unpaid family workers in comparison with male workers. 
Improvement in health led to lower mortality rates but despite better education 
and family planning, the rate of population growth remained as high as 2.7%. 
Despite industrialisation and urbanisation, there was widespread malnutrition, low 
life expectancy and high infant mortality. Half of the population lived in rural 
areas and the female population continued to be less than the male population 
(Iran Statistical Year-book 1996: 35). 
In rural areas, women's unpaid work in agriculture and in pastoral nomadic 
activities continued. Land reform and the introduction of wage labour had little 
effect on the role of women as unpaid agricultural producers and carpet weavers. 
In some ways women's position deteriorated. The small plots of land distributed 
to poor peasants were not enough for their survival, they were neither able to 
benefit from rent nor in a position to obtain loans or, if they did, to pay back their 
debt. This led to male migration to the cities, leaving the land and the production 
to women. As is shown in table 4.1, in the majority of cases, a woman followed 
her husband and family or migrated in order to marry a husband who was chosen 
for her. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of female and male reasons for migration in rural 
and urban areas in 1972. 
Urban areas Rural areas 
Male Female Male 
Female 
Looking for work 165000 13000 4000 
Better work 620000 2000 71000 
Job Transfer 177000 9000 17000 1000 
Education 24000 3000 1000 0 
Marriage 3000 275000 1000 48000 
With family 921000 1506000 104000 
133000 
Other 112000 23000 40000 2000 
Total 2022000 1831000 238000 
184000 
* represents less than 1000 persons 
Source: Extracted from Iran Year-book 1977: 39 
The family remained interconnected with the labour market and women's choice 
and power of decision making were not equal to men's. Women were much more 
confined than men in their job opportunities. Their triple role as mothers, wives 
and workers affected their chances in the labour market. The mechanisation of 
agriculture did not affect women's work, mainly weeding, picking, planting and 
harvesting, and often increased women's hours of work where better ploughed 
and irrigated land extended their responsibilities (Tabari 1982: 7). Table 4.2, 
shows that despite improvement in female literacy rate, the gap between male and 
female literacy rate was still high. 
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Table 4.2: Comparison of female and male literacy rate in urban and rural 
areas 1966 -1977 
Total population Literacy rate 
Years Total Female Male 
1966-67 29.4 17.9 40.1 
1976-77 47.5 35.5 58.9 
Urban areas Literacy rate 
Years Total Female Male 
1966-67 50.4 38.3 61.4 
1976-77 65.4 55.6 74.4 
Rural areas Literacy rate 
Years Total Female Male 
1966-67 15.1 4.3 25.4 
1976-77 30.5 17.3 43.6 
Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical year-book 1992: 113 
Therefore, males benefited from education opportunities more than females which 
could explain why women were concentrated in low-paid jobs within the labour 
market. Thus, the state and its institutions, the family, the education system and 
the labour market pervade gender division and the continuation and perpetuation 
of women's subordination. 
In some areas, He for women was different. Among the nomadic pastoralists, 
women work remained an important part of the nomadic household economy and 
survival: milking; milk processing (yogurt, butter, cheese and oil); preparation of 
animal derivatives (skin, hair and wool); care of animals; light firewood collection; 
bringing of water; gathering wild plants; bread baking; cooking and child care; 
weaving; spinning and dyeing the yarn. Women prepared the goods to be taken to 
99 
towns by men for trade, but they did not receive any payment for their work 
(Beck 1978: 358-360). 
In the 1970s, 13% of all women over the age of 12 or 1.4 million were in paid 
employment. In industries 70% of all cloth weaving employment and 72% of 
carpet weaving employment was in the rural sector (Halliday 1979: 191-193). 
90% of this workforce was female and 40% of them were under the age of 
fifteen. They either worked as unpaid family workers or received very low wages, 
worked in appalling conditions and were at the mercy of the middle-men who 
employed them (Tabari 1982: 7). In 1970 in Yazd textile mills women were 
employed and were paid 75 pence per day (Fischer 1978: 192-193). 
As is shown in table 4.2 in urban areas the literacy rate amongst women was 
higher than in rural areas. This was an important factor for women in urban areas 
to have better employment opportunities. Also in urban areas, the growth of 
industries and services and the state bureaucracy provided better opportunities for 
women's participation in the labour force. In 1974/75 the state ministries (the 
majority of them in urban areas) employed 297,863 workers of which 29% were 
females; in 1972/3 the large industries employing more than ten workers (the 
majority of them private enterprises in urban areas) employed 249,649 workers of 
which 8% were women and in 1972/73 the small private enterprises employed 
6,922,000 workers of which 9% were women and the majority of them (17%) 
were unpaid family workers who worked in household-centred work places in 
rural areas (Iran Statistical Year-book 1977/78: 66,386,50). 
In urban employment 200,000 were in a professional category, working within the 
state and service sector of the economy as doctors; engineers; architects; 
pharmacists; university professors; and judges. Some women became 
parliamentary deputies, senators, ministers and ambassadors. In other occupations 
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the proportion of women was: 45% in teaching; 44% in clerical and 
administrative positions; 11% in medical and para-medical positions (Najmabadi 
1991: 61; Halliday 1979: 191-193). 
The rapid and uneven industrial development in this period affected only a very 
small sector within the economy, creating regional, class and gender 
differentiations. In 1978, the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita reached 
above $2000. However, 87% of Iran's villages had no school, only 1% had a 
medical facility of any sort, 40-50% of the budget went on military spending and 
prices had risen steeply. The investment programme was highly import 
consuming. By 1978, non-oil exports covered only 3.1 per cent of imports 
making the country's growth dependent mainly on oil exports. The country's 
imports consisted mainly of capital goods, semi-manufactured goods, food, arms 
and consumption goods to satisfy the growing demand of the newly rich middle 
class (Abrahamian 1982: 426-435; Halliday 1979: -173). 
This pattern resulted in middle class prosperity, concentrated in a large state 
bureaucracy and in a service sector enjoying salary increases of over 30 per cent 
per year, compared to a lower income group which remained squeezed under the 
pressure of high inflation, on average 15% per annum between 1974 and 1978. 
Under these circumstances for the majority of the population the state was an 
institution which served the interests of foreign powers and the dominant classes. 
By the end of 1975 the fall off in oil demand, coupled with the high rate of 
domestic and international inflation, led to cash flow problems. To carry out and 
finance its industrialisation plans, Iran had to borrow massively from the 
international banks. Iran then was seen as a country unable to feed large parts of 
its population, in massive debt to the international banks and with a falling oil 
revenue. The ruling class went on an orgy of corruption and speculation, spending 
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and making quick profits and salting away their monies in foreign banks 
(Abrahamian 1982: 426-435; Halliday 1979: -173). 
Property speculation, corruption and hoarding of commodities led to an inflation 
rate of near 40%. Rent consumed an average of one quarter of earnings, cheap 
food went off the market, industrial production began to fall back, and official 
figures estimated an unemployment rate of 15%, with no benefits. During this 
time Iran became the largest market for arms imports in the world. The number of 
American military advisers reached 24,000 and it was expected to grow to about 
60,000. Sazemaneh Ettellaat Va Amniat Keshvar (SAVAK, the secret police) 
was expanded and employed over 5300 full time agents and a large but unknown 
number of part-time informers. In 1973 Tehran became the headquarter of the 
Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) in the Middle East and in 1975, Hezbe- 
Rastakhiz (the Resurgence Party) was established and the Shah declared Iran a 
one party system (Abrahamian 1982: 435-446; Halliday, 1979: 64-103) 
In conclusion, economic transformation in the 1960s and 1970s marginalised the 
role of the clergy in economy and society, but as will be discussed in the next 
section Sharia law determined gender roles and relations within family and 
society. The oil economy became the dominant source of accumulation and 
surplus which led to industrialisation, the building of infra-structure and improved 
health; education and employment opportunities. However, the process of 
economic development was structurally and spatially uneven. The state 
bureaucracy provided a limited employment opportunity for a minority of women 
in urban areas. The majority of women constituted the bulk of semi-skilled, 
unskilled and unpaid family workers, working in industries where new technology 
was not applied and production remained labour intensive. The female population 
remained less than the male population which is the characteristic of many 
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developing countries where women's health was neglected and female's education 
lagged behind male's. 
4.4.2 Gender and Politics 
This section will examine the contradiction between modernisation of the 
economy and society and the persistence of Shia ideology on gender roles and 
relations and how state-sponsored patriarchy perpetuated female subordination, 
despite economic and political changes. It will also assess women's responses and 
their struggle for change under the repressive regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
during 1960s-1970s. 
The weakening of state power prior to the 1963 White Revolution allowed a 
degree of political struggle by women, workers, students and the clergy. In 1962 
various women's organisations of the previous decade became active again. They 
campaigned vigorously for women's right to vote, by lobbying ministers and 
Majlis deputies. Finally the law was drafted but under the pressure of the clergy 
and their opposition to the bill, its implementation was postponed. The women's 
campaign intensified, petitions were signed, letters were sent to media and the 
politicians. In January 1963 they refused to celebrate Reza Shah's Women's Day, 
the day of compulsory unveiling. Women teachers, civil servants and employees 
of private enterprises called for a day of general strike and marched to the prime 
minister's office and presented their demand. Finally on 27 February 1963 women 
achieved electoral rights (Hendessi 1990: 8; Sanasarian 1982: 82-83). 
The White Revolution allowed Mohammad Reza Shah to consolidate his power 
under American intervention. The increase in oil revenue changed the character of 
the state. The state no longer relied on taxation for revenue but solely on oil 
revenue. This made Mohammad Reza Shah's dictatorial state different from his 
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father's. Under Reza Shah the political elite participated in the decision making, to 
a degree. Under Mohammad Reza Shah they were silenced. He saw himself not 
just as the head of state, but as the state itself. As a result citizens were no longer 
expected to participate in state-building. He was building a state based on the oil 
revenue and the citizens were to serve it, benefit from it, and be obedient and 
grateful to him (Najmabadi 1991: 58-59). 
Therefore, women's activities were not only controlled by the state but were also 
initiated by the state. In his famous interview with Oriana Fallaci the Shah 
rejected the whole notion of gender equality by expressing his contemptuous 
attitude to women. He asserted that "you may be equal in the eyes of the law but 
not in ability, as you have never produced a Michelangelo, a Bach or even a good 
chef" (Fallaci 1976: 271-272). But under internal and international pressure he 
made some reforms for and on behalf of women at times suitable to his 
international image. In 1963 six women were elected as the Majlis deputies and 
two women were appointed by the Shah to the senate. In 1965 he appointed 
Faroukhru Parsa as the first female minister for education (Sanasarian 1982: 79- 
100). 
In 1966 Shoraye Aliye Jamiate Zanan (High Council of Women's Association) 
was dissolved and replaced by Sazemaneh Zanan Iran (Women Organisation of 
Iran, WOI). Thirty three associations (religious and national minorities, charity 
and some professional groups) constituted its structure and membership (Iran 
Almanac 1967: 518-525). Many active members of this organisation came from 
political families who were involved in the political struggles of the previous 
decades. They developed certain ideas for reform of family law but they had to 
wait until the time was right for the Shah to grant the reforms. For example in the 
mid 1970s, Manochehrian, a woman senator and a lawyer proposed that the 
requirement of the husband's permission for a married woman to obtain a passport 
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be eliminated. Her proposal was rejected and she was forced to resign her seat 
(Najmabadi 1991: 63). 
Nevertheless, the WOI created family welfare centres in various parts of the 
country. It provided health, education, legal aid, child care facilities, vocational 
training and free contraception. In 1967 the Family Protection Act (FPA) 
reformed the family law. According to this reform a man could only marry a 
second wife with the permission of the court. In 1975 the consent of the first wife 
was added to the 1967 reform, unless the first wife was unable to have sexual 
relationship with her husband or unable to bear children. The first wife also had 
the right to ask for divorce if her husband married a second wife. A woman could 
apply for divorce if her husband was unable to have sexual relationship with her; 
unable to provide for her; ill-treated her; suffered from contagious disease; 
abandoned her or was insane. Divorce could only be obtained in the civil courts. 
The 1975 Act also increased the age of marriage to 18 for women and 20 for 
men. In 1977 abortion was legalised, but married women had to obtain their 
husband's written consent. Unmarried women with their own written request 
could have an abortion. 
These reforms were ambiguous. For example, in the majority of cases consent to 
a husbands' polygamy was often given by the woman because of fear of violence 
from the husband. Also these reforms were not contradictory to the Sharia law, 
they were modified and left women as inferior beings in the following ways: the 
man was still the head of the family; a wife was still legally forbidden to hold a job 
which the husband may consider damaging to the dignity and prestige of the 
family; a woman could not leave the country without the permission of her 
husband or father; the wife was not free to choose her place of residence; a 
woman, regardless-of her age, had to obtain permission of her father to marry for 
the first time; at divorce, the father retained the custody of the children. Even with 
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the husband's death, it was the grandfather on the fathers' side that automatically 
became the guardian over the children and not the children's mother; according to 
Ghesas (the law of retribution), a part of Sharia law, it was not a criminal offence 
for a man to kill his wife for the defence of his dignity; women could not be 
employed as members of the political staff to the foreign ministry; in the course 
of land reform, the land was sold only to men; the Muslim system of polygamy 
under which a man can have four wives remained legal, although the number of 
polygamous marriages declined for economic reasons and strengthened the 
nuclear family relationship. Sighe (temporary marriage) when in Shia Islam, a man 
took a woman as his wife for a limited period, continued to be sanctioned by the 
clergy (Bahar 1983: 182; Sanasarian 1982: 88-96). 
The reform of the labour law was a step forward for female workers. For 
example, in the 1970s employers were responsible for payment for a woman's 
maternity leave through the workers' insurance scheme. Paid maternity leave was 
ten weeks (Six weeks before and four weeks after childbirth). All workplaces 
which had more than ten women with babies had to organise a nursery and 
women workers were allowed to breast feed every three hours. However, many 
workplaces did not have a nursery and women workers had to leave their children 
with their parents, friends and neighbours. Also women (except nurses) were 
forbidden to work between 10 pm - 6am and to do heavy work, as women were 
considered weak. This was in accordance with Islamic ideology of giving priority 
to family structure and making women available for their families which 
discriminated against women as they were categorised unskilled and therefore 
law-paid (Pakizehgi 1978: 222-223). 
Similarly, by 1975, the number of women in highly professional categories 
increased: 18 female Majlis deputies, 2 senators, 2 deputy ministers, 28 court 
lawyers and a few hundred councillors. In 1975 the Shah ordered the WOI to join 
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the Rastakhiz party and selected five women to be on the executive board of the 
party. But in the summer of 1978 when political opposition to the Shah's system 
escalated, he gave concessions to the religious leaders who were asking for 
greater adherence to Islam by reversing women's rights. He reduced the age of 
marriage for girls from eighteen to fifteen and dropped the post of Minister of 
State for Women's Affaires. Mahnaz Afkhami, who was also the Secretary- 
general of the WOI was not given any other cabinet post (Sanasarian 1982: 100- 
114). 
These reforms had been part of the culture of modernity which resulted from the 
development of capitalism in Iran with its accompanying industrialisation and the 
establishment of new political and social institutions based on the western model. 
They barely affected the lives of the majority of rural working women who 
remained poor, illiterate and unpaid familyworkers. In urban areas the majority of 
working class women constituted the first generation of rural migrants who lived 
in shanty towns or in poverty, with limited education and a subsistence wage. 
Both groups remained attached to Islamic values. 
Thus the Shah's state, in the 1960s and 1970s, only entitled a minority of women 
to some reforms. Moreover, the Bazaar economy and its associated traditional 
middle class were weakened. This meant that the role of those who carried on 
retail, export trade and manufacture of traditional commodities declined. The 
growth of supermarkets, department stores and large banks, reduced the role of 
the Bazaar. Instead those who, with the help of the state, carried on retail, 
import, export and - manufacture of modern commodities or those who 
participated in the state bureaucracy became the dominant class, encouraged and 
supported by the state. As a result the political power of the traditional middle 
class was also undermined by the weakening of the religious institution, the 
mosque. Nevertheless the uneven economic development meant that their 
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economic and political decline was relative. The massive migration from the rural 
areas made their existence viable as there was a need for petty retailers, Bazaar 
wholesalers and money lenders. Therefore their numbers remained considerable 
and they became hostile to the Shah's reforms as the traditional Bazaar values - 
the close family, financial and cultural ties of the Bazaar with the ulama - were 
being undermined by modem values associated with the modemisation of the 
economy, society, and the state (Keddie 1981: 244-245). 
The impact of this form of modernisation, in this period, was particularly painful 
for the traditional middle class women. They had to go through the process of 
modernisation of the education system and the job market by observing the 
absolute Islamic values of segregation, including wearing the chador dictated by 
their families, especially male relatives who regarded the culture of modernity as 
horrific and inappropriate for their women. 
But for respecting these values and traditions they had to pay the heavy price of 
being labelled as backward in schools, universities and workplaces. These women 
were torn between their families' traditional values and a society which promoted 
western values, including the wearing of the latest European fashion. They were 
expected by their families to leave their home wearing the chador as a sign of 
honouring their family's norm and tradition. But outside of the home they felt 
rejected for wearing the chador which was assumed to be the sign of 
backwardness. Many tried to resolve this dilemma by accommodating both 
values. They left home veiled and took their veil off before entering schools, 
universities or the workplaces. But many others under the pressure of the family 
took a defensive position and wore the veil outside of the home as a sign of 
protest to the uneven economic, political and social change (Tabari 1982: 9-10). 
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The impact of modernisation and secularisation on the modern middle class was 
different. It allowed the development of new ideas, and encouraged a degree of 
struggle to challenge the patriarchal values. Despite political repression and the 
continuation of traditional values attached to Shia Islam gender ideology a small 
but nevertheless significant number of women, to a limited extent, experienced 
some aspects of the women's liberation which was occurring in other parts of the 
world. These women began to fight traditional values as a way of freeing 
themselves from the double standard of male centred values and perceptions on 
how women should behave. They fought for divorce and refused Mahr and 
Nafaghe which are essential conditions in an Islamic marriage. The rejection of 
the Islamic institution of marriage was a protest against the treatment of female 
sexuality and her reproductive role as a tradeable commodity. It was also against 
male entitlement to female services ranging from control over her sexuality and 
fertility to her activities inside and outside of the home. They began temporary or 
permanent relationships with men, including sexual relationships, outside 
marriage. But their experience was no less painful than the traditional middle class 
women, as this behaviour was unacceptable and unforgivable within the family 
and society. Families, regardless of their secular or Islamic sympathies began to 
reject Gharbzadegi (Westoxication) which meant the celebration of the corrupt 
culture of the West. Gharbzadeh woman, a woman who transgressed the norm of 
her community went under enormous attack. The imposition of social control, 
with a varied degree according to the degree of secular belief of the family was a 
common thread throughout the society to denounce the Gharbzadeh woman and 
limit her moral behaviour (Najmabadi 1991: 64-65). 
My own experience of this period was similar to that of many young women who 
were the victims of the contradictory rules of having secular education and being 
expected to participate in the public sphere of life but at the same time bound to 
the Islamic values of morality. My process of socialisation was totally secular and 
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members of my family were supporters of the communist and nationalist 
movements in the 1950s when close relatives were imprisoned and tortured. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, when these movements were suppressed, my family became 
sympathetic to the Shah's process of modernisation. However, they pressurised 
me to get married when I was seventeen and still at school. Their fear was that 
the culture of Gharbzadegi may lead me to moral degeneration. Under these 
pressures I got married, hoping to be able to free myself from my family's double 
standard values. My marriage only survived three years during which time I had 
two children and did not feel free from the male-centred values and perceptions. I 
resented all the forces that inhibited my potential and I dared to break the norm by 
leaving my husband and demanded divorce. My punishment was to be denied not 
only the custody of my children according to the Islamic law but also not having 
access to visit them. 
Many women suffered from another form of dual role which was expected from 
them by religion and the state. In 1992 when I interviewed four Iranian women in 
London about their experiences of the 1960s-1970s in Iran, Mandana explained 
the way she was forced by her own mother to go through a virginity test, in case 
she was not a virgin and therefore, unable to marry a man who was superior to 
her. Mana, despite her secular education and style of life was made so paranoid 
about her virginity that when she went for her entry examination for a teachers' 
training course, she wrote nothing on the answer sheet in order to fail, because 
part of the examination involved a virginity test and she was scared by the idea 
that she may not be a virgin. These experiences may be unique as individual cases 
but they also represent the experiences of many others (Poya 1992: 141-162). 
My generation was greatly inspired by Forough Farokhzad (1935-1967) a great 
feminist, poet and film maker. She married when she was sixteen and was 
eighteen when her son was born. Two years later she left her husband and she lost 
110 
the custody of her child and was denied visits with him. She expressed her pain 
and grief in her poetry collections Asir (Captive) and Divar (Wall). She lived a 
free and varied life usually reserved for men. She dared to write about her 
sexuality, her feelings and activities in her poetry. In her other collections Osian 
(Rebellion), Tavaledi Digar (Another Birth) and Iman Biavarim be Aghaze Fasle 
Sard (Let us believe in the dawn of the cold season) she expressed the feeling of 
many young women of that period who were the victim of the popular perception 
of the illegitimacy and immorality of breaking the norm. In 1967 at the age of 
thirty two she died in a car accident. She devoted her life and her poetry to 
exposing the double standard of male-centred values and perceptions and how 
women were manipulated by those values and perceptions which had confusing 
affect on their lives, making them unable to operate within- a patriarchal system. 
Her poetry expressed hostility towards a secular state and economy which 
preserved all the traditional values which were a hindrance to changing the 
unequal treatment of men and women., (Milani 1985: 317-331; Keddie 1981: 196; 
Warnock Fernea and Qattan Bezirgan 1977: 291-319). 
In the 1970s women's political participation both inside and outside of the country 
increased. Many women during this period realised that as long as poverty and 
repression exist in Iran women would continue to be regarded as inferior beings. 
They played an important role in the fight back against the system. Even the 
official statistics estimated that there were thousands of women political prisoners 
in the Shah's jails. While torture was a common fate for all political prisoners in 
the Shah's jail, the women were subjected to particularly cruel and degrading 
forms of torture, including rape. Abroad Iranian women joined the anti-Shah 
struggle and were active for many years in student, political and women's 
organisations. 
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The secular opposition consisted of a number of small organisations, operating 
underground. The most important one was Cherikhaye Fedaiye Khalghe 
(Fedayeen Guerilla Organisation) which developed out of a split from the pro 
Soviet Tudeh Party. They believed in armed struggle as the prime means of 
overthrowing the regime. They adopted a variant of Marxist dependency theory 
and borrowed an analysis and strategy of national liberation that called for 
popular unity of the masses against the regime and imperialism. Many women 
activists joined this organisation in Iran, many were arrested, tortured and killed. 
Well known among them was Ashraf Dehghani one of the founding and leading 
member of the organisation who escaped from prison and in exile wrote her book 
Hemaseh Moghavemat (The legend of Resistance) and revealed facts about the 
condition of political prisoners in Iran. She continued her struggle in exile and 
returned to Iran during the 1979 revolution (Bahar 1983: 184). 
But, within the secular left, there was ignorance and lack of interest in women's 
issues. Struggle against gender inequality was considered divisive and 
jeopardizing to the unity of the movement. The task was to raise the slogan of 
equality and liberation of women and wait until the victory of socialism. 
Disillusioned and isolated both on personal and political levels I joined the many 
other Iranian women abroad. I became involved in the women's and students' 
movement of the 1970s, but soon became known to SAVAK and had to remain in 
exile until the 1979 revolution. 
As a whole the secular left was isolated. They failed to understand the 
contradictory changes which were taking place in Iran. Blindly, they followed 
their formulae for liberation and socialism, failing to relate to the majority of the 
population, who were affected by the contradictions of economic and socio- 
political development. They did not relate to class, gender and racial inequalities 
in society except in an abstract way, as was the case with religion and religious 
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values. This facilitated the easy takeover of power by the conservative Islamic 
opposition. 
Beside the secular opposition there was also an Islamic opposition. The most 
important one was Mujahedeen Khalgh (The Islamic Guerilla organisation) which 
developed from the religious wing of the National Front led by Ayatollah 
Taleghani in the 1960s. They believed in a link between Islam and modern ideas 
(Abrahamian: 1982: 464-473; Keddie 1981: 236-239). Many women joined the 
Mojahedeen. Two women, Mother Rezai and Mother Shayegan symbolised the 
resistance of Iranian mothers whose children were tortured and killed by SAVAK 
but they remained in opposition and they themselves were arrested and tortured 
(Bahar 1983: 183-184). 
All Shariati, a French educated sociologist inspired by Frantz Fanon, was the 
ideologue of modernised Islam2. His message was that Islam, particularly Shi'ism, 
was a revolutionary ideology that permeated all spheres of life, especially politics, 
and inspired true believers to fight against all forms of oppression, exploitation 
and social injustice. Ayatollah Khomeini also led the clerical opposition to the 
Shah's regime from exile first in Turkey and later in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s. 
He opposed the regime for being a threat to Islam and to nationalism in Iran. He 
did not attack the communists; nationalists and women's rights issues. He 
attacked the Shah's regime for exploiting the country's resources and the people 
and for using women as sex objects to promote consumerism. He stated that in 
Islam women and men are equal (Abrahamian 1982: 450-480; Sanasarian1982: 
117). 
In reality, Shariati's Islamic populism complemented Khomeini's theory of Velayat 
Fagih (the governance of the religious jurist). This meant the Islamisation of the 
state and society on the model of the original Islamic community of prophet 
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Muhammad and his immediate successors. This fundamentalist Islam insists that 
Islam is a religion and a state. An Islamic state must apply the tenets of Islamic 
doctrine, above all Sharia law to all aspects of social and economic life. So 
Ayatollah Khomeini was explicitly rejecting the secular state. Throughout the 
1970s he urged not only an adherence to Islamic law but the establishment of an 
Islamic state (Bakhash 1985: 38-40; Rose 1983 : 166-188). Shariati did not 
oppose this but he insisted that all modem concepts and doctrines of European 
social thought are contained in a superior form in the Quran. This gave an illusion 
to the opposition. They interpreted Shariati's writing and speeches as being 
secular and believed that Ayatollah Khomeini was on their side (Zubaida 1982). 
Shariati died in 1977 and left Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader of the opposition. 
In October 1978 Ayatollah Khomeini moved to Neuphle-le-Chateau near Paris. 
This strengthened his opposition as he had access to journalists from the world's 
leading media to express his views. Iranian political leaders (National Front, 
Fedayeen, Mujahedeen and the Tudeh party) visited Ayatollah Khomeini in his 
new head-quarters and acknowledged Khomeini's domination of the opposition 
movement. The groundwork was laid for the Islamic state. 
In January 1979 as a journalist I visited Ayatollah Khomeini in Neuphle-le- 
Chateau. I was told that I had to wear a black chador, otherwise he would not 
receive me. I explained to him that my family and close relatives opposed the 
Shah's regime and suffered persecution and that I had also suffered personal and 
political repression. Thus, as a woman who was looking forward to an end to the 
dictatorial system of the Pahlavi I was desperate to know whether women in 
Islamic Iran would be allowed to study in higher education; work equally along 
side men in paid employment and would have equal rights with men within family 
and the law. He did not answer my questions and practically asked me to leave by 
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angrily saying that "Yes, we have said it all, the problem is that you are talking 
too much woman, goodbye". 
The secular opposition and the traditional middle class cemented their alliance 
with Ayatollah Khomeini. The struggle in the streets and workplaces intensified. 
Khomeini's and Shariati's messages expressed the feelings and aspirations of the 
urban poor more effectively than the liberal and the left political groups who were 
attracted to Shariati's views. The majority of the population could not identify 
with the secular opposition. They found religious opposition more identifiable. 
There was a world apart between their life and a small majority who benefited 
from the process of economic development under the Pahlavi. The Islamic 
opposition took the form of nationalism in favour of independence from the 
Shah's repressive regime and its American ally 
Throughout 1978 opposition to the Shah's regime escalated. Up until June 1978, 
the demonstrations were predominantly composed of intellectuals, - students and 
the urban poor. From September 1978, workers effectively shut down almost all 
industrial establishments and services. Among the first strikers were women in 
telecommunications, nurses and hospital workers. As the strikes spread, with oil 
workers playing the most important role by reducing production to the amount 
necessary for internal consumption, women teachers, civil servants, and factory 
workers also participated intensively. (Bahar 1983: 184-188; Abrahamian 
1982: 496-525). 
Finally on 16th January, 1979 after 18 months of bitter struggle, the Shah was 
forced to leave the country. On 1st February Ayatollah Khomeini returned to 
Iran from his exile in Paris. Five days later he declared himself the head of the 
state. The nationalist and communist organisations mistakenly regarded 
Khomeini's Islamic anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism as an advance towards 
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nationalism and socialism. So they participated in the establishment of the Islamic 
state. 
In conclusion, women's struggle in the early 1960s led to women's suffrage. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s a powerful repressive state emerged which 
suppressed all movements, including the women's movement. Nevertheless 
women's actions achieved a degree of reforms in relation to women and family; 
women and education and employment. These reforms, however, only touched 
the lives of a minority of women in urban areas and even they were bound by the 
religious values of morality. As a result the majority of women were hostile to the 
modernisation of economy and society. A minority who benefited from material 
changes also suffered as they were caught between the contradictory demands of 
religion and the state. The uneven socio-economic and socio-political 
development led to mass opposition which led to the 1979 revolution. The mass 
participation of women reflected not just their desire to change the dictatorial 
system of the Pahlavi but also their struggle against the patriarchal social relations 
which was part and parcel of processes of economic development. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the inter-relationship between the process of 
capitalist development under foreign domination; Shia Islam ideology and class 
formation in the twentieth century in Iran has produced uneven economic, social 
and political developments. The state, as the main agent of capital accumulation, 
determined and regulated social relations within production and reproduction and 
simultaneously between classes and gender. It, therefore, operated as one single 
system of capitalism and patriarchy and determined the way women should be 
incorporated into the public sphere of life. 
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Under the influence of the state, capital and religion, social classes at different 
periods have had differential access to material resources, the values attached to 
religious ideology and political power. Whenever the power of the state 
weakened, women struggled and forced the state to reform. Reforms were made 
in relation to women's education, employment, unveiling and de-segregation. 
But the uneven development did not allow the majority of women to benefit from 
the changes. The majority of working women remained unpaid workers or low- 
paid workers. A minority of women benefited from the secular education, reform 
of the family law and the opportunities in the labour market. Some even occupied 
important positions. Despite this women's independence in the family and their 
independent presence in the public sphere were opposed. The state maintained its 
legitimacy by making concessions to Shia Islam gender ideology. Although the 
form of female subordination changed at different periods and affected different 
classes differently, gender identity based on Islamic tradition maintained sexual 
hierarchies, sexual division of labour and as a result female subordination. 
Notes 
1. This organisation was the Tudeh (masses) Party's, the pro-Soviet communist 
party womens' organisation. 
2. For an excellent analysis of Shariati's role see Rahnema A (1998) The Islamic 
toopian_, a political biography of All Shariati (I. B. Tauris) and Rahnema A (1994) 
"Ali Shariati, teacher, preacher, rebel" in Rahnema A, Pioneers of Islamic Revival 
(Zed Books). 
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Chapter Five 
1979-1981 
The Islamic sexual division of labour 
5.1 Introduction 
Following the 1979 revolution, the Islamic state rejected the economic policy of 
the Pahlavis and advocated an Islamic command economy, isolated from the 
global economy. It expanded the state sector and it intended to isolate the private 
sector of the economy. This policy,, combined with an international trade ban on 
Iran, led to economic depression. During this period, the state, based on the 
principles of its Islamic gender relations, also implemented policies which aimed 
at the seclusion of women. This policy required the complete exclusion of women 
from the public sphere, especially employment. The Islamic defence of women's 
place in. the home was that during the Pahlavi era a culture of consumerism was 
promoted which led to moral degeneration and the breaking down of Islamic 
values. The state, therefore, strengthened patriarchal relations in marriage and 
family life, by undoing the reforms of the family law. Based on the natural and 
biological relations between men and women, motherhood and wifehood were 
considered the most important tasks for women and bread-winning was the 
responsibility of men. This process of exclusion of women from the labour market 
was to begin with a policy of gender segregation in the public domain: strict dress 
codes for women, the introduction of gender division in education and 
employment which inevitably resulted in many women losing their jobs. 
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5.2 The numbers and disposition of women in the economy on the eve of 
revolution 
This section will examine the statistical data for female workforce participation 
before the 1979 revolution. The statistics published under the Pahlavi in 1978 
included the state ministries' employment in 1974/75 which was a total of 297,863 
of which 87,474 were women and 210,389 were men (Iran Statistical Year- 
book1977/78: 66). According to the Iranian national census, the state sector was 
that which employed workers who worked either in government or government- 
affiliated organisations for a wage or salary. Government-affiliated organisations 
were those in which at least half of their stock was government-owned. They 
operated under Ghanoone Estekhdame Keshvari (The Country's Employment 
Law). 
According to these statistics, women constituted 29% of the total workforce 
within different ministries in 1974/75. The percentage of women workers was 
highest in the ministries of education (41%); higher education (39%); tourism 
(27%); trade (27%) and health (26%). 
Aside from the administrative sector there were in 1972/73 3973 large industrial 
enterprises in Iran which employed more than ten workers. 3834 of these 
industries (97%) were owned and controlled by private entrepreneurs; 89 of them 
(2%) were owned and controlled by the state and 50 of them (1%) were joint 
ventures between the state and the private entrepreneur. They employed a total 
workforce of 249,649 of which 230,190 were men and 19,459 were women 
(Statistical Year-book 1977/78: 383-7). Women constituted 8% of the total 
workforce within these industries. The percentage of women workers was higher 
in smaller industries categorised as "others" (15%); textile industry (10%); 
chemicals (11%) and Food industries (9%). 
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Beside these industries, there were also a large number of small privately owned 
enterprises which were divided into the following categories of people: employers 
(all persons who were active in the private sector, who owned all or part of an 
establishment, and who had at least one employee); self-employed (all persons 
who were active in the private sector and owned all or part of an establishment 
but either worked alone or employed only unpaid family workers); unpaid family 
workers (all persons who worked in a shop, factory, farm or other types of 
establishment owned by another member of their household or by a relative and 
received no wage or salary); private sector employee (all persons in the private 
sector who worked for a wage or salary. These were firms which employed less 
than ten people). 
These enterprises operated under Ghanoone Kar va Omoreh Ejtemaie (The 
Labour Law and Social Affairs). In 1972/73 these industries employed 6,922,000 
of which 648,000 were women and 6,118,000 were men (Iran Statistical Year- 
book 1977/78: 50). Women constituted 9% of the total workforce within these 
industries. 17% worked as unpaid family workers; 10% as wage and salary 
earners; 7. % as self employed and 1% as employers. 
5.3 The Islamic state's initial programme of a minimal demand for female 
labour 
This section will assess the Islamic state's initial economic strategy, during 1979- 
1981 and its policy on gender and employment. After the revolution in 1979 and 
the establishment of the Islamic state, Ayatollah Khomeini, as the head of state, 
rejected the previous economic strategy under the Pahlavi. He argued that the 
Shah and his regime had plundered the country's resources by over-spending and 
promoting western-oriented consumerism. He blamed the west, the east and their 
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agents in Iran for ruining the economy. He suggested that an Islamic economic 
system, based on self-sufficiency would end all the plundering and usurpation of 
wealth (Rahnema and Nomani 1990: 235-237; Algar 1981: 115-116). 
Hence the political slogan of "Neither East, Nor West, but Islamic Republic" 
became popular. The ideal Islamic economic system was seen as self-sufficiency 
and agriculturally-oriented small scale production, with little or ideally no contact 
with the outside world's values, ideas, production relations or technology. It was 
claimed that under an Islamic economic system land, labour and capital would be 
utilised according to Sharia. This allotted landlords a fair amount of rent, the 
capitalists were entitled to a fair amount of profit and the workers were entitled to 
a fair wage. The ideal relationship between labour and capital was based on co- 
operation. Wage bargaining and trade unionism were considered unfair and both 
the capitalist and the workers were prohibited from exploiting one another. 
Borrowing was to be interest free, but despite this capital could grow because 
Islam allows profit which acts as an incentive to save. Moreover, the institution of 
zakat (Islamic tax) would inhibit accumulation and concentration of capital in few 
hands. The Islamic state was entitled to hold considerable economic power: to 
own property; receive taxes; organise and dispose of state and public properties 
and revenues. 
This philosophy engendered policies which led to the confiscation of the 
properties of the Pahlavi and their allies - private domestic owners of capital and 
the owners of foreign capital who had fled the country. Their property was 
brought under state ownership and control. Bonyade Mostasaffin (The 
Foundation for the Disadvantaged) was established to administer these properties 
including 200 large factories, farms, banks, hotels and trading companies 
(Rahnema and Momeni 1990: 240). A large state bureaucracy was created to 
administer the Islamisation of society. The workers in this new social bureaucracy 
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consisted of some of the traditional middle class, the urban poor and lumpen 
elements who provided an important element of Khomeini's support in the vital 
years after the fall of the Shah (Poya 1991). 
There was no controversy among the Islamic leaders on the economic role of the 
state. However, there was a dispute over the extent and the means by which the 
state - should intervene in the operation of the private sector (Rahnema and 
Nomani 1990: 146-159). Moreover, the enlarged state sector was heavily 
underfunded. A ban on Iranian oil imports had been adopted immediately after the 
US embassy occupation in November 1979 (see chapter eight). This led to a fall 
in oil revenue which diminished the state's capacity to invest and to subsidise. The 
private entrepreneurs who remained in the country and continued their activities 
under the Islamic state also relied on state regulation and subsidies. Therefore all 
sectors of the economy suffered and the result was rising unemployment. 
Iran's isolation in the world market also meant that the value of the Rial (Iran's 
currency) collapsed in the world market. In 1979 the value of the Rial in the 
foreign exchange markets fell by 25 fold ($1 = 70 Rials became $1 = 1750 Rials). 
This situation undermined Iran in foreign trade and created shortages and 
inflation. Under pressure from the shoras (workers councils which will be 
discussed further in chapter eight) the level of wages had increased. However, as 
a result of inflation real wages fell and therefore the wage increases did not help 
many poorer families. Unemployment and inflation drastically reduced purchasing 
power (Poya: 1991: 96-99). 
Moreover, during this period the public behaviour of women became a central 
issue. The Shah's regime was denounced as decadent and the cause of corruption 
of womanhood. A liberated woman was declared to be one who followed the path 
of Fatimah, daughter of the prophet Mohammad and Zaynab her daughter. As 
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previously explained, Fatimah represents and symbolises motherhood and 
womanhood, the perfect mother and wife in the sphere of the home, and Zaynab 
represents and symbolises the woman in the political and social sphere of life, 
fighting alongside men in the battlefields for Islam. A large number of women 
were sacked because they did not comply with Islamic dress and behaviour codes- 
Many others were offered early retirement and redundancy. Hence economic 
depression, combined with the state's policy of women's place in the home, 
reduced the demand for women's labour and increased the level of 
impoverishment. 
The explanation for sending women back to the home was that, like Zaynab, 
women had fulfilled their responsibilities in the public sphere of political life 
through demonstrations to bring about the revolution, the Islamic state and 
society. Now that the Islamic state had been established they had to go back to 
their main responsibility and concentrate on their activities in the sphere of the 
home and the family, acting "like Fatimah". 
At the heart of this position was a belief in the biological and psychological 
differences between the sexes, expressed in the writings of prominent Shia clergy 
in Iran such as Majiesi, Motahhari, Nouri and Tabatabai. Nouri (1964/5) and 
Tabatabai (1979/80) have used this argument to exclude women from holding 
positions in government, the assumption of the profession of judges, managerial 
positions and participation in war. Majlesi (1979) has also used these arguments 
to justify women's place in the home and allocating the responsibility of bread- 
winning and the protection of the family honour to men. Motahhari's book on 
The Rights of Women in Islam (1981) extensively discusses the relationship 
between the differences between women and men and the question of men's 
responsibility to maintain women, children and the family. Thus, according to this 
position, women had to be protected, looked after and controlled by men. 
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Even Shariati's writings (1990/1) which were considered by the liberal and the left 
wing political groups as progressive and radical, advocated the same principle by 
suggesting that the ideal woman in an Islamic society is Fatimah: 
As a mother she raised a daughter like Zaynab and sons like Hosein and 
Hassan. In a different aspect she was an exemplary wife, one that stayed 
every inch of the way with All through his loneliness, difficulties, problems 
and great moments (1990/1: 239). 
On this basis Zahra Rahnavard, a writer on women's issues and known as a 
Muslim feminist, argued: 
Motherhood and wifehood is the road to freedom and liberation. A woman 
has the revolutionary responsibility of showing the right path and 
prohibiting the wrong deed, decrying the false and teaching the right. It is 
women who teach the future generations and it is women who must endorse 
or reject any political agenda (n. d: 103-110). 
As a result of this ideology the state either forbade employment or made 
conditions increasingly difficult. Many, women lost their jobs in the legal 
profession. Many others were removed from top level government posts. On 3 
March 1979, a decree forbad women judges to work since, according to Islam, 
women are not fit to judge. Only those with the following characteristics can be 
judges: "Male, adult, Muslim, Shia, just, mojtahed (practising religious 
jurisprudence), legitimate child, with good and strong memory, able to write and 
read and visualise" (Payame Hajar 29.1.1992; Zanan nos 4-6 1993). Following 
this, the ministry of justice refused to issue decrees confirming women judges 
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(Ayandegan March - July 1979) and qualified women were told to apply for 
administrative posts in the judiciary. 
On 6 March 1979, the Minister of Defence, General Madani, declared that 
women would not be drafted into the army in future. All women serving their 
conscription terms were dismissed and released from military service. On 9 June 
1979 the swearing-in ceremony of new judges took place without the 
participation of women nominees. The minister of justice told the press that other 
posts would be given to women who had been trained for judicial responsibilities. 
On October 1979 the cabinet ratified a decree officially transferring women 
judges and lawyers to legal departments in other ministries to perform tasks rather 
than being judges (Moghadam 1988: 226; Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 235-236). 
On 2nd December 1979 the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
ratified and determined women's contemporary position. It declared that the 
Islamic foundation of the state will be derived from Khomeini's theory of velayat 
faghih. Under the heading "Women and the Constitution" it stated: 
The family is the cornerstone of society and the primary institution for the 
growth and improvement of the individual; consensus and ideological belief 
in the principle that the formation of family is fundamental for the future 
development of the individual is one of the main aims of the Islamic 
government (Nashat: 1983: 207). 
A variety of methods were used to discourage women from employment. A large 
number of women were sacked for, not complying with He, jabe Eslami (Islamic 
dress). Azar, a35 year old teacher, explained: 
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As Islamisation spread and was consolidated, things became more and more 
difficult. One could be dismissed for "unIslamic" behaviour, that is for 
talking to male colleagues or wearing make up. Finally, when wearing 
Islamic clothes became compulsory, a large number of women were sacked 
for being bad hejabi (not complying with Islamic dress). 
Maryam, a teacher, also explained how women were pushed out of workplaces: 
The condition of work became very harsh. The staff rooms were 
segregated. If women talked to men, it was "unIslamic" behaviour and 
enough to cause dismissal. Before Islamisation colleagues and friends used 
to organise dooreh (getting together socially) in the evenings or at the 
weekends. It was a cheap and enjoyable form of entertainment as well as 
catching up with the news about our profession, our job and condition of 
work. We had to stop these gatherings, in case the informers reported us to 
the authorities for "unIslamic" behaviour. I am a religious woman, even 
under the Shah I dressed and behaved modestly. These rules and regulations 
are not Islamic. Those who are in control are opportunist, they are corrupt 
and they do anything to become the new elite. 
On 6 May 1980, the Islamic Republic Party declared that Fatimah's birthday, 
occurring in 1980 on 6 May, was to be celebrated as Women's Day. This was to 
emphasise the Islamic character of the state and signify the virtues of motherhood 
as symbolised by Fatimah. Following this, more women lost their jobs (Tabari and 
Yeganeh 1982: 237). 
The age of retirement for females was reduced from 50 to 45 and their years of 
service were reduced from 30 to 25 to make them eligible for retirement. Maryam 
explained: 
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The retirement law changed. They offered early retirement. If women were 
45 and had 25 years of service they could retire and take home 25 days 
salary a month. Before, men and women had to have 30 years of service. I, 
alongside many women applied for early retirement. The conditions of work 
were very hard. 
On 22 July 1980 all co-educational schools were abolished. Teaching was 
segregated, women teachers assigned to girls' schools and male teachers to boys' 
schools. The Islamists argued that male heads of departments must replace female 
secretaries with male secretaries. Male nurses should look after the male patients 
and male teachers should teach male students. 
When I interviewed a number of nurses, I learned that although nursing was seen 
as "naturally" a woman's job, it was never considered a respectable job for a 
woman. It was believed that relationships between male doctors' and female 
nurses could lead to fesad, for which women were responsible and blamed. 
Nursing required night shift work and close contact between female nurses, male 
patients and male doctors which was not respectable. After Islamisation, this 
ideology was used to segregate the nursing profession and as a result, many 
female nurses lost their job. 
Unfortunately - for the period 1979 - 1986 - there are no statistics available, 
based on gender distribution, to show the effect of this policy on women's 
employment. However, my field research showed that the Islamic state's initial 
programme was based on the goal of a minimal demand for female labour which 
was put into effect by a series of measures of exclusion and moral pressure on 
women. 
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5.4 Patriarchal relations in marriage and family life 
The state's policies on employment were reinforced by a strengthening of 
patriarchal relations in marriage and family life through laws and regulations 
based on traditional interpretation of Sharia. 
On 26 February 1979, a few days after the revolution, the attack on the gains of 
the revolution began with attacks on women's rights. The Family Protection Act, 
the Shah's minimal reform of women's rights, was suspended. Ayatollah 
Khomeini returned to men the exclusive rights to divorce and permitted them to 
take four permanent and an unlimited number of temporary wives (sighe) without 
the first wife's permission. 
The institution of sighe is a contract made for a period of time which could be for 
an hour or more. There is no divorce, the transaction ends at the end of the period 
and the woman has to wait 45 days (eddeh), before entering another sexual 
relationship, in case of pregnancy (Haeri 1994; 1989). 
According to articles 941,077 and 1,113 of the Islamic constitution the man has 
no obligation to maintain the temporary wife. Therefore, there is no mahr, nor 
nafaghe and she has no inheritance rights (Keyhan 11.12.1990; 24.12.1990). 
Conventionally, female virgins do not become sighe. A woman who becomes 
sighe is labelled as "not a good woman". 
In April 1979, Ghale Shahre Noe (the Tehran prostitution quarter) was burned 
down by the Hezbollah (Partisans of God). 8000 women lived in the Ghale. Many 
of them burned to death and many became homeless. In July 12 1979, three 
prostitutes were executed. This was following Khomeini's speech when he said "if 
you flog four prostitutes, prostitution will end". Later in the year, Ghale Shahre 
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Noe was officially closed down by the Kanone Hemayate Eslami (The Centre For 
Islamic Protection). It ordered all prostitutes to introduce themselves to Daftare 
Ezdevaje Bonyade Eslami (The Islamic Foundation Marriage Bureau) where the 
women were made to become sighe. 
On 2 October 1979 the Islamic family legislation was ratified by the Council of 
Islamic Revolution and included: a husband's right to forbid his wife to take 
employment; a woman had to obtain permission from her male kin to work, to 
travel, to study and to change her place of residence; in case of divorce, a father's 
right to have the custody of female children after seven years of age and of male 
children after two years of age and to his relatives in case of his death; the 
banning of the use of contraceptives and making the practice of abortion illegal 
(Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 236; Keyhan 7.3.1979). 
On 2nd December 1979 the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
ratified and determined women's contemporary position: 
In the creation of Islamic social institutions, all elements of humanity that 
hitherto served the multifaceted foreign exploitation of our country are to 
regain their true identity and human rights. As a part of this process, it is 
only natural that women should benefit from a particularly large 
augmentation of their rights because of the greater oppression that they 
suffered under the despotic regime. The family is the fundamental unit of 
society and the major centre for the growth and advancement of humanity. 
Compatibility with respect to belief and ideal is the main consideration in 
the establishment of a family, for the family provides the primary basis for 
humanity's development and growth. It is the duty of Islamic government to 
provide the necessary facilities for the attainment of this goal. This view of 
the family unit delivers woman from being regarded as an object or as an 
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instrument in the service of consumerism and exploitation. Not only does 
woman recover thereby her momentous and precious function of 
motherhood, rearing alert and active human beings, she also becomes the 
fellow struggler of man in all the different areas of life. Given the weighty 
responsibilities that woman thus assumes, she is accorded in Islam great 
value and nobility (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
1991: 13). 
In July 1981 The Ghesas law (The Bill of Retribution) replaced the civil laws. 
This meant that women were denied the minimum protection which had been 
offered to them by the civil law in cases of marriage, divorce, custody of children, 
freedom of movement, murder, adultery, lesbianism, abortion and many other 
issues. According to Qhesas law, harsh sentences, such as lashes and stoning to 
death were to be practised on women for violations ranging from not totally 
complying with the Islamic dress code through to adultery. To prove murder only 
male testimony was to be accepted. If a woman was killed by her husband 
because of adultery, her murder was not considered a crime (Paidar 1997: 348- 
353; Afkhami and Friedl 1994: 180-189; Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 94-98). 
Initially the Islamic state encouraged temporary marriage. The rationale for 
encouraging sighe was to bring about Islamic morality and harmony. However, a 
combination of economic problems together with men's easy access to divorce 
and temporary marriage created chaos and disorder in family relations and in the 
wider society. 
Zane Rouz weekly women's magazine reported that despite the closing down of 
the prostitution quarters, neither prostitution nor adultery had not been 
eradicated. It also reported that under these circumstances women had become 
the victims of gender differential treatment by the law. It demonstrated that a 
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larger percentage of women than men were sentenced to death because of 
prostitution. Many of them were forced to prostitution because of poverty. Many 
of these women were accused of adultery and were therefore executed. This was 
because adultery was proven on the basis of men's testimonies, and women's 
testimonies alone did not disprove adultery. In cases where four men gave 
testimonies, women were sentenced to death (Zane Rouz 12.7.1980). 
The chaos in family relationships and within the wider society worsened further 
when physically and psychologically disabled men began to return from the war 
fronts. Women were encouraged to marry these disabled men from the war. 
Ayatollah Khomeini suggested that: 
Those sisters who have lost their husbands in the war must remarry with the 
disabled from the war in order to share their pain and bring more children to 
society (Zane Rouz 2.10; 12.6.1981). 
And Mrs. Behrouzi, a member of the Majles also argued that: 
Marriage is a way to overcome many problems such as zena (adultery), 
poverty and prostitution (Zane Rouz 12.6.1981). 1 
In conclusion, during this period, the Islamic state strengthened patriarchal 
relationships in marriage and family life by undoing the reforms of the family law. 
The significance of these changes was to establish the Islamic state's hegemony 
over family life. The Islamic state became the voice of religious social groups who 
had objected to economic transformation under the Pahlavi, which, according to 
them, created an undesirable necessity for women to work outside the home. 
Under the Islamic state women's priority was to be in the home and female's 
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sexuality and fertility was to be controlled by men and by the state through 
unreformed Islamic family laws, especially marriage and divorce laws. 
5.5 Gender segregation in sports, education and public places 
This section will discuss gender segregation in sports, education system and 
public places. The aim is to investigate the level of success and failure of the state 
to fully implement gender segregation and to what extent the state succeeded to 
exclude women from the public domain. 
On 9 March 1979, women were barred from sports on the grounds that'coaches, 
judges and spectators in such events included men. On 8 July 1979 several 
Caspian Sea resort towns initiated a sexual segregation of the sea. Many women 
were flogged in public during the summer of 1979 on charges of swimming in the 
men's section. (Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 233; Ayandegan 31.1 1979) 
Within the education system gender segregation affected women even more 
adversely. The Islamic state's policy of excluding women from certain fields of 
study and areas of specialisation was to reinforce the ideology of women's place 
in the home and to control female's supply of labour. On 21 May 1979 the 
ministry of education banned co-education. Educational institutions were ordered 
to segregate all classes. Many institutions indicated that since the number of 
female students alone would not justify setting up separate classes they would be 
unable to register any female students. In late September 1979, when schools 
opened, female students of technical training schools staged a protest against the 
suspension of their studies as a result of this decision. They were told to change 
their courses of training to fields where there were enough female students to 
justify separate training courses (Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 235). 
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On 3 June 1979 the Ministry of Education banned married women from attending 
ordinary high schools, They were told they should continue studies on their own 
and take part in special examinations in order to obtain final degrees. Coupled 
with the lowering of the minimum age for marriage of women to 13 years, this 
meant a lowering of educational levels for women (ibid: 235). 
In the academic year 1979-1980, the first post revolution nationwide entrance 
examination women were not admitted to degree courses in Mining; Islamic 
Jurisprudence; Foundations of Islamic Law; Islamic Culture and Iranian 
Civilisation. At the same time nursing schools admitted only single women 
(Mojab 1987: 4-5). 
Gender segregation of the education system had a particularly negative effect on 
female education in rural areas. Azar, a school teacher and one of my respondents 
explained: 
In the 1970s mixed schools opened and it became acceptable that boys and 
girls go to school together. In most rural areas there was only one school in 
a whole village. Because mixed schools were accepted by the rural 
population, girls were sent to the mixed school. But since Islamisation, girls' 
education has suffered. Because where there is only one school in a whole 
village only boys are given the chance. 
According to the Islamic state and the Islamic tenet advocated by the Islamic 
scholars women were biologically and psychologically different from men. 
Therefore, women and men had to be prepared for life differently. The importance 
given to women's place in the home had logically led to a different education 
system for male and female. For example Article 30 of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the government was committed to provide 
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free education for all, but Article 21 of the Constitution emphasised that women's 
rights to free education would be assured in conformity with Islamic criteria 
(Algar 1980; Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari 1994). The basic goal of female 
education was the reproduction and stability of family and family relationships 
based on Islamic rights and morality, rather than preparing women for 
employment (Mehran 1989; Mohsenpour 1988). 
As. a result women were excluded from studying in many institutions. Either the 
priority was given to male students or many courses were identified as unsuitable 
for women. In April 1980 Ayatollah Khomeini made a decree for Enghelabe 
Farhangi Eslami (Islamic Cultural Revolution). The aim was to purge the 
universities from all opposition to the process of Islamisation from left or right 
and to give total political power to the Islamic societies which replaced student 
organisations. Following an armed attack on the universities' campuses, injuring 
many students, all higher education institutions closed down (Mojab 1987: 6). 
Segregating women and men in public places had not been anything like as 
successful. For example, to specify. certain rooms to men and certain rooms to 
women in work places had not been possible. To successfully implement this 
policy new buildings would have had to be built to create more space. 
Nevertheless, in some cases women themselves had initiated segregation in work 
places because it created space for them. Fataneh a bank clerk explained: 
In our work place the management did not insist on segregating women and 
men into different rooms. But women prefer to work in a room without 
men, as they feel free and more comfortable to move around. For this 
reason we organise the rooms in a way that men and women are segregated. 
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Similarly, segregation on the buses had not been totally successful. On 30th July 
1980 The Tehran Bus Company announced that the first three rows of seats in 
buses would be allocated to women passengers (Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 238). 
Later most buses specified a section at the back of the buses for female 
passengers. The proportion was one third of the bus seats for women and two 
thirds for men. The assumption was that this corresponded with the official size of 
the male and female workforce but in the rush hours the iron barriers in the 
middle of the buses were removed on many busy lines because women had the 
responsibility of taking their children to the nursery schools or alternatively to 
their families and friends, before they go to work. 
But generally women had welcomed segregation on the buses. Fatemah a school 
teacher explained: 
Many women prefer the segregation on the buses, we feel more 
comfortable, as we are not sexually harassed by men. 
Divided queues, and divided seats in cinemas, public halls, colleges and 
universities had been successful. The state, therefore, in this period succeeded in 
segregating the sexes, in sport grounds, within the education system and public 
places. Women's responses had been different. In some cases they had accepted it 
and in other cases they had rejected it. The majority of women did not object to 
segregation in public places, even if they had to sit separate from their husbands, 
as this had reduced sexual harassment and allowed women to participate in the 
public sphere of life, without their families' objection. To conclude, the level of 
success and failure of the state's policy of sex segregation had largely been to do 
with women's responses. As will be discussed in chapter seven, women's objection 
to sex segregation in sports and education led to reforms and change in the 
position of state. 
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5.6 The Islamic dress, an effective measure of gender segregation. 
This section will discuss the way the state succeeded to implement the policy and 
practice of wearing the Islamic dress. It will also discuss women's diverse 
responses according to their social class and levels of religiosity. 
In July 1980, after several months of bitter struggle by secular women in urban 
areas against Islamic dress, the wearing of hejab eslami became compulsory (to 
be discussed further in chapter eight). The uniform consisted of wearing a roposh 
(a long dress with long sleeves); a pair of trousers underneath; thick socks, tights 
or stockings and a maghnae (a very large scarf covering head, all hair and 
shoulders). At work places this uniform had to be either in black, grey or dark 
brown. It was to comply with the religious tenets of female look, to cover the 
whole body of the female person except the face and the two hands. 
In work places, petitions were circulated in several government ministries, asking 
women employees, voluntarily to add their signatures to a statement supporting 
Islamic dress. Those who did not comply were sacked. Women television 
broadcasters who refused were replaced with women wearing full Islamic dress. 
Shops were ordered to refuse to sell goods to women without the Islamic dress. 
The media began an ideological war on women not complying with Islamic dress, 
accused of being communist or capitalist (Poya 1992; 1987: 153; Tabari and 
Yeganeh 1982: 233). 
Soon there were new security units: Sarollah (The Blood of God), Ershad Eslami 
(Islamic Guidance), Komiteh (local Islamic councils) and Pasdaran (The 
Revolutionary Guards). They patrolled the cities, hunting for the opposition and 
for women without hejab. No woman dared to appear in public without Islamic 
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dress because so many women's bones were broken and their faces were burned 
with acid. A woman whose scarf did not completely covered her forehead was 
stopped by a male Komiteh member, who pulled her scarf down and pushed a 
drawing pin into her forehead to hold her scarf down. 
This form of segregation had been successful. Despite mass struggle by women in 
1979-1981 against the compulsory hejab, the majority of women had accepted it 
and some had welcomed it. 
Women who identified themselves as middle class, with lower level of religiosity, 
objected to it. But because they were a minority, their objection had been limited 
to the modification of the uniform. Because they had greater access to money and 
a lesser degree of ideological constraint, they were able to wear a modified 
version of the dress, sometimes compatible with the latest international fashion, in 
terms of the shape and the colour of the uniform. However, at work places they 
had to comply with the uniform. When I interviewed a number of these women, I 
was surprised to hear even from them that although they objected to it, they 
found it more comfortable as it had reduced the degree of sexism. Zohreh the 
manager of the laboratory of a chemical industry explained: 
I do not like to wear the hejabe eslami. It is ugly and I feel that women 
have to cover their body because men cannot help themselves to be sexist, 
sexually harass women and look at women as a sex object. But I have no 
choice than to accept that this is an unfortunate reality of our society. 
Exactly for this reason now that I am covered head to toe my work my 
expertise is appreciated much more than under the previous system. Now 
they look at me as a scientist while before they looked at me as a sex object. 
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The policy of hejabe eslami had not affected women of rural areas and belonging 
to different nationalities. They had continued to wear their national dress at home 
and at work which is usually family centred. As always, even under the Pahlavi, 
they only wore the hejab at the time of public gatherings, especially when they 
received outside guests. They had, therefore, welcomed this policy, as they 
identify with the Islamic practice of hejab. 
Women who identified themselves as middle class or working class with high 
level of religiosity, had welcomed this uniform. This was despite their differences 
in terms of access to money and the amount of money they may or may not spend 
on a more or less sophisticated form of the uniform. Islamic dress had given them 
the identity of "good woman", advocated by the Islamic tenets and enforced by 
their own process of socialisation. 
As is discussed in chapter four, under the Pahlavi a culture of modernity had 
regarded women who wore the Islamic dress as backward. These religious 
women were prohibited from working by male members of their families who did 
not regard the culture of modernity under the Pahlavi. as appropriate for their 
women. Under the Islamic state, however, this group of women found gender 
segregation to their benefit, enabling some of them to have more opportunity to 
enter paid employment. Maryam explained: 
I like to wear the hejabe eslami. I feel that this is respecting the views of 
people like me. Under the previous regime, I could not get a job as a nurse 
because I was wearing the chador. In 1976 one hospital, Sevomeh Shaaban, 
was set up by the Islamic Bazaaris (Islamic traders from the Bazaar). This 
was the only hospital which employed women like me. 
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In many cases hejabe eslami became a source of power for religious women- 
Many religious women were employed by the Islamic security organisations to 
ensure the full implementation of the practice of hejab. They became agents of the 
state in implementing social control and this was approved by their male kin. This 
was empowering for them. They used their power against secular women by 
supporting the patriarchal rules and roles for women. They supported the state 
which created these measures for their empowerment. 
Mana, one of my respondents explained: 
Many times I was arrested in the streets for not fully complying with 
compulsory hejab. I was always asked similar questions by female 
members of the Islamic security forces: Sister, how could your heart allow 
you to let the eyes of a namahram (strange) man look at your body? How 
could you make him guilty of sin? I was dying to ask her: Sister why in your 
eyes am I guilty of his sin? Why is it that I am not only sinful for not being 
ashamed of my own body, but also guilty because a man harasses me by 
looking at me as a sex object? Why am I responsible for his faults, and why 
is it me who is driving a pure man to sin? Why do you see your value and 
your power in what you do for men, and for this you deny your own body 
and your visible presence? I couldn't, though. If I had, I would have ended 
up in jail (Poya 1992) 
To conclude, the state succeeded in imposing the full implementation of the policy 
and practice of hejab. For secular women these measures were repressive. For 
religious women they were liberating. Despite these diverse responses, the 
majority shared the view that this form of segregation had created space and more 
opportunity for females to enter employment. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that in the first phase of Islamisation (1979-1981) 
the state's initial gender and employment policy aimed at excluding women from 
the labour force. My field research demonstrated that the ideological effect of 
women's place in the home, combined with economic depression and change in 
laws, regulations, customs, policies and practices reduced the demand for female 
labour. The Islamic state also strengthened patriarchal relations by creating 
separate spheres for women in the public domain which ensured that women's 
reproductive role within the family was more important than their role in the 
public sphere of life, especially in employment. The aim was to restrict women to 
the private domestic domain and exclude the supply of female labour. In this short 
period the impact of Islamic gender ideology was overwhelming. But the 
development of secular and religious responses to state Islamisation were 
diversified. This process of diversification combined with the impact of economic 
circumstances of the war years soon changed the position of the theocratic state 
on women's employment. 
Notes 
1. Arranged marriages with soldiers continued, but did not seem to resolve the 
social problems. As late as 1987 in a series of articles the newspaper Ettellaat 
continued to encourage this form of marriage "as a way to combat moral 
degeneration". However the same articles pointed out that "the economic 
problems of inflation, male unemployment and high rate of mahr had decreased 
the number of marriages" (Ettellaat 15 - 17.12.1987). To help this desperate 
situation Janbazan (the Freedom Fighters) organisation was set up and the Majlis 
ratified article 20 of the law which allocated 1 milliard Rials to this organisation to 
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arrange and encourage marriage for the soldiers. In 1990 this fund increased to 
2.5 milliard Rials (Keyhan 14.11.1990). 
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Chapter six 
1981-1989 
The impact of the Iran - Iraq war 
Accommodating mechanisms 
6.1 Introduction 
Following the beginning of Iran - Iraq war the Islamic state's economic and 
gender and employment policies changed. The state had to respond to pressures 
of war, economic dislocations and rigidities in the labour market. In this chapter, 
based on my interviews and the analysis of statistical data, I have investigated the 
factors which determined the demand of the state and the private employers for 
female labour. I will also discuss the way in which in this period, the policy of sex 
segregation began to adapt. It maintained the ideological stance of the Islamic 
state yet at the same time, accommodated the economic circumstances. Although 
the ideological constraint placed women in a disadvantageous position within the 
labour market, paradoxically in some cases gender segregation opened up 
opportunities for many religious women to enter employment and 'even occupy 
important positions for the first time. At the same time, the imposition of social 
control by the state (and men) and also self control by women themselves were 
major obstacles to the upward mobility of many female workers. It will be argued 
that the role of the war was not limited to its effect on the supply of and demand 
for female labour. It was an event which raised ideological issues to legitimise 
state's hegemony. However, these ideological issues interacted with material 
circumstances of women and men and provided the ground for changing the 
position of women in society. 
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6.2 The impact of the state sector's demand for female labour 
This section will examine the change in demand for female labour by the state 
sector of the economy, during 1981-89. Despite the ideological effect of Islamic 
gender ideology, a number of factors soon increased the state's demand for female 
labour. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1989) was one turning point when the flight of 
men to the war zones reduced the supply of male labour. Inflation was another 
factor. Also, a general level of male unemployment as a result of Iran's isolation in 
the world market; the war and the war economy increased the supply of women 
seeking work or resisting exclusion. There were also rigidities in the system, 
determined by the ideology of a gendered division of labour which generated 
continuing particular demands for female labour. Men were neither trained nor 
ideologically willing to do "women's jobs" such as nursing, teaching, secretarial 
and administrative work. 
In this period, the state gradually changed its original policy of self-sufficiency 
and its attempt to operate in isolation from a world economy dominated by the 
West. The Islamic regime gradually began to reverse this economic policy, while 
continuing the slogan of "neither East, nor West". It is now widely recognised 
that in this period, Iran, western and eastern countries, continued their political 
rhetoric against each other but at the same time Iran's oil was purchased and arms 
were sold to Iran by the back door. Therefore, there was a return to the economic 
policy of Import Substitution Industrialisation. However, the terms of trade 
moved against Iran. The Islamic state , 
began to pay for imports through barter 
deals. Cheap oil was sold in return for expensive imports. The priority was given 
to food and military equipment. All these resulted in hoarding, shortages and a 
ration system and consequently a high level of inflation, officially recorded at 30% 
in the 1980s (Behdad 1995; Pessaran 1995; Poya 1991). 
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During this period, Islamic ideology in terms of female participation outside the 
home also changed. Compared to the previous period when the emphasis was to 
send women back to the home, women were now mobilised by the state to cook, 
sew and prepare medicines, in the mosques, for men at the war fronts, acting as 
Zaynab, as suggested by the Islamic state. 
As a result, the demand for the unpaid labour of women increased and the state 
benefited from it economically and politically. Basseej Khaharan (The women's 
organisation of the mobilisation of the irregulars for the war), one of many Islamic 
state organisations, had the responsibility for recruiting large numbers of women. 
The sons, husbands and fathers of many of these women were fighting in the war. 
During this period, the organisation was financed by donations made by its 
supporters. They mobilised women in, large numbers in mass street 
demonstrations and in the mosques to produce food, clothes, blankets and 
medicine for the men in the war fronts. These women were called Khaharane 
Zaynab, (Zaynab's Sisters). Once again Zaynab became the symbol of 
womanhood. The process of recruiting these women to unpaid work continued 
throughout the war years. There are no statistics to show the number of these 
women. But as late as December 1988 the daily newspaper Ettellaat reported 
that: 
Basseej Khaharan had a number of tasks: Military and ideological training 
of women; helping the families of the Martyred (the families of those who 
died in the war) and the families of the prisoners of the war and to serve in 
the literacy Corp, to teach in poor rural areas voluntarily. Their main task, 
however, was to prepare medicines, repairing the soldiers' clothes and 
preparing food for the soldiers in the front lines (Ettellaat 30.11.1988). 
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Even under these circumstances, where the state mobilised women to be active 
outside the sphere of the home, the emphasis was on women's priority in the 
home. In an interview with a member of Basseej one of the women argued that 
"although I am married and have children, my activities have no adverse effect on 
my duties at home (Basseej Khaharan 30.11.1988). Elsewhere, Jebheh Ettellaat 
(the supplement to Ettellaat daily newspaper) covering the war news reminded 
women that "in Islam it is not necessary for women to go to war. Obeying the 
husband is equal to becoming a mujahedeen" (warrior for God) (Jebhe Ettellaat 
25.9.1989). 
Unlike the previous period when women were forced out of jobs, they were now 
encouraged to work part time. Zahra Rahnavard, a female state spokesperson on 
women's issues and known as a Muslim feminist writer, condemned the Shah's 
regime for encouraging female employment which led to women's independence 
and the weakening of family unity, which was against the Islamic state's 
principles. Keyhan daily national newspaper of 5.8.1981 reported her views: 
Women under the previous system entered employment for a number of 
reasons: the hatred of family life; to be independent; to help the family's 
budget as the man's earnings were not enough; a few because of their 
specialisation but generally insecurity in relation to the family. The Shah's 
objective was therefore to: disrupt family life; to increase bureaucracy; to 
create sexual chaos; and generally to create pro-western family life. 
Instead she put forward an alternative situation for the ideal Muslim women 
Men are responsible for nafagheh, therefore, they must maintain the family. 
Women's priority is to bring up children and perform domestic duties. Only 
under certain circumstances could women go out to work: if their domestic 
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duties are not neglected and if this work is to promote Islamic values. 
Under present economic difficulties, where women are forced to go out to 
work, the government must promote men's employment enabling them to 
maintain their families. Women's hours of work must be reduced to allow 
them to perform their domestic duties satisfactorily. Women who have 
specialisation and are financially secure must give up part of their earnings 
to help the economic problems of the country. 
These arguments were not only ideological in terms of an Islamic philosophy that 
women's place is in the home to serve men and the family. They also reinforced 
gender subordination for the benefit of the state. Employing women part time, 
paying women half a salary, and reducing the hours of nursery schools, saved 
government expenditure. 
Zane Rouz weekly women's magazine also suggested that women who had 
children could return to part time work if their children were three years of age. 
This way the state nurseries would operate half of the time and women could look 
after their children the other half (Zane Rouz 14.5.1982). 
Two years later in March 1984 Ayatollah Khomeini announced that: 
Women can participate in economic, political and social affairs within the 
Islamic laws and regulations (Ettellaat 31.3.1984). 
This was a breakthrough. The economic pressure and the war was so hard on 
families that the state had to compromise its original position. However, this 
reconciliation needed Khomeini's approval. His speech legitimised women's work 
outside the home, as did a later speech of President Rafsanjani, but argued that 
the management of their money and property had to be supervised by men: 
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Women, after performing their main responsibility of domestic work, could 
be involved in all levels of economic, social and political affairs. But, in 
Islam, because of the principle of Mahr and Nafaghe, women are not 
responsible for the bread-winning of the family (Ettellaat 25.4.1984). 
Thus, during this period, the demand for female labour increased and was 
legitimised by the state. But the emphasis remained on the part-time work of 
women which reduced women's opportunity, ability and willingness to be in full 
time employment with its full-time entitlement. In April 1985 the Majlis passed a 
law about women's part-time work. Part time work was defined as half of the 
time of full time work, receiving half of the salary of the full-time work, without 
any subsidies and entitlements. The minimum period of work was one year. 
Women were given the opportunity to contribute to their pension according to 
the full time rate. They also had the same rights as full time workers, in terms of 
maternity leave, but only received part time pay (Ettellaat 8.4.1985). 
The Islamic state inherited the Pahlavi structure of the state sector of the 
economy (and the private sector of the economy which will be discussed in the 
next section). The only difference was that a number of state ministries which 
operated under the previous system closed down (Tourism, Rural Development 
and Art and Culture). But new ministries were formed (Plan and Budget; 
Accounting; Industries; Heavy Industries; Oil; and Radio Television). Many 
Islamic institutions were also formed and some of them became ministries: 
Pasdaran (the Revolutionary Guards); Jihad (Reconstruction crusades) and 
Ershade Eslami (Islamic Guidance). Other Islamic organisations also operated 
under state supervision: the Komitehs (local Islamic councils); Basseej 
(mobilisation of irregulars for the war) and Islamic societies (Anjomane Eslami) 
which replaced the shoras (workers' councils which will be discussed in chapter 
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eight). These ministries and state organisations employed a large number of both 
male and female workers. 
According to official statistics, by 1986/87,54,388 men and 579 women were 
employed in the Reconstruction Crusade and 7,083 men and 1,420 women were 
employed in Islamic Guidance organisations (Iran Statistical Yearbook 1986/87: 
86). Many more were employed in other Islamic organisations (Pasdaran, 
Komiteh, Baseej and Islamic societies) for which there are no figures available. In 
1986/87 state ministries employed 1,433,966 of which 1,014,422 were men and 
419,544 were women. Thus comparing the figures between 1986/87 and the pre- 
revolution situation (which was discussed in chapter five) the total percentage of 
female workers (29%) in different ministries did not change. In some ministries 
the percentage of female workers fell whilst in others it increased. For example, 
the percentage of women in ministry of education increased from 41% to 43%; 
their percentage in ministry of health increased from 26% to 41 %. But, their share 
in the ministry of higher education fell from 39% to 19% and in the ministry of 
trade fell from 27 to 8%. The ministry of tourism with its female workforce of 
27% closed down. But the ministry of Islamic guidance's female workforce 
reached 17%. 
The increase in the share of women in ministries of education and health was 
because despite the initial attempt to stop female nurses and female teachers 
attending to male patients and teaching male students, the demand for female 
teachers and nurses increased. Also, a significant number of women were 
employed in secretarial and administrative tasks. 
I interviewed a number of these women. They all pointed out that the demand for 
male nurses, secretaries and teachers increased. Many men were trained and 
employed in these professions, but there was still a severe shortage of labour in 
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these fields mainly because these professions were seen, as . women's jobs. 
Maryam, a 35 year old nurse, explained: 
Initially during the early years of the war, the injured Islamic soldiers 
objected to being treated by female nurses. Later, however, they had no 
choice as there was a real shortage of nurses and very few men wanted to 
become a nurse. 
The state, therefore, had to intervene and appeal to the soldiers that female nurses 
should be accepted. In a series of articles, Etteellaat daily newspaper reported 
that according to the international standard, for every 1,000 persons there had to 
be at least 3 nurses. That means Iran should at least have 120,000 nurses, while 
there were only 7,100. The articles also discussed the importance of female nurses 
and how they should be respected (Ettellaat 16.1.1986-19.1.1986) 
Similarly many female teachers returned to work, as sex segregation exacerbated 
the already existing shortage of teachers. Maryam explained: 
Under the Shah's regime male and female teachers taught at both single sex 
and mixed schools. After the revolution, all schools became single sex. Male 
teachers were to teach at boys' schools and female teachers at girls' schools. 
The result was that many girls' schools were left with very few teachers. So 
they allowed female and male teachers to teach at all primary schools but 
not at secondary schools. 
The demand for women to re-enter administrative and secretarial work also 
continued. Although men were also encouraged to enter these jobs, they were 
traditionally categorised as women's jobs. Shahnaz, a 44 year old head of a 
university department explained: 
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To employ male secretaries for male heads of departments and managers 
did not work out. Male secretaries were not as good as female secretaries. 
So female secretaries returned to work. 
In conclusion, in the 1980s the Islamic ideology on female participation in the 
workforce changed. In the early 1980s women's unpaid labour could be justified 
in the interest of the state's war efforts. The Iran-Iraq war increased the demand 
for female labour. Throughout the 1980s, and especially by mid 1980s, state 
ministries employed a large number of women. Islamic organisations were formed 
and increasingly employed women to deal with women's affairs. In the fields of 
education, health and administrative work the demand for female labour increased 
because of the inability and/or unwillingness of men doing women's jobs. 
Nevertheless, the Islamic state still emphasised women's place in the home and 
women's part time work outside of the home. This way the state was successful to 
reinforce its stated gender ideology. Moreover, the state saved expenditure by 
entitling women to half a wage and not providing child care facilities. 
6.3 The impact of the private sector's demand for female labour 
This section will examine the change in demand for female labour by the private 
sector of the economy, during 1981-1988. 
The domestic crisis and the war with Iraq put pressure on Islamic statism and the 
Islamic command economy. By the mid 1980s the faction within the regime in 
favour of state intervention weakened. The faction in favour of limitations on 
state intervention gradually took state power. On the basis of Sharia, private 
property was revaluated and, the state encouraged the private entrepreneur to 
invest and to operate free from regulations and restrictions (Poya 1991: 96-99). 
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Despite significant nationalisation in the first phase of Islamisation; lack of 
investment by the private entrepreneur and lack of subsidies by the state in the 
privately owned and controlled enterprises, private ownership of land and capital 
prevailed. Under the Islamic state the structure of the private sector of the 
economy remained the same as under the Pahlavi. In 1986/87 the small private 
enterprises employed 7,119,000 workers of which 6,610,000 were men and 
509,000 were women (Iran Statistical Yearbook 1993: 69) in comparison with 
1972/73 figure when these enterprises employed 6,922,000 workers of which 
6,118,000 were men and 648,000 were women (Iran Statistical Yearbook 
1977/78: 50). Despite an increase in the total number of male and female workers, 
the percentage of the female workforce in different categories of private 
enterprises showed a negative trend in comparison with before the revolution 
(discussed in chapter five): Women's share in the total fell from 9% to 7%. For 
unpaid family workers women's share increased from 17% to 43% (the majority 
of these women worked in rural areas working as carpet weavers and agricultural 
workers in household centred workshops); women's share as wage and salary 
earners fell from 10% to 5%; their share of self-employment also fell from 7% to 
4% but their share as employers increased from 1% to 4%, the majority of these 
workers worked in urban areas. 
These statistics are useful tools to indicate where women are in the labour market. 
However, my field research casts doubt on these statistics. In rural areas many 
more women work as carpet weavers, cloth weavers and agricultural workers 
than the statistics suggest. They are unpaid family workers whose work is 
invisible in the statistics. The product of their labour is sold by the male members 
of their families in the market. Golrang, a carpet weaver and agricultural worker 
explained: 
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I have been a carpet weaver and an agricultural worker since I was seven 
years of age. I help my father in animal husbandry and my mother in 
agricultural work and carpet weaving. Women do not get paid. In a good 
year, when my father returns from selling the goods in the market, he gives 
my mother a sack or two of rice to sell within the village. With this money 
my mother buys gold, silver, household materials and appliances for me and 
my sister's jahizieh (trousseau). Similarly for carpet weaving; my father sells 
the carpets in the market or sometimes he gives my mother a carpet to sell 
in the neighbourhood and she spends the money for me. 
Thus a large number of women who work in rural areas are not rewarded fully as 
wage labourers and they do not appear in the statistics. In fact, the Islamic state 
has not intervened in the working condition of these workers, because it is unpaid 
and within the home. 
In urban areas also, many women work as self employed and petty commodity 
producers and sellers. But they do not appear in the statistics, although their 
contribution is essential for the well being of their families. I interviewed a group 
of ten women who worked as self-employed in a variety of jobs. Fataneh 
explained: 
I make hand bags, blankets and sheets and sell them to the co-operatives. 
Sometimes I manage to sell 5- 10 of each every day. This way I have been 
able to pay off all our debts. 
Maryam explained: 
I make pickles, jam, tomato puree and dried herbs and I sell them to the 
neighbours and to the shops in the area. This way I feed the family. 
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Pari explained: 
I make decorative combs and hair clips. This help us keep going. 
Pouran explained: 
One day as I was driving, I saw two women in the neighbourhood waiting 
for a taxi. I offered them a lift. They insisted on paying me. From then, I 
discussed this with women in the neighbourhood and asked them to use me 
as a taxi driver. They agreed. I became a lady cab. I also work as a taxi 
driver for the local nursery school. Without my earnings it would be 
impossible to survive the inflation. 
Zari explained: 
I buy blank T-Shirts, imprint on them and I sell them to the co-operatives. 
This way I have been able to help with the mortgage. 
Badri explained: 
I grow plants and sell them door to door and to the co-ops. 
They explained that their husbands' earnings were not enough to feed the family. 
They therefore had to take the initiative of producing different goods at home and 
selling them door to door or to the co-operative chain stores. Although they 
recognised that their earning was important for their families. They did not 
categorise themselves as self-employed workers. Furthermore, no-one ever asked 
them what they did and they thought that if they were asked for statistical 
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purposes, they would categorise themselves as housewife, because the petty 
commodities that they produced for sale were produced while they were doing 
the housework. They also explained that they and many women in the 
neighbourhood were also involved in buying rationed food cheaply and selling it 
in the black market, which could also be categorised as self-employed. But they 
did not appear in the statistics. 
In urban (and rural areas) there are also a large number of women who are salary 
and wage earners, working for many small private sector firms. These women 
were not registered because by not registering their workers the employers escape 
paying tax to the state and benefits and insurance to their workers. Furthermore 
these workers did not appear in the statistics. In mid 1980s, the demand from 
these industries for female workers increased. This increase was dictated by the 
cheapness, flexibility and disposability of female workforce, but hidden as a 
response to state labour laws. 
According to the law employers had to register their workers by contributing the 
equivalent of 20% of each workers' salary for their registration and insurance. 
Once the workers were registered, 7% of their wage or salary was deducted for 
their insurance contribution. This meant that if employers did not register their 
workers and did not contribute to their insurance, the workers could not be 
registered and no national insurance was paid. Benefits such as paid holidays, 
sickness benefits, maternity benefits, insurance, tax allowances, pension and 
retirement were paid only to workers who were registered (The Labour Law 
1981/82: 277-375). 
There were male and female workers who worked for private sector enterprises 
and were not registered. They were paid below the national minimum wage and 
they received no benefits or subsidies. But a large number of firms preferred to 
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employ women because they could be hired and fired easily and many women 
entered and left these firms because this was the only way that they could get a 
job for a period of time and the rest of the time perform their domestic duties. 
Women with children, were particularly at the mercy of these employers because 
they often arrived late, left early and brought their children to work part of the 
time because of the lack of or the shortage of nursery schools. In the late 1980s 
and in the 1990s the increase in the population of children under ten years of age 
also created shortages of schools and teachers. As a result a shift system was 
introduced at schools. Tahereh explained how this made women's employment 
more problematic and private enterprises exploited women workers more than 
ever before: 
For four years I worked in a private medical clinic from lam - 2pm. I had 
no break, I was paid half of the national minimum wage. The employer did 
not pay insurance for me or other workers. Therefore we received no 
benefits because we were not even registered anywhere as workers. We 
could see with our own eyes how the employer bribed the government 
agents in order to get away from paying tax and insurance. When my son 
was under 7 years of age (school age) my mother-in-law looked after him, 
because in these firms there were no work place nurseries; state nurseries 
gave priority to state sector workers and I could not afford a private 
nursery's fees. When my son was seven he went to school, morning shift 
only, 7.30 - 11.30. He then came to my workplace, stayed with me until I 
finished work at 2pm. Because of this they made me work over time and 
during holidays without pay, to compensate for the hours that my son was 
there. Finally when I complained to the Ministry of Labour the attitude was 
that I should have known my rights better. 
Lily also had similar experience: 
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I worked in a private company for 2 years. They would not pay insurance, 
although they paid the agreed minimum wage. When my first son was born 
I left the job for a year to look after him. When he was one year old, I left 
him with my mother-in-law and went back to work as a receptionist in a 
private clinic for two years. Again they paid no insurance for me. So for 
four years, although I was paid the minimum wage I was not registered as a 
worker and lost all benefits and years of service. My second son was born, I 
left my job for another year and I returned to work when he was one year 
old. I got a job in a paint-making firm as a secretary. I demanded that they 
should register me and pay insurance for me. After a while they agreed and 
as a result I was registered as part of the workforce and received all the 
benefits. But going to work with two children was very difficult. At lunch 
time I had to bring my older son to work until 2pm. As a result they made 
me work unpaid overtime and I lost many days of my paid holidays in order 
to pay back for the hours that I went to collect my son and brought him to 
work for 2 hours every day. 
Throughout 1980s the number of female workers in these firms increased. For 
example the government instructed the shops which sell female clothes to employ 
female shop assistants only. A majority of these shops did not register their 
workers. By the time the law caught up with them, they sacked the women and 
employed new ones. These examples illustrate that a large number of women in 
urban areas were also invisible in the workforce statistics, while their contribution 
was essential for their families and for the national economy. 
It is the gender ideology which places these women workers in a disadvantaged 
position by undercounting and undervaluing their work. According to the labour 
laws the minimum wage in the mid 1980s was 45,000 Rials a month. Workers 
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categorised as hourly paid, daily paid, seasonal workers or contract workers 
(those who were employed for one year at a time) only received the minimum 
wage, without any benefits or subsidies. The benefits and subsidies were 
extremely important and they made a great deal of difference in the final 
calculation of what the worker took home. For example the salary of a registered 
full time worker included 45000 Rials fixed minimum wage plus child benefit 
(calculated on the basis of three times one day's salary per month) housing 
benefit, food and cash bonuses and subsidies. These workers were also entitled to 
paid holidays and sickness benefits (Labour Law 1981-82). However, as was 
discussed above, the majority of female workers did not receive these benefits 
because they were not registered by the private firms. 
The private sector of the economy included employers, self-employed, unpaid 
family workers and wage and salary earners who worked in small enterprises 
employing less than ten workers. The majority of the workforce in Iran was 
working in these categories rather than being employed by large private 
enterprises or the state owned and controlled enterprises. In this section I have 
demonstrated that the percentage of female workers in these categories were 
greater than appears in the official statistics. Moreover, by the 1980s, the small 
private enterprises which employed wage earners had resumed production and the 
demand for female labour increased. But the demand was determined by its 
cheapness, flexibility and disposability. 
6A Women's preference for work in the state sector. 
This section, based on interviews, will argue that the state sector of the economy 
is more attractive to workers seeking jobs than the private sector of the economy. 
However, women's preference for work in this sector was determined by gender 
ideology, enforced by the state's policy and practice. Generally, the job security of 
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the state sector had made this sector more attractive to both men and women, 
despite lower level of wages in this sector in comparison with the private sector. 
Banks, whether state owned or privately owned, had similar employment 
conditions and had special advantages. For example they offer favourable 
mortgage schemes to their employees. After the death of an employee, the loan 
would be cancelled and the property would be transferred to the inheritors. 
However, women preferred to work in state enterprises for ideological reasons. 
State workplaces were physically large, and sexual segregation and social control 
could be implemented easily in order to avoid fesad. This was because women 
were regarded as both corrupting and corruptible. The concept of sexual 
harassment did not exist for the state and for men. Women recognised the abuse 
of power by men over women but this ideology is so deeply rooted in the minds 
of men and women that they believed that the mixing of the genders could create 
moral degeneration. Thus, they saw the solution in segregation and the state as a 
location for moral safety. Fataneh and Maly were both bank workers and 
identified themselves as middle class with low level of religiosity. They believed 
that 
The state sector has large work places where fesad (moral degeneration) 
can rarely happen. In the small private sector work places, there is a great 
deal of fesad, because men and women work closely together. Many 
women prefer to work for the state sector, they feel safer in these large 
places, , both in terms of relationship between the sexes and sexual 
harassment. 
And for Azar who identified herself as middle class and religious: 
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For religious families, women working in the private sector is out of 
question. Within the state sector, teaching is the most respectable 
profession. 
Besides the importance of morality, women also preferred working for Banks and 
the state sector because the flexibility of the hours of work allowed women to 
perform their domestic work more easily. For example banks had their own 
employment regulations, which were advantageous to women. In the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s banks introduced flexible hours of work for women who had 
children. Many women found this helpful to them, as they could work three days 
a week flexible hours, even though they were paid half a salary of a full time 
employee. Also these women were offered one year unpaid maternity leave 
without losing the security of their job. Although, this gap was not calculated in 
their years of service, many women accepted the offer because the regulation 
allowed them to go back to their job after the leave. 
Beside banking, nursing was another profession where women were concentrated, 
and working in state hospitals was regarded as preferable for female nurses- 
However, despite the ideology, low wages and bad condition of work in the state 
sector forced the poorer women to work in the private sector or both. 
Forough, a 45 year old, nurse described her experience: 
I have worked in both private and state hospitals. In some ways nurses 
prefer to work in private hospitals, because conditions of work are less 
harsh than in the state hospitals. The state hospitals are overcrowded, there 
are terrible shortages of medicine, food and equipment. The salaries are also 
higher in the private hospitals. However, there is more job security and 
flexibility in the state hospitals, you have a He time job. No one can dismiss 
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you providing you keep your head down and do as you are told. You don't 
have this security in the private sector. There is a great deal of competition 
and with the slightest problem you can lose your job. But still the harsh 
conditions of work in the state run hospitals and very low wages force many 
women to seek jobs in the private hospitals. 
To conclude, choice between working in the state sector or private sector was 
different for women and men. Men chose to work in the state sector because of 
the material advantages of this sector. Women, however, chose this sector for 
ideological reasons. Even when they considered the material advantages of this 
sector, it was ideologically based. In some cases the economic pressure forces 
women to work in both sectors or move between the private and the public 
enterprises. Hence, the pressure of ideology controlled the supply of their labour. 
6.5 Gender segregation within employment 
This section will assess women's responses to sex segregation within employment 
and, the positive and negative effects of this policy on women's employment. 
In some cases, segregating women and men in work places increased female's 
employment. As is discussed in chapter five, the policy of segregation opened up 
opportunities for a large number of women to be employed in boutiques and 
shops to serve women only. Also supervisory positions were created for females 
in some factories where male and female workers were segregated on assembly 
line production. When I visited Bel Air radio and television factory I observed 
that women worked on one side of the assembly line and men on the other. Zahra 
the female supervisor of women's assembly line explained: 
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Complete segregation is not always practical. There is a division of labour 
between female and male workers. Women assemble the smallest items, as 
they have small fingers, and men carry heavy items. But sometimes to 
accomplish their task they have to move around and mix with male workers. 
Since Islamisation we have female supervisors for female workers, like 
myself, which we did not have before. This is to reduce the amount of 
contact between the male and female workers but has created higher 
positions for some women. 
Mansoureh a VDU operator also confirmed that: 
There are some positive aspects to segregation. We work in a much more 
relaxed atmosphere because there is much less sexual harassment. This 
means that many religious women feel comfortable to go out to work while 
under the previous system they could not. Before, all supervisors were men, 
now we have female supervisors which is good. 
Although segregation had created opportunity for some women to become 
supervisors and managers, their numbers are very small and wherever there was a 
position as manager or supervisor, there was a male person above them. This was 
to comply with the religious ideology that women should not be in the position of 
judging and managing. The ideological effect of women's priority in the home was 
to stigmatise women who were participating in the public sphere of employment. 
The ideology of segregation, therefore, had imposed social control on women and 
enforced an inferior position for women in relation to men. 
Zohreh, the manager of a laboratory in a chemical industry explained: 
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I am a scientist and I have a great responsibility as the head of the team and 
the head of the section. I have to control the whole of the production 
process, from controlling the raw materials, to the control of formulas and 
packaging. I have eleven specialists who work under my supervision. But 
because I am a woman, I have to work ten times harder than my male 
counterpart who has been given a higher position than me. To prove that I 
am able in my position. I constantly have to translate the latest formulas and 
research about the most up to date ways of producing medicine until they 
recognise my expertise. The male colleagues get others to do their work for 
them and with a few speeches and letters prove their ability. After one year, 
one male colleague has received a company car. After seven years, I have 
been given access to a car with a driver to drive me from my home to work 
and return. Their reasoning is that I am a woman and did not need a car, 
because my husband has a car (See appendix 1: interview c). 
The inferiority in the eyes of the law is the basis of women not being promoted at 
work places to higher position: Shahnaz, a university lecturer, explained: 
Most heads of departments and principles are male. Teaching is considered 
the right profession for women but not promotion to high position in the 
education system. Women do reach some high positions because of their 
high standard of education and experience but there is always a limit for 
them to go any further. They are not promoted because the criterion for 
promotion is not education and experience, it is gender ideology. Even if 
women have a high position they can not go any further. For example, 
women never go out of their work places to meetings and conferences, 
meeting other heads of sections and principals. It is not seen as good for 
women to keep going in and out of their workplace. While male colleagues 
are constantly after their promotion and they achieve it. 
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Negative aspects of segregation excluded women from further and upward 
mobility. Zohreh, a scientist and the manager of a laboratory explained how 
segregation reduced mobility, even if Islamic laws were reformed and did not 
totally exclude women from work. Even when women had the knowledge and 
expertise, lack of access to information and negotiation placed them in inferior 
positions: 
Men sit together, talk together and support each other. Women are too 
busy working hard to prove their abilities. Men make relationships between 
themselves from management positions to the security officers at the factory 
gate. This way they create a support network which allows them to manage 
all their affairs and step up the ladder of promotion and success. Women are 
ideologically prohibited to do this. 
Simin, an accountant, also explained how male workers created their own support 
system and network and excluded women from it. This was one of the ways for 
their upward mobility and segregation had made it easy for them: 
I am the head of industrial accounting. But my managing director never 
asks me to go with him to discuss the business with the bank manager. He 
goes with a male accountant. It does not look good if he goes with me. This 
excludes me from further mobility, while allowing the male accountant who 
is in a lower position to me to be promoted. 
Mahin, a nursery school teacher, and Shahin, a bank clerk, explained how the 
ideology of segregation controlled women's movement within work places. 
Women's movement was only allowed if it was directly related to their domestic 
responsibilities. This had a negative affect on their upward mobility within their 
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employment, while men's movement was naturally related to their position and 
further mobility within employment. They both had similar experiences: 
During the break time women never go out, while men go out to meet with 
other colleagues. If women have to go out which is usually to deal with 
their domestic and child care problems they have to fill a form and take time 
off which is calculated and deducted from their salary. For men, however, it 
is so normal to go out that it is naturally accepted as going out for business. 
Nahid, the technical vice president of an electronic firm confirmed that even if 
women worked better and harder than their male counterparts segregation limited 
their mobility within the workforce: 
In this factory I am the only female person in the position of management. 
Male managers usually come late and leave early. But I work 10 - 12 hours 
a day to prove my suitability. I never go out to meet any colleagues. I am 
never invited to meetings and conferences, while I am more knowledgeable 
about new technology and scientific management than any of my male 
colleagues. 
In Iran, female journalists have perhaps the hardest time to fulfil their task under 
pressure of the ideology of segregation. If going to places, hearing people and 
getting engaged in discussions and debates are important part of a journalist's 
work, in Iran, female journalists could not go to places and get involved in 
discussions and debates. This is because these activities are considered to be 
undignified for women, while when men did the same it was considered to be part 
of their knowledge, specialisation and efficiency. Shahrzad, a journalist explained: 
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Many female journalists are forced to accept this attitude. They put their 
heads down and do what they are told, in order to prove their dignity. A 
good female journalist is the one who is quiet and her head is down. Those 
who argue and get involved in discussions and debates are not good 
women. Female journalists are not sent to other cities or abroad for 
journalism. Unmarried female journalists are an even in worse position. 
Very few responsibilities are given to them. Married women with children 
sometimes have to leave early or arrive late because of child care problems. 
They usually welcome that they are excluded from being sent to other cities 
and abroad, otherwise they will be under more pressure for fulfilling their 
domestic work as well as their journalist tasks. As a result they are given 
the least important jobs and they are treated badly even if they are good 
journalists and write well. Women journalists are usually considered as not 
being able to do their job properly. 
Zhila, another journalist, also explained: 
All editors and head of sections are men. Female journalists' activities are 
very restricted. They are never sent to other cities let alone abroad. 
Ministries and other workplaces mostly stress that they don't want women 
journalists. I am the only female journalist in the political department. But 
my male colleagues believe that because I am a female, I am emotional and 
weak so I cannot do my job effectively. So I have to work much harder to 
prove that I am a good journalist. They appreciate that I am a good writer. 
But they send a male colleague to collect information and then they ask me 
to write and rewrite his materials which will then be published in his name. 
Gender segregation within employment had some positive effects. In some cases 
it had increased female's supply of labour and had opened up opportunities for 
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women to enter high position such as managing and supervising women workers. 
However, in the majority of cases the negative aspects of segregation had 
imposed social control on women and had enforced an inferior position for 
women in relation to men. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, based on the analysis of my field research data, I have argued that 
in the second phase of Islamisation (1981-1989), the state used the war to 
legitimise its hegemony. But material factors, arising from economic 
circumstances of the war years affected women's expectations, family relations 
and their positions in the labour market and consequently had a powerful impact 
on the Islamic ideology on female participation in the workforce. The demand for 
female labour gradually increased both in the state and private sectors of the 
economy. Women were engaged in a variety of occupations and their contribution 
was absolutely necessary for the well being of their families. In this period, the 
state used different perceptions and the process of segregation as accommodating 
mechanisms to perpetuate women's employment, despite its stated ideology that 
women's place is in the home. These mechanisms were then used by the state to 
control the supply of female labour and exclude most women from upward 
mobility. 
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Chapter seven 
1989-1997 
Real reversal 
7.1 Introduction 
The end of the war with Iraq in 1988 and the death of Ayatollah- Khomeini in 
1989 marked a real reversal of the state's economic and gender and employment 
policies. This chapter will argue that despite the initial attempt by the Islamic state 
to exclude women from employment, a comparison of the statistical data of pre 
1979, with the 1980s and the 1990s, shows that women's participation in the 
labour force had barely changed. In this period, under socio-economic pressure 
and women's responses, the state relaxed measures which were, initially designed 
to control women's position in the public sphere of the economy. The family law; 
education and employment regulations were reformed. However, despite these 
reforms, patriarchal relationships continued to impact on women's employment. 
Based on the interviews I will argue that gendered roles in the domestic domain; 
the necessity of men's permission; lack of or shortage of nursery schools; gender 
blind policies and state intervention to influence the structure of the labour 
market, are among factors ensuring women's subordination within the workforce. 
7.2 The numbers and disposition of women in the economy in the 1990s 
In this section I will compare the statistical data for the state and privately owned 
and controlled enterprises in three different periods: before 1979; in mid 1980s 
and in the 1990s. My aim is to examine the extent by which the Islamic state was 
able to abolish female labour as was its stated aim. A comparison of 1993/94 
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figures with mid 1980s and pre-revolution figures shows that the total percentage 
of female workers in state ministries did not fall - in fact it increased from 29% to 
30%. As is shown in table 7.1, during this period the percentage of women 
workers increased in the ministries of education; health and justice. It fell in 
ministries of trade and higher education and ministry of tourism which its female 
workforce was 27% closed down. However, the percentage of female workers in 
ministry of industries increased and the ministry of Islamic guidance's female 
workforce reached 17%. In other new ministries the number of female workers 
increased between mid 1980s and 1990s. For example, the number of females 
employed in the Reconstruction Crusade increased from 579 in 1986/87 to 1,234 
in 1989/90; to 1,438 in 1991/92 and 1,751 in 1993/94 (Iran Statistical Year- 
books 1988/89: 69; 1992/93: 79 and 1994/5: 71). 
Table 7.1 Percentage of female workforce in selected state ministries, in 
selected years 
Ministries 1974/75 1986/87 1993/94 
Total 29 29 30 
Education 41 43 42 
Trade 27 8 10 
Health 26 41 41 
Justice 6 10 19 
Higher Ed 39 19 20 
Tourism 27 
Industries - 5 14 
Islamic Guidance - 17 17 
Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical Year-books 1977/78: 66; 
1986/87: 86 and 1996: 71. 
A comparison of 1993/94 figures with mid 1980s and pre-revolution's figures for 
large industrial enterprises (state and privately owned) employing more than ten 
workers shows that the number of these enterprises increased from 3973 in 
1972/73 (Iran Statistical Year-books 1977/78: 383) to 5,922 in 1993/4 (Iran 
Statistical Year-books 1994/5: 164). In 1993-94 these industries employed 
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619,437 workers of which 34,479 were women and 584,958 were men (Iran 
Statistical Year-books 1994/5: 158) in comparison with 1972/73 when these 
industries employed 19,459 women and 230,190 men (Statistical Year-books 
1977/78: 386). As is shown in table 7.2, in 1993/4 women's share of the total 
workforce in these industries fell from 8% to 6% in mid 1980s and remained the 
same in the 1990s. In most industries the female share fell with the exception of 
industries producing basic metal; paper, cardboard, print and publishing, and 
wood and wood product. 
Table 7.2. Percentage of female workforce in different types of industries 
within the large industrial enterprises, in selected years 
Type of industries 
Total 
Food, beverages & tobacco 
Textile, clothes & leather 
Wood and wood products 
Paper, cardboard, print & publishing 
Chemicals 
Non-metallic minerals products 
not including coal and petroleum 
Basic metal 
Machinery and tool making 
Others 
1972/73 1984/85 1993/94 
8 6 6 
9 6 6 
10 7 6 
1 1 2 
3 2. 4 
11 8 9 
4 6 3 
1 0 7 
6 5 1 
15 10 5 
Source: extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical Year-book 1977/78: 386; 
Large Industrial enterprises statistics 1985/86: 41-43 and Iran Statistical Year- 
book 1996: 158. 
A comparison of 1993/4 figures for small private enterprises in 1993-94 with mid 
1980s figures and pre revolution's figures also shows a fall in the total percentage 
of women workers in these industries from 9% to 6%. As is shown in table 7.3, 
according to these statistics, female's share of unpaid family workers increased 
from 17% in 1972/3 to 43% in 1986/7 and to 44% in 1991/92; the share of 
female wage and salary earners decreased from 10% in 1972/3 to 5% in 1986/7 
and remained the same in 1991/2; the figures for female self-employed decreased 
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from 7% in 1972/3 to 4% in 1986/7 and increased to 5% in 1991/2 which is still 
less than before the revolution. But the figures for the category employer 
increased form 1% to 4% in 1986/7 and decreased to 2% which is higher than 
before 1979 revolution. 
Table 7.3 Percentage of female workforce in small private enterprises in 
selected years 
Type of employment 1972/73 1986/87 1991/92 
Employer 142 
Self-employed 745 
Wage and salary earner 10 55 
Unpaid family worker 17 43 44 
Total 976 
Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical Year-books 1977/78: 50; 
1993: 69 and 1996: 66 
However, many of my respondents expressed doubts about the figures for female 
employment in small private enterprises. Firstly those who collect statistics, 
mainly men, do not talk directly to women. Secondly, as is discussed in chapter 
six, many women who may be working as employers, self-employed or unpaid 
family workers do not declare themselves as workers because they see themselves 
primarily as house-wives. Thus, the actual number of women in these enterprises 
must be higher than what the statistics show. Having considered this problem and 
assuming that this problem existed under the Pahlavi, it can be concluded that the 
percentage of female workers in state ministries has increased but in private 
industries has decreased. Nevertheless this analysis based on the sexual division of 
labour under the Islamic state shows that the Islamic state was unable to abolish 
women's labour. 
Despite state ideology women have not been marginalised but are involved in a 
variety of employments where their contribution is absolutely necessary to 
improve the standard of living of their families. 
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7.3 Shifts in the position of the state 
The war with Iraq ended in 1988. Both sides claimed victory for a war which 
lasted eight years. It was estimated that one million Iranians and half a million 
Iraqis died and a million others were left physically and psychologically disabled. 
Ayatollah Khomeini died on 3 June 1989. War reconstruction began and 
economic relations were liberalised. In the 1990s, the restructuring of the 
economy was a move towards further integration to the global economy. 
Despite the emphasis on Islamic moral, ethical and financial laws, the Islamic 
economic system in Iran rapidly adapted to world capitalism. Islamic economic 
laws and regulations were modified to allow the operation of a capitalist mode of 
production based on private ownership of the means of production with an 
Islamic flavour. For example production and consumption of alcoholic beverages 
and pork was prohibited. Nevertheless alcoholic beverages were produced and 
distributed in the underground economy. Whilst interest was officially prohibited, 
it was charged in the uncontrolled financial markets of the Bazaar. Fees, bonuses, 
prizes and discounts have replaced the interest rate in the controlled and 
nationalised banking system (Rahnema and Nomani 1990: 159-161). 
However, the absence of interest rate remained a problem. It did not and still does 
not operate as a mechanism to adjust inflation. It had, therefore, created a very 
high rate of inflation (officially recorded at 40 - 45% in the 1990s) which severely 
reduced purchasing power. Despite its rhetoric, the Islamic Republic had also 
followed the economic strategy of the former regime (Import Substitution 
Industrialisation). The Iranian economy relies heavily on oil. Crude oil was 
produced and sold on the world market to provide the capital and a major part of 
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foreign exchange was used for the private and public sectors of the economy 
(Behdad 1995; Pessaran 1995; Poya 1991). 
Moreover, the liberalisation of the economy did not lead to economic growth. 
Productive investment remained low and the currency remained outside world 
currency markets. The foreign exchange problem created an unstable economy 
and discouraged entrepreneurs from making long term investments. Iran's traders 
exchanged Rials under different exchange rates. Although the state provided a 
favourable exchange rate for entrepreneurs and traders, they were only involved 
in short term investments and trade, made quick profits and moved their profits to 
foreign banks. The process of impoverishment, especially of the poor who 
constructed the backbone of the Islamic regime had been intensified (ibid). 
Nevertheless, despite these economic problems, the oil money had helped to 
generate funds. In the 1990s the Gulf war and the American destruction of Iraq's 
economy pushed oil prices up and Iran benefited. Iran's oil revenue increased to 
$18b. The GDP began to rise, imports of goods increased from $10b to $24b, and 
as a result, consumption increased (Poya 1991). Thus, the general level of 
demand for labour whether male or female had increased as a result of post war 
reconstruction. Male inability and unwillingness to perform women's jobs also 
increased the demand for female workers in particular sectors. As a result 
women's participation in both the official and statistically accounted for, and the 
unofficial and undercounted labour market had increased. Nevertheless, 
rhetorically the Islamic state had continued its stated ideology of women's place 
being in the home and controlled conditions of women's employment. 
In this period the prisoners of war returned. The voluntary work of women in 
Islamic organisations declined. But in the absence of state welfare to subsidise the 
unemployed, the war veterans and their families, more opportunities were created 
172 
for women's participation in the labour force. Priority for training and 
employment opportunities were given to women who, lost their male members of 
their families in the war. A large number of women who worked in the Islamic 
organisations on a voluntary basis were now employed by these organisations and 
were paid a wage. 
But state propaganda continued to emphasise part time work for women. In his 
speech on Iran's women's Day, the birthday of Fatimah, President Rafsanjani 
announced that the law for part-time work of women would allow women to 
spend half of their time in economic and social activities outside of the home and 
the other half in their . home, performing their domestic duties (Keyhan 
26.12.1991). On the same day, Khamenei who replaced Ayatollah Khomeini as 
the spiritual leader also reminded women that family was a natural institution and 
was the basis for women's activities. Women with all their expertise and 
knowledge must first fulfil their family role (Keyhan 26.12.1991). 
7.4 The reform of the family law 
This section will discuss the factors which led to change in the position of the 
state and consequently the reform of the family law. The end of the war with Iraq 
in 1988 and Khomeini's death in 1989 coincided with massive economic and 
social crisis and with demands for liberalisation of the economy and society. The 
government controlled media expressed the changing position of the Islamic state. 
They reported the statistics about population explosion *and argued that this 
problem was partly the result of arranged marriages and encouraging marriages 
"as a way to combat moral degeneration" and partly the result of the banning of 
contraceptives. According to official statistics Iran's population increased from 
33,708,744 in 1976/77 to 49,445,010 in 1986/87 and to 55,837,163 in 1991/92 
(Iran. Statistical Year-book 1996: 35). 
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In July 1989, the Ministry of Health for the first time announced plans for a 
government policy on population control. In February 1990 Ayatollah Sanei even 
raised the question of acceptability of abortion as a method of birth control (Zane 
Rouz 3.2.1990). This was in complete contrast to the official policy in the early 
1980s when Ayatollah Khomeini emphasised that "abortion, regardless of the 
stage of pregnancy, and sterilisation were prohibited in Islam" (Paidar 1997: 288- 
289). The media waged a massive campaign for population control. Posters were 
put up in the streets, factories, offices, schools and universities calling for national 
awareness and population control. Newspapers warned about the link between 
poverty; illiteracy; unemployment and population increase. Keyhan newspaper in 
a series of articles reported: 
The total land under cultivation is only 12 million hectares which is only 
enough to feed 30 million persons. The rate of population growth among 
the 6-10 years age group is 4.7% per annum. This means that in the last 15 
years their number has been doubled. If this trend continues, Iran's school 
student population will grow to 27 million within the next 20 years. They 
need employment which the state cannot provide. One employed person is 
responsible for feeding 3.5 persons. In order to maintain this level of 
employment the state has to create 950,000 jobs every year while between 
1976 - 1986 only 190,000 jobs were created. In terms of health the rate of 
population increase has been 3% while the rate of increase in opening health 
centres has been 1.3% (Keyhan 18,21,25.9.1991). 
The media also criticised the family law for the population explosion: 
The model of having many children means poverty, more people living in 
shanty towns and higher mortality rates. All the regulations in relation to 
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encouraging the population increase must be abandoned and policies in 
relation to population control must replace them. Female education, health 
and employment must be improved, as an effective way to decrease the 
growing population. The ministry of health and education must campaign 
and help people to understand the importance of the use of birth control. 
Higher budgets should be allocated for female's education, health and 
employment (Keyhan 22,23,26.9.1991). 
The media, especially women's magazines encouraged the use of contraceptives. 
Different forms of contraception (pills, condom, coil and sterilisation) were made 
free of charge and available on demand. Keyhan reported that there was 
widespread back street abortion and warned about the dangers of this practice. As 
is shown in table 7.4 it also provided information about the percentage increase in 
the use of different forms of contraception between 1989 - 1991 (Keyhan 18- 
24.0.1991). 
Table 7.4 Percentage increase in the use of contraception 1989-1991 
Pills Condom Coil 
1989-90 7612350 15707136 96809 
1990-91 8079933 37938343 133121 
% increase 6 141 37 
Source: calculated on the basis of information in Keyhan newspaper 19 
September 1991. 
On 11.3.1992 the same newspaper announced that 330 hospitals around the 
country were distributing different forms of contraception free of charge. 
Other reforms were also made in laws regarding marriage, divorce and custody of 
children. High Judicial Council agreed with a new clause in the marriage law. It 
announced that women, at the time of marriage, may request that the clause 
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"Condition under the Marriage law" be included in their marriage contract. Under 
this clause a woman had the right to: ask for divorce; refuse the husband the right 
to marry another woman; have the custody of her children, boys to their 
adulthood and girls as long as she did not get married to another man. Also a man 
no longer had the unilateral right to divorce his wife, by simply registering his will 
at a registry office without the woman's knowledge; men and women had to go to 
the civil courts for divorce and the registry offices could only register divorce 
with a civil court's decree. If a man decided to divorce his wife unjustly he had to 
pay compensation to her. Similar reform allowed female lawyers to practise family 
law in the civil courts. The law stated that "In each civil court a woman who has 
knowledge of the law must be present to deal with divorce cases" (Keyhan 
19.10.1991; 25.9.1991; Zane Rouz 18.8.1991). At the 1997 International 
Conference on Middle Eastern Studies, Mehranguiz Kaar, a female lawyer from 
Tehran at a Round Table on the Situation of Women in Iran argued that: 
After the revolution the religious leaders insisted that in Islamic laws 
women do not have the right to be judges and female judges were sacked. 
In mid 1990s we have seen a step towards ratifying and returning to the 
previous situation. There is now a law which allows women to act as judges 
but not judges who give definitive judgement which delineate the part of the 
law and their signature in this context is not validated. According to the law 
women can be research judges. They prepare the case, they prepare the 
evidence, they prepare the argument and they present it to a male judge 
who makes the final decision on the basis of the research judges. This has 
allowed women lawyers predominantly act as judges in family law, but by 
law they can be research judges in different areas of law. Before this law, 
according to Sharia, women had no right to be judges. Now in practice 
women are acting as judicial councillors. Remarkably the clergies are now 
stating that in principle in Islamic term there is no barrier to women acting 
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as full judges and giving full judgement in all cases. For many Iranian 
women, this is a step leading to a future position. It is for this reason that 
we feel that fundamental changes is taking place and in this process we are 
gaining certain ground which has been gained so hard that it would be 
extremely difficult to lose. They are permanent footage and there is a way 
forward. 
Furthermore, the Islamic state legitimised male and female relationships outside 
marriage, through the reform of the sighe law. President Rafsanjai acknowledged 
the view that sex outside marriage was not acceptable and if it was practised it 
had heavy penalties ranging from stoning to death and one hundred lashes, 
according to the severity of the sin Thus he argued that sighe could resolve the 
problem of moral degeneration in an Islamic society. But he also acknowledged 
that sighe could resolve the sexual need of men and women, and not just men. He 
argued that the practice of temporary marriage had to be made more acceptable. 
Women as well as men could initiate such a marriage. There was no need for 
marriage ceremony to be conducted by a clergyman and to be registered in the 
presence of witness. The man and the woman could recite the formula even in 
Farsi, if they found the Arabic version difficult. Through this private and verbal 
contract the man and the woman could be together for any length of time (Zane 
Rouz November 1990). 
Throughout November and December 1990 a heated debate took place in the 
Iranian media about the advantages and disadvantages of this reform. The middle 
classes with a lesser level of religiosity regarded it as legalised prostitution. Other 
social groups with higher level of religiosity regarded Rafsanjani's reform as 
preferable to the decadent western style promiscuity and free love (Haeri 1989; 
1994). However, despite the initial attempt by the Islamic state to encourage 
temporary marriage and president Rafsanjani's reform, the practice of temporary 
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marriage remained marginal and stigmatised. In particular virgin women could not 
initiate sighe without jeopardising their future marriageability. 
More importantly, changing the law did not easily change people's attitudes. The 
cultural values attached to the principle of marriage and virginity was so deeply 
rooted that despite acknowledging female sexuality and giving a lesser degree of 
importance to the question of virginity, many were reluctant to accept male- 
female sexual relationships outside permanent marriage. 
However, the most important effect of this reform was the way some women 
reacted and used the reform to legitimise their freedom of movement and 
employment status. Laila explained: 
After getting divorced from my first husband I set up a small media and 
communication business to publish a literature and art magazine. But it was 
impossible because I was a divorced woman, living with my two children 
without a husband. Meanwhile I became fond of a male colleague. We 
wanted to be together and work together. This was another impossibility. I 
did not want to marry him. I wanted to get to know him. I, therefore, 
proposed to him a temporary marriage for a year. Everyone around us 
disapproved, they thought it was degrading for me. But for me this was the 
only way to work without being harassed by the neighbours and the people 
who I worked with. 
In the 1990s the state, partly under socio-economic pressures and partly women's 
responses (to be discussed in chapter eight), changed its initial position of 
attempting to seclude women within the home. A programme of family planning 
to control the population, the reform of marriage and divorce laws and allowing 
women to act as judicial councillors were all major concessions that the Islamic 
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state had to make in order to accept the reality of women's situation and gave 
women a relatively better bargaining position within the family law. 
7.5 The reform of the education system 
In this section I will assess the reversal of the Islamic state's position on female 
education. 
As noted in chapter five, in 1980 all higher education institutions closed down. In 
1984, they reopened with the slogan "Religion before Science" and major changes 
were introduced. The changes included general criteria for all applicants: 
believing in Islam or one of the religions recognised by the Islamic Constitution 
and having no connection with political parties, categorised as anti-government or 
atheistic. Male applicants also had to meet very strict requirements of military 
service (Mojab 1987: 6). The aim was to create a totally religious generation 
(Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari 1994: 36-40; Matini 1989; Echo of Iran no 6 1986). 
The criteria for female applicants, however, signified Islamic gender ideology in 
operation. Women were not admitted to a large number of courses. For example 
64% of the institutions did not admit women to Mathematical and Technical 
Sciences. 17% did not admit women to courses categorised as Experimental 
Sciences. These were Veterinary Sciences; Animal science; Agrarian Studies; 
Geology; Disease Control and Natural Resources. Conversely, Midwifery; Family 
Hygiene and Sewing as part of Art and Design courses admitted only women. In 
other areas the maximum limits for female applicants ranged between 25% to 
50% (Mojab 1987: 7). 
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Finally, in 1985, the Majles passed a law which prohibited unmarried women 
from going abroad to study. Their underlying philosophy was that these 
unmarried women may be affected by western values and cultures. 
However, in the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s the education system 
was reformed, allowing women a greater participation in previously restricted 
fields of study. As is shown in table 7.5, although female literacy rate lagged 
behind male education, the gap was narrowing, especially in urban areas, in 
comparison with pre 1979 period. 
Table 7.5 Percentage of female literacy rate in urban and rural areas -1976 - 
. 
1992 
Years Total Female Male 
1976-77 47.5 35.5 58.9 
1986-87 61.8 52.1 71 
1991-92 74 67 80 
Urban areas Literacy rate 
Years Total Female Male 
1976-77 65.4 55.6 74.4 
1986-87 73.1 65.4 80.4 
1991-92 no figures are available 
Rural areas Literacy rate 
Years Total Female Male 
1976-77 30.5 17.3 43.6 
1986-87 48.4 36.3 60 
1991-92 no figures are available 
Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical year-books 1992: 113 and 
1996: 432. 
Also as is shown in table 7.6 a detailed analysis of women's education under the 
Islamic Republic shows that female participation had increased at all levels of 
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education (in both urban and rural areas with the exception of middle school). 
This was despite all the limitations of Islamic gender ideology and the Islamic 
state's intention of secluding women in the home. 
Table 7.6 Percentage of female educational level in selected years 
Total 
Education level 1976/77 1986/87 1991/2 
Primary school 35 43, 45 
Middle School 43 38 40 
Secondary School 35 40 41 
Higher education 26 28 33 
Total 35 40 43 
Urban areas 
40 45 46 
50 43 44 
37 43 44 
27 29 35 
38 43 44 
Rural areas ' 
27 39 44 
26 30 33 
19 24 27 
15 14 15 
26 36 39 
Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical Year-books 1981/82: 113; 
1989/90: 108; and 1994/95: 433. 
The percentage increase in female education was not homogeneous for all urban 
and rural areas. When in 1991 I visited a number of villages in the east and the 
north of Iran I learned that in the poor areas of the east very few girls went to 
school but in the comparatively richer areas of the north most girls went to school 
alongside boys. This was a change from the first phase of Islamisation when 
educational segregation excluded female children from going to school in rural 
areas. Nevertheless, as is also shown by Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari's detailed 
analysis of women's education in poorer parts of the country and in non-Persian 
ethnic provinces the education level was generally low, though especially for 
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female education. Still here too the gap was narrowing (Higgins and Shoar- 
Ghaffari 1994). 
To analyse the gender differentiation in areas of., specialisation I have also 
compared male and female higher education degrees in different fields of study 
(Medicine; Humanities; Science; Technical and Engineering; Agriculture; Arts and 
Architecture) for the academic years 1992/93 - 1993/94 and 1994/95 - 1995/96_ 
As is shown in table 7.7 only in Medicine was the percentage of females 
comparable or higher than males at different levels of further and higher 
education. In other areas the gap was very wide because priority was given to 
male students and these fields of study were considered unsuitable for female 
students. 
Table 7.7 Percentage of female further and higher education degrees in 
different fields of study in the academic years 1992/3 -1993/4 and 1994/5 - 
1995/6 
Higher BA/BSC MA/MSC PHD 
Diploma 
1992/93 - 1993/94 %%% 
Medicine 51 71 55 40 
Humanities 12 32 15 13 
Science 20 38 19 22 
Technical & Engineering 3 7 4 4 
Agriculture 1 3 3 8 
Arts &Architecture 47 45 20 7 
1994/95 - 1995/96 
Medicine 55 67 52 44 
Humanities 18 33 15 17 
Science 25 39 17 17 
Technical & Engineering 4 9 4 5 
Agriculture 11 11 2 6 
Arts &Architecture 51 46 20 9 
Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran statistical Year-books 1995: 471-2 
and 1996: 472-3. 
182 
The establishment of Alzahra University, a women-only university played an 
important role. The female lecturers had exploited the idea of the university as a 
single sex institution and had opened up opportunities for female students to 
study in many courses which were not available in other universities. Fatemeh, 
head of a department explained: 
Alzahra university, the only female university in Iran, provides many science 
degree courses for females and has increased the number of female students 
in many higher degree courses. However, in other universities there are 
many courses which are closed to women. For example Chemistry; Physics; 
Medicines; Dentistry and Biology courses give priority to male students. 
This is even written in the guide books for entry examination to university 
degree courses, which in reality closes many doors to women's education 
and employment. 
The regulations concerning not admitting female to study agricultural studies 
(Keyhan 16.5.1989) and law (Keyhan 25.9.1991) were also modified, creating 
more opportunities for women to study and work in these fields. 
These reforms were as a result of pressure on the state by women who had to 
participate in the labour market despite the Islamic ideology. For example in 1990 
religious women objected to the 1985 education law which excluded unmarried 
female students from studying abroad. They argued that they supported the 
Islamic state, but their interests were defined in both gender and class terms that 
the Islamic state was failing them by ignoring their interests. A group of these 
women wrote a letter to Keyhan complaining that: 
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This law discriminates against religious working class women who rely for 
their studies on government financial help. Those women who have money 
can go abroad despite the law and continue their education. It is also gender 
discrimination, because why should moral degeneration only apply to 
women and not to men? We appreciate the importance of marriage and for 
this reason we appeal to the Majles to reform the law and allow women of 
over 28 years of age who have a good record of Islamic behaviour to be 
allowed to continue their higher education abroad (Keyhan 22.11.1990). 
In the 1980s, the state policy of sex segregation in sports was successful and 
women's sport suffered severely. However, in the 1990s women only sport 
grounds were created in swimming; table tennis; horse riding; skiing, shooting and 
chess. The state also allowed women to compete internationally in those sports 
such as flatwater kayaking that did not require compromising their -hejab (The 
Guardian 1.11.1995). 
Also the interaction between ideological factors and material circumstances has 
changed gender consciousness and attitudes to female education. Many families 
regard higher education as a valuable asset for females as well as for males. The 
ideal future is seen to depend on becoming a university graduate. The idea of 
"marriage after university; work after university; independence after university" is 
becoming a shared value expressed by many young women. Although many 
female graduates do not enter the workforce, as their priority is to get married 
and have children, many young women's attitude is that "if I do not get married, I 
will get a job" (Farhadpour 1998). This is also evident in the statistics for the age 
of marriage. Although officially the age of marriage for girls is nine, in practice 
the average age of marriage is twenty one in both urban and rural areas (Iran 
Statistical Year-book 1996: 52). 
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Kaar (an Iranian lawyer) explained: 
The Sharia law is contradictory with civil law. For example, according to 
Sharia law nine years old girls can get married. According to education law, 
all children age seven must go to school, otherwise their parents can be 
punished for not respecting the civil law of compulsory education for 
children. Also conventionally a nine year old is considered a child. This is 
one of the contradictions which have united all women, regardless of their 
class and levels of religiosity to pressurise the state for reform( Kaar 1997). 
In conclusion, in the 1990s the state under socio-economic pressures and 
women's responses changed its position. The education system was reformed 
which provided better opportunities for women to enter employment. 
7.6 Patriarchal relationship and women's employment 
The initial changes which were made to underwrite patriarchal relations in the 
public and private spheres of life did not seclude women within the home and as is 
discussed in previous sections the state had to change its position -and reformed 
the laws and regulations. 
However, as I argued in chapter three (literature review), Kandiyoti's 
characteristics of classic patriarchy (1991: 31-35) is more prevalent in Iran under 
the Islamic state than under the Pahlavi. The ideology of the patrilocal household 
and the authority of the senior man had been strengthened. Even in prosperous 
urban areas, such as Tehran, economic hardship had forced many young families 
to abandon their nuclear unit and live with their parents. Azar, a school teacher, 
explained: 
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We live with my husband's family firstly because we cannot afford to have a 
place of our own. Secondly, because my husband works outside Tehran 
most of the time and in the eyes of my husband's family it is not good that I 
live on my own. They are a religious family. They don't like the idea that I 
work outside the home but there is not much choice, as we need the money. 
To compensate for this I have to do most of the housework. My brother-in- 
law and his family also live in the same household. My sister-in-law and I 
share the housework between us. She sometimes helps me with my son. For 
example, if I can not take him to school or collect him from school on time, 
she does it for me. As a result, I end up doing most of the housework which 
is the work of three families. 
The cultural values attached to the importance of marriage and total compliance 
with the practice of mahr and nafaghe had increased to the extent that its practice 
is a source of prestige and to deviate from it is to dishonour the family. Minoo 
explained: 
I was a student in London and there I lived with my boyfriend. When we 
returned to Tehran, under pressure from our families we had to get married. 
Before the marriage ceremony our families bargained over the rate of my 
mahr for a long time and finally agreed a price. I had to go along with this 
degrading practice because in the eyes of my family I have already 
dishonoured myself and my family by losing my virginity to a man and living 
with him without being married to him. My mother wanted to regain my 
honour and the honour of our family. She was satisfied by succeeding to get 
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my husband's family to agree to the amount of my mahr equal to my 
husband's sister (my sister-in-law) who was married a few months ago. 
In rural areas, in particular, many poorer women were forced to marry older men 
in order to survive poverty and deprivation. Zahra a young carpet weaver and 
agricultural worker explained: 
My family who live in the next village are very poor, they have no land of 
their own and work as agricultural workers. Three years ago they married 
me to my husband who is 70 years of age, because they couldn't afford to 
keep- me any more. My husband owns his land. I gave him a son. He has six 
older children from his first marriage. His daughter, Maryam, is older than 
me. But he likes to have more children. 
Marriage of cousins had also become more common and popular than during the 
period between 1960s-1970s. Segregation of the sexes in public places had led to 
a situation where public gathering and entertainment were non-existent: There are 
divided seats in all public places such as cinemas, theatres and concert halls. Only 
those who were married with each other or were related through the extended 
family could sit together in the restaurants or walk together in the streets, parks, 
mountains and other public places. People's movements were strictly under the 
surveillance of the Islamic security forces: The degree of punishment for non- 
conformity varied from imprisonment, eighty lashes and severe warning. As a 
result, in the majority of cases, the extended family gathering was the only form of 
entertainment. This situation had reduced the chances of men and women meeting 
and getting to know each other. 
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If women were not married and had no children, they were expected to look after 
the old and the sick within their family. Shahin a 40 year old administrative officer 
explained: 
After my divorce, everyone in my family expected me to look after my old 
and sick parents instead of continuing my education and seeking a career 
through employment, especially as I had no children. As a result I have been 
looking after my parents for many years. Since my mother died I have been 
looking after my father and for the last two years I have been working part 
time, in the afternoons, in my brother's company. I wake up at lam, make 
breakfast for my father, give his medicines, do cleaning, washing, shopping 
and cooking. After lunch I give my father's medicines and I put him to bed 
for an afternoon nap and then I go out to work. At work I have a large 
number of responsibilities, administrative work, secretarial work and as 
telephone operator. I also help with the VDU operators, planners, 
accountant and the librarian. Every body expects me to work harder 
because I am not married and have no children. They seem to forget that 
looking after an old sick man is as demanding as looking after a child. I end 
up working at the weekends and in the public holidays. I work harder than 
my brother who is the managing director of the company. I feel that if I was 
not a woman and I was not expected to look after my parents I should have 
been the managing director. 
A married woman had prestige and social status and a single or divorced woman 
had neither prestige nor status. Women's virginity was the most important factor 
determining the honour of the husband and the family. Mally explained how these 
values forced women to abandon their children for the honour of the family: 
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When I was sixteen I married and I have a son from that marriage. After a 
few years he divorced me to marry another woman. Life was hell, because I 
was a divorced woman and had a child on my own. I met my second 
husband. He was also divorced and had a son from his first marriage. It 
appeared that it could be an equal relationship but it was not and it is not. 
When we decided to marry, he told me that his family's honour would be in 
jeopardy if they found out that I was not a virgin, a divorced woman with a 
child. I had no choice than to hide this reality and send my son to be 
brought up by my mother. Since then I have been pretending that he is my 
younger brother but my husband does not have this problem. He regularly 
meets his son, who lives with his mother, and he does not need to lie about 
him. 
Therefore, the state reformed laws. But patriarchal control over women was seen 
as being essential because of the link between the honour of the family and the 
honour of the community and society - which women were responsible for. Thus, 
if women had to participate in the workforce, and if this threatened patriarchal 
authority of the man or men within the family. The state was to ensure the 
operation of patriarchy at the level of the state and the family. The slogans on the 
walls and outside workplaces read: 
"Sister, your hejab is more effective than my blood" signed "on behalf of 
martyred soldiers of Islam (Soldiers who died in the war with Iraq)"; 
"Women who are not observing the proper hejab, are offering their 
sexuality", "Women who do not observe the proper hejab, show how 
dishonourable their men are" (Maiyar 1995, no 14) 
Also, as was discussed in earlier sections, women actively participated in and 
responded to the economic forces and the reversal of the state's position provided 
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better opportunities for women to enter employment. However, the position of 
women workers as major or auxiliary contributors to the family income was not 
recognised. Furthermore, their subordinate position within the labour market was 
reinforced by gender ascriptive relations. Based on interviews, in the next 
sections, I will argue that factors such as gendered roles in the domestic domain; 
the necessity of men's permission; the lack of or shortage of nursery schools and 
the state's gender blind policies, allow men and the state to control and restrict 
women's ability to sell their labour power and place them in a disadvantaged 
position within the labour market. Social class, access to material resources and 
level of religiosity also affected women's position within employment and the 
home. 
7.6.1 Gendered roles in the domestic domain 
This section will discuss the relationship between marriage and work for women 
in Iran under the Islamic state. It will be argued that the importance given to 
marriage institution and women's exclusive responsibility to perform domestic 
duty put constraint on the supply of female labour. The constraint, however, is 
determined by class and levels of religiosity. 
As is discussed in chapter five, the authorities used the concepts of Mahr and 
Nafaghe to justify women's place in the home, performing domestic duties. Thus, 
under economic pressure women went out to work but the ideology of female 
domesticity restricted the supply of their labour and put them in a disadvantaged 
position within the labour market. Maryam, a teacher and the mother of 4 
children, explained: 
I worked as a Physical Education teacher. It was so hard to work as a PE 
teacher and at the same time be solely responsible for the housework and 
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looking after the children, as my husband never took any responsibility. In 
the morning I had to rush, take children to my mother and go to work. 
When I finished work, I had to do shopping, collect children and go home, 
to cook; clean, wash and to help with my children's home work. I was 
always exhausted. As a PE teacher I was expected to be fit and lively, but I 
wasn't. Most PE female teachers are in the same situation. Some 
headmistresses were sympathetic, most headmasters were not. As -a result 
most of the time I was demoted. This meant that I had to work in rough 
working class areas with less resources, while male PE teachers were 
promoted to middle class areas with more resources. 
Moreover, the ideological effect of the institution of marriage and the concepts of 
mahr and nafaghe gave the responsibility for the domestic work exclusively to 
women. The Islamisation of the state and the emphasis on women's place in the 
home had meant that the only part of the domestic work that men were willing to 
help with was shopping which was an activity outside of the home, and carrying 
heavy objects which was seen as masculine. Mahin a 33 year old nursery school 
teacher explained: 
I do all the house work. The only work that my husband is willing to do is 
shopping and carrying the paraffin and the gas containers from one floor to 
another. 
It was also because of gender-based processes of socialisation. The majority of 
men before marriage lived with their family, where their mothers or other female 
members of the family did the domestic work. Fataneh, 37 year old nursery school 
teacher, said: 
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My husband, my children and I live with my parents who own the house. 
My sister is also living with us. My mother does all the housework. My 
sister and I help her when we return home from work. My husband and my 
father don't touch anything, if they attempt to do anything, it is bound to go 
wrong. Housework is not. men's work. They don't know how to do it and 
women should respect this. I teach my daughter how to do the housework 
but not my son. 
The attitude to domestic work was also different according to women's access to 
resources and their level of religiosity. The poorer the women were, and the 
higher their level of religiosity, the harder they worked and their hours of work 
were longer. In rural areas the work of women was totally household centred and 
there was little distinction between their productive work which was sold in the 
market by men and their domestic work. When I asked Ameh Khanom a 57 year 
old agricultural worker and a carpet weaver whether men do any domestic work, 
she lowered her voice and whispered in my ears that: 
It is wrong if men do any housework. The house work is naturally woman's 
work. It is a disgrace if men do the house work. Only if something goes 
wrong with the electricity or the water pump then it is men's job to fix them. 
In a group interview at Margarin factory all seven women that I interviewed 
explained that they and their daughters or daughters-in-law carried out the 
domestic work, but not sons, sons-in-law or husbands. They also thought that it 
would be a disgrace if men did the housework, even though they were 
unemployed and stayed at home all day while their wives or daughters worked in 
the factory. The idea of men sitting at home and women going out to work was 
such a disgrace for these women that they voluntarily approached the 
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management to make them unemployed and gave their jobs to their husbands and 
sons (see appendix 1: interview b). 
Women who had better access to resources spend less time on domestic work but 
ideologically they were responsible for it. Nahid, the technical vice president of an 
electronic firm, age 33 explained that: 
I have a servant who does all the housework. But if she is not around for 
any reason I do all the housework myself. Mainly because my husband does 
not know how to do it. 
Domestic work was crucial to the standard of living of all families. Men and 
children depended on women to do this work for them and benefited from it. This 
division of labour, however, increased women's hours of work, regardless of the 
degree of their access to resources and their level of religiosity. Only a minority of 
urban women who had chosen to be unmarried and had no children and had made 
a hard decision to concentrate on their upward mobility through a career could 
escape domestic work. As is shown in table 7.8 on the basis of seventy six 
interviews I calculated the average daily hours of work of women in rural and 
urban areas: 
Table 7.8 Average daily hours of work of women in rural and urban areas. 
Rural Urban 
Married Unmarried Married Unmarried 
Type of Work 
Unwaged 12 12 -- 
Waged 8 12 
Housework 444- 
Shopping --3- 
Helping with --2- 
children's studies 
Total 16 hours 16 hours 17 hours 12 hours 
Source: Calculated on the basis of 76 interviews. 
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To conclude, despite reforms, gendered roles in the domestic domain which was 
an important justification for the ideology of women's place in the home restricted 
women's participation in employment. 
7.6.2 The necessity of men's permission 
Despite reforms, it is conventional and according to Sharia, that women must 
obtain permission from their husbands and / or other male head of the family to 
seek employment and to be employed. This section will discuss the restriction 
imposed on supply of female labour through male's control over the sale of female 
labour. All the women that I interviewed had to obtain permission to go out to 
work from their male kin. The majority of my respondents explicitly stated that 
they would stop working the moment their husbands asked them to leave their 
job. This is not only to comply with the state regulation but also to comply with 
the ideology of male domination within the family. In the majority of cases men 
do give permission to women to go out to work, mainly because women's 
earnings are essential for the family's survival. 
The class and the level of religiosity play an important role in the practice of such 
an ideological stance. For example, those women who identify themselves as 
Kargar with high level of religiosity are poorer women where families need their 
earnings. Under these circumstances and despite the ideology, men and women 
have to accept that women must go out to work. As a result male permission to a 
women is pure formality. When I interviewed a number of women, factory 
workers and agricultural workers/carpet weavers and asked them about how they 
obtained permission to go out to work from their male kin, they looked at me as if 
I was asking a strange question and then they laughed and said "men have to give 
permission, there is no choice". 
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Those identified themselves as middle class with a greater degree of religiosity 
suffered a greater degree of subordination than those who identified themselves as 
middle class with a lesser degree of religiosity. They practiced the values attached 
to Islamic gender ideology to a greater extent. If a woman had to go out to work, 
they were under enormous pressure. Maryam a nurse explained: 
I will not work unless I have my husband's permission. My husband and I 
believe that my prime duty is my domestic activity. We therefore both feel 
uneasy about my work, as a nurse. To be khanomeh khaneh (the lady of the 
home) and aghayeh biroon (the master of the outside of the home) is a 
difficult task. It is like to run two hostile worlds and keep them in harmony. 
But we have no choice. My salary is important for the survival of the family. 
Another Maryam, a teacher, expressed similar feelings: 
We are a religious family. In religious families, women should not go out to 
work. But we had no choice, I had to go out to work in order to help to 
feed the family. I had a good opportunity to get 'a job in a bank. But my 
brother would not give me permission. He said that it was a" disgrace for 
him if I work, especially in the same workplace. I became a teacher. When I 
married it was the same story, my husband did not want me to go out to 
work, but because of financial problems he had to agree that I continue with 
my job as a Physical Education teacher. However, he would not agree that I 
go to games on Fridays (the weekend in Iran). He wouldn't agree that I 
teach at boys' schools. As a result, I lost overtime pay, bonuses and any 
opportunity to be promoted. Most female teachers faced the same 
problems, while male teachers had none of these problems on their way of 
upward mobility. 
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However, women who identified themselves as "Non religious middle class", 
were under less ideological pressure from men and the family and because they 
had better access to material resources the question of husband's permission was 
more implicit rather than explicit. They had to comply with the law and to 
acknowledge male domination within the marriage and the family. But, they had a 
greater degree of autonomy in decision making about the supply of their labour. 
Maly, the head of a section in a bank explained: 
For non-religious middle class, it is prestigious that women go out to work 
and their work is valued but they are expected to give priority to domestic 
duties. Women who work are respected, they have more control over their 
property, belongings and decision making (also see appendix 1: interviews c 
and d). 
The necessity of men's permission was a formality which was practiced to a larger 
or lesser degree, depending on the social class and levels of religiosity of men and 
women. It was to comply with the ideology of male domination within the family 
which had been strengthened by the Islamic state. It controlled and restricted 
women's ability to sell their labour power. 
7.6.3 Lack of or shortage of nursery schools 
This section will describe the shortage and lack of child care provision by the 
state as an obstacle to the sale of women's labour. Article 78 of the employment 
law, which was ratified in October 1991, stated that all work places that 
employed women workers must have a nursery school, operating under the 
supervision of the ministry of health. The employer must allow women workers to 
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breast feed their babies every three hours, for half an hour. Furthermore, these 
hours should not be deducted from their wages or salaries (Keyhan 7.1.1992). 
According to Keyhan newspaper in 1990 there were only 930 nurseries across the 
country, operated under the supervision of Ministry of Health, 300 of which were 
privately owned and controlled and were situated in Tehran, the capital city 
(Keyhan 6.1.1992)'. Less than half a million children (out of a potential cohort of 
15 million) attended such nurseries (Keyhan newspaper 27.7.1991). 
These nursery schools operated under Sazemane Behzisty va Behdasht (Well 
Living and Health Organisation) which is part of the Ministry of Health. There 
were three different forms of nursery schools in Iran: Workplace nurseries, state 
nurseries, subsidised by the state and privately owned nurseries. 
Some large industrial enterprises (employing more than ten workers) had 
workplace nursery schools. They accepted under 7s (school age) and were free of 
charge. Each woman worker had the right to take three of her children to these 
nursery schools. For other children, she was paid up to 8,000 Rials for each child 
to be looked after in the state nurseries, outside the factory. With slight variation, 
this was the case in the three industrial plants (Bel Air Radio and Television 
factory, Margarin Cooking Oil factory and Iran Hormon Pharmaceutical factory) 
that I visited in 1991. 
Some work places such as banks, schools hospitals and some ministries also had 
nursery schools. They were not free of charge but they were subsidised. The 
majority of the state sector work places that I visited had such a nursery schools 
but many women could not afford to pay the subsidised fees. Fataneh; mother of 
two children and a bank clerk explained: 
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The work place nursery charges between 4000 - 12000 Rials per month, per 
child. It was too expensive for me. Most of the time my mother and mother- 
in-law looked after my children. Otherwise it would have been impossible 
for me to go out to work. 
There. were also state nurseries, subsidised by the state. They charged more than 
the work place nurseries. within the state sector. But they were overcrowded, 
usually 45 children in each age group, which was against the labour law. Keyhcrn 
daily newspaper reported that according to the ministry of health each age group 
must not exceed thirty children (Keyhan 9.1.1992). They did not have qualified 
staff and there was evidence of health and educational hazards in many of these 
institutions (Keyhan 14.1.1992). 
In a series of articles in 1992, Keyhan daily newspaper reported a number of 
complaints made by women. Nursery fees had increased between 30 - 50%. This 
meant that a large number of women could not go out to work. As a result, 
families' standard of living had fallen. If the government was keen to return 
women to employment and use their expertise it must provide nursery facilities 
(Keyhan 8.1.1992). Women demanded that either the government had to provide 
better and cheaper state nursery schools or increase their wages so that they could 
afford the private nurseries fees (Keyhan 5-14.1.1992). 
The fees of private nurseries varied. The cheapest was 30,000 Rials per month, 
per child, an equivalent of one month salary of a low paid worker in early 1990s. 
In 1992, a year after the ratification of the labour law, stating that workplaces 
which employ female workers must provide nursery schools, many of these 
nurseries had to close down for being underused and because of lack of profit. 
Many state nurseries and work place nurseries also closed down because of 
general economic recession (Keyhan 27.7.1991). High taxation, high insurance 
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premiums, low level of pay to the nursery workers, high rate, high rent, shortage 
of appropriate food, technology for disabled children and lack of general nursery 
school resources were identified as reasons for the closure of these nursery 
schools (Keyhan 7.1.1992). .. 
The response of some employers to women's objections to lack of nurseries was 
"we have more important things to do". Some increased women's wages, but 
women complained that this proportion was much less than what they had to pay 
for nurseries. For example some employers agreed to pay 3,000 Rials per month, 
per child while nursery fees were 30,000 Rials per months, per child (Keyhan 
7.1.1992). 
The majority of the women whom I interviewed and the majority of my 
questionnaires showed that women used their mothers or mothers-in-law to look 
after their children. 
Table 7.9 Type of child care facilities and women's options 
Type of facilities - Questionnaire Interviews 
Female kin 237 43 
Workplace nursery 20 10 
State nursery 27 12 
Private nursery 85 
Source : Calculated on the basis of 348 questionnaires and 76 interviews. 
For the majority of women any form of nursery school which charged a fee was 
too expensive.. Maryam a teacher with four children explained: 
Without my mother it would have been impossible for me to go out to 
work. I could neither afford the expensive private nursery schools nor 
overcrowded and poor condition of state nurseries. 
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Thus, the shortage and lack of nursery schools reduced the supply of female 
labour. Paid maternity leave was 3 months for the first and the second child and 
then one month for other children. But most women took one or two years 
unpaid maternity leave, until their children were older, enabling them to leave 
their children with their female kin. This put women in a disadvantaged position in 
comparison with men in the labour market and had a negative effect on their 
grade, salaries, years of service, insurance, and pension schemes. Mansoureh, a 
35 year old VDU operator explained: 
I have two children. I have lost 2 years of service, as I had to take 2 years 
unpaid leave, one year for each child. Most women in our workplace are in 
the same position. We lose years of service for-bringing up children. I have 
worked the same number of years as some of my male colleagues, but 
because I have lost 2 years of service for bringing up children, I am behind 
of them in terms of grade and salary. 
Fataneh 48 year old bank clerk had similar experience: 
I have 4 children, I had to take 7 years unpaid leave to bring them up at 
different times. As a result I have lost 7 years of service, affecting my years 
of service, insurance scheme, pension scheme and all other benefits and 
bonuses. 
Despite reforms and changes in the laws and regulations, the shortage of nursery 
schools or lack of them were important obstacles in the way of female supply of 
labour. 
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7.6.4 Gender blind policies 
The state's laws and regulations were also gender-based. They did not take into 
consideration women's domestic responsibilities and this also placed constraints 
on the supply of women's labour and added to their hours of work. For example, 
Lily, a 29 year, old secretary, explained how segregation on the buses, and 
specifying that 1/3 of the buses was for women only, added to women's hours of 
work: 
Going to work with two children was very difficult. I had to take one child 
to his school and the other to his nursery school. Since they segregated the 
buses, only 1/3 of the bus is allocated to women, on the basis that less 
women go out to work than men. Even if this is the case, they do not 
consider that this is not enough for women with 2,3,4, or 5 children going 
to work early in the morning. My children and I have to leave the house 
two hours earlier every morning. By the time I got to work I felt exhausted. 
Tahereh, 28 year old secretary, explained how, the rationing system added to 
women's hours of work: 
To do the shopping within the rationing system is a great task. One coupon 
has to be taken to the north of Tehran and another to the south in order to 
buy the necessities cheaper than in the black market. If you don't go on time 
your coupons will be out of date. Sometimes it becomes impossible to do 
the work outside of the home as well as the housework and help children 
with their studies. 
In October 1990 the hours of work of the state sector employees changed from 7 
-3 to 9 -5. This created enormous problems for women workers and added to 
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their hours of work. In a number of articles in newspapers and, magazines women 
described their problems: 
"I have two children, 5 and 7 years of age. With the change in the hours of 
work I do not see my children from lam - 7pm. I am not able to help them 
with their homework. ". "Nursery schools only keep children up to 3- 4pm. 
We have no choice than to bring our children to our work place until 5pm. 
This is creating problems for us in the work place". "Before the change in 
the hours of work I finished work at the same time as the nursery school. 
This allowed me to collect my children on the way home. Now I have to 
take leave to collect my children which is deducted from my wages" 
(Key/ian 22.10.1990; Zane Rouz 12.10.1990). 
Shahin, one of my respondents expressed similar worries: 
Before the change in hours of work I had more time to do the housework. 
Now I get home around 5.30. I do the cleaning, the washing and the 
cooking. After, dinner I help children with their home work and get them 
ready to bed. I then have to cook tomorrow's lunch for my children because 
they only go to school half a day and also do the ironing and other bits and 
pieces. I sometimes find myself working until 1 or 2 am. I don't get enough 
sleep and I am always very tired. 
The state's social and economic policies were based on the assumption that 
women's place was in the home. These gender blind policies restricted the supply 
of female labour. 
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7.6.5 The structure of the labour market 
.. 
This section will argue that the structure of the labour market is based on the 
patriarchal relationships within the home and the wider society and according to 
the Islamic state's gender ideology. 
One important effect of such stated gender ideology was the refusal to recognise 
women as bread-winners. Therefore, their benefits were calculated as a single 
person. A single person received half of a married person's allowances and 
subsidies. For example, employers paid 3,000 Rials per month to a single person 
and 7,000 Rials to a married person in the form of goods or food subsidies. 
Sometimes instead of cash bonus, coupons were given for food items. These 
coupons could be sold in the black market, if they were not needed for the 
household use and they added a considerable amount to the income of the family. 
Women did not receive child benefit, even if they had children. They did not 
receive the married person's allowance, even if they were married. This reduced 
their level of salary drastically, in comparison with men's. For the same reason, 
women's tax, pension and retirement deductions and allowances were also 
calculated on the basis of a single person. For example after her death a woman's 
pension would stop while a man's pension would be transferred to his family. 
Women and men were entitled to health schemes but women could only use the 
scheme for themselves and not for their families. Fataneh explained: 
Banks have their own annual bonus schemes which is not a part of the 
national agreement. It is an arbitrary amount which is paid to the 
employees. Many women do not receive this bonus because they are not 
considered as the head of their family. Under special circumstances some 
women may receive some bonus, but much less than men. 
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In 1990 Zane Rouz weekly women magazine published an article, describing the 
government approval of the new year bonus to workers. This also revealed the 
gender differential treatment within the labour force and the labour market. 
Each employee who is married and has children will receive 100,000 Rials. 
Each employee who is not married will receive 70,000 Rials. Married 
women are considered as single persons (Zane Rouz 4.3.1990). . 
According to my field research, women earn 50% to 25% less than their 
husbands, because as was discussed in the previous sections, they were not 
categorised as the bread-winners and were excluded from benefits and subsidies. 
However, they spend all of their earnings on the household. Men earn more and 
spend a lesser percentage of their earnings- on the household expenditure and, 
therefore, save more. Fatemeh explained: 
I earn 70,000 Rials per month, I pay the rent which is 30,000 Rials per 
month and after consulting my husband I spend the rest on household 
expenditure. My husband earns 100,000 Rials per months. I think I pay for 
half of the household expenditure and he pays for the other half. He must 
make some savings. 
In some cases where women had access to resources and were less constrained by 
ideology they were able to spend less and save more. Fereshteh explained: 
As an electric engineer and supervisor, I earn 200,000 Rials per month. My 
husband who has the same level of education is a manager and earns 
300,000 Rials per month, because he is the bread-winner. I spend very little 
of my money on household expenditure, I spend it on what I want and I 
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mostly save. I -do, however, consult with my husband about what I would 
be spending my money on, because tradition and the norm dictates to me 
that I should respect him and get his approval. 
In another article Zanan Monthly Magazine reported another way by which 
women were in a disadvantaged position. The article pointed out that within the 
state sector the percentage of women who had higher education was 18%, while 
only 6% of men had higher education. But only 3% of these women occupied 
high positions. The article reported interviews with a number of women in high 
positions and asked their opinion. Dr. Firouzeh Khalatbari, female assistant 
director of the economic affairs of the Bank Markazi Iran, (the central bank of 
Iran) explained: 
This is not surprising. In a patriarchal developing country it is natural that 
the criterion for reaching high status is not superiority in educational level. 
Dr. Jaleh Shadi female sociologist in Tehran University expressed a similar view: 
To encourage women to retire early, the media portraying women as 
mothers and wives, not allowing women to work in managerial positions, 
and not considering women as the bread-winners of their families are a few 
reasons among many to explain why there are few women occupying high 
positions. 
The article also confirmed that many married women had to pay higher rate of 
taxation because they were not considered bread-winners. Nahid Javanmard 
female barrister and lecturer in employment law, business law and civil law in 
Azad University pointed out that: 
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In the eyes of the law men and women may be equal but the employers treat 
women and men differently (Zanan 22.11.1990). 
In the late 1980s - 1990s the state attempted economic expansion and had to 
respond to pressures of war, economic dislocation and rigidities in the labour 
market. As a result there was a shift in the state's position. Expediency replaced 
the initial hard ideological line and consequently a pragmatic acceptance of 
increase in female labour force. Nevertheless the social relations of gender 
remained tightly controlled by men and by the state. 
7.6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the Islamic state, despite its initial attempt, did not 
succeed in abolishing women's labour and secluding women within the home. In 
the 1990s under socio-economic pressure and women's responses, the family law, 
the education system and the employment regulations were reformed. But the 
continuing patriarchal control over women within the home and employment 
restricted women's ability to sell their labour power. The structure of the labour 
market revealed how the state, unable to abolish women's labour, differentiated 
between women's condition of work and men's condition of work. The 
construction of gender roles and gender rules by the Islamic state in the home, in 
the workplace and in society as a whole continued to place women in a 
disadvantaged position within the labour market and the family. 
206 
Chapter eight 
Women's political responses to the patriarchal gender relations 
8.1 Introduction 
"The legal reform which had taken place was the result of women's 
activities inside and outside of the country, of activists and scholars who 
had constantly struggled for change. These struggles had ensured that it 
was no longer possible to offer the kind of traditional interpretation of the 
Islamic laws that was entirely detrimental to women" (Kaar 1997). 
During the years 1979-1981 religious and secular women saw the revolution as a 
first step towards liberation from the uneven economic and political developments 
of the Pahlavi state. This was mainly an urban movement, especially in big 
industrial cities such as Tehran. The majority of women who were engaged in this 
movement were waged workers, including industrial workers who were engaged 
in worker's struggles within the workers' councils (shoran). After the 
establishment of the Islamic state secular women's organisations were driven 
underground or disappeared and workers shoras were replaced by Islamic 
Societies. Throughout the 1980s only religious women's organisations and actions 
were favoured by the Islamic state and only in the interest of the war efforts. 
However, by the late 1980's many religious women were politicised. Their work 
experience in paid and unpaid work and their active participation in the political 
movements raised their consciousness about the limitations of the Islamic state 
gender relations. In the 1990s, many religious women who supported the Islamic 
state and opposed secular women's movement in the first phase of Islamisation, 
changed their position and invited secular women to join them in the debate on 
women's issues within the media and politics. For many secular women the 
Islamic state severely limits their struggle for a better society free from religion. 
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They see the state holding on to its patriarchal gender relations, as its survival 
depends on it. However, under this theocratic state, where they have no access to 
political sphere, some see their unity with religious women as the only way that 
they could challenge the Iranian state. In previous chapters I argued that women 
actively participated in and responded to economic processes and forced the state 
to adapt its ideological position and practices. Here I focus on the forms those 
responses and struggles have taken. I will argue that a combination of women's 
political activism and their individual survival strategies led to gender 
consciousness on a scale which has never been experienced in Iran. Through class 
analysis, my aim here is to show how women's organised and individual responses 
constitute a form of constraint on the extent of state power and the patriarchal 
power of men. 
8.2 Women's political response to the revolution in 1979 
This section will discuss the mass participation of women in the 1979 revolution 
and the struggle of women workers for trade union rights within the shoras. 
8.2.1 The mass participation of women in the revolution 
Why women of different social classes and with different levels of religiosity 
participated on a mass scale in the 1979 revolution? During this period, millions 
of women took part in everyday demonstrations, predominantly wearing the black 
chador. The majority were religious women who, as is recorded in chapter four, 
were considered backward and had no place under the Pahlavi regime. Many 
young women of these families had been forced to imitate western values, 
including the wearing of the latest European fashion when they went to work or 
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to university, whilst their families insisted that they should behave according to 
religious values, including the wearing of chador. This imbalance resulted in a 
crisis for them. Thus their support for Ayatollah Khomeini was a political act 
against alienation and dissatisfaction and reflected their anger. More importantly, 
when I interviewed a number of these women, I learned that behind the passive 
image which was given to them by the media and the state (serving God and men) 
was another reality, of strong women, taking initiatives, organising and raising the 
consciousness of men and women about injustice and inequality. 
One of my respondents was Azam Taleghani who was a member of the Majles 
during the revolutionary period of 1979 - 1981 and the head of the Women's 
Society of the Islamic Revolution. She explained about women's activities during 
the revolution: 
Women carried their children on their shoulders and attended meetings, 
conferences and marches. Many were killed during the street 
demonstrations against the Shah's regime. We worked in hospitals all day 
and night and looked after the injured. Women left their homes and their 
husbands to work in hospitals and in the mosques. They only went home a 
few hours a day to sort out things for their children. Those who had young 
children organised collective child care facilities in the neighbourhood, 
allowing time for everyone to do their share of voluntary work. Women 
attacked police stations and barracks, confiscated arms and distributed them 
amongst, the revolutionaries. 
Forough, another participant in the revolutionary movement, also explained how 
during the revolution, in her neighbourhood, women took the initiative to work in 
the hospitals. They forced men to accept their work outside the home and made 
them contribute financially to the revolutionary cause: 
209 
My uncles are Bazaar merchants. I phoned them one day and told them that 
I and many other women, rich and poor, from the neighbourhood have 
decided to go and help the injured in the hospitals. I told them that they 
should make themselves useful and send us a large amount of cotton 
materials. They listened and we women sat by our sewing machines, and 
within a day or two we cut the materials they sent and made massive 
amount of bandages, we washed them, ironed them and took them to 
hospitals. 
It should be noted that the mass movement also included secular women. Even 
the women members of the Women's Organisation of Iran (the Pahlavi state- 
sponsored women's organisation) supported the movement, despite the fact that 
their headquarters were burnt down by the Islamists (Sanasarian 1982: 117). 
Many women joined the demonstrations everyday without chador and everyday 
were given scarves by the march organisers who pleaded with them to wear it as a 
sign of unity for the overthrow of the Shah. One woman activist showed me a 
whole wardrobe full of scarves which she collected on the demonstrations. This 
gave the women's response to the revolution an Islamic flavour. 
What was important for all these women, religious or secular, was the fact that 
they all felt that this was the time to fight for change. Parvaneh summed it all up: 
Many friends were in jail and under torture. Many were executed. I was 
anti-Shah, but there was no concrete political guidance for my generation. I 
found religion as a way of survival. I was not fundamentalistically religious. 
I prayed, but I wore a miniskirt. I fasted, but broke my fast with a sandwich 
and a Coca-Cola in the cinema. I found religion fulfilling and securing my 
life but I did not like the religious implication that women should stay at 
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home. I did not want to stay at home. I wanted to be educated and be an 
artist (Poya 1992: 149). 
To conclude, the majority of women despite their class differentiation and levels 
of religiosity celebrated the revolution and took the revolution as a first step 
towards improving their status within family, employment and the wider society. 
8.2.2 Women's struggle within the shoras 
The 1979 revolution provided an opportunity for trade union activities. Women's 
participation in the shoras raised gender consciousness, as their struggle for better 
wages and conditions of work had a gender dimension. 
One important feature of the early days of revolution was the rise of the shoras. 
They survived for eighteen months and played an important political role in 
securing basic trade union rights in Iran. Female and male workers actively 
participated in these shoras. In rural areas, where the impact of the revolution 
was not as much as in the urban areas, confrontation between landlords and 
agricultural workers became widespread and shoras were set up to re-distribute 
the land to agricultural workers and organise production. In the oil industry and 
other established industries, where the practices of trade union activities existed 
and some workers remembered their own involvement or their parents or close 
relatives' involvements in the working class activities of 1940s-1950s, helped in 
the formation of these shoras.. But in industries where the workforce had mainly 
migrated from the rural areas since the 1960s, the shoras could not be created on 
the basis of historical experience. The pre-revolutionary strike committees were 
the basis of these shoras (Bayat 1987: 109-113). 
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A few days after the revolution, Khomeinie sent a message to the workers asking 
them to go back to work in the name of Islam and revolution. The workers went 
back to work, but they found no change, the same wages, and the same 
conditions. They reacted quickly against the same system. In many factories, the 
manager or the owner had fled the country. Therefore, their absence provided an 
opportunity for the workers to immediately create shoras. In other factories 
where there existed the same management, the same supervisor and even the 
same SAVAK representatives, this became the reason for the creation of the 
shoras. The workers formed committees within shoras to secure different 
demands including: better wages and conditions; health and insurance; 
participation in decision making; contact with other shoras; publicity for workers' 
news; the organisation of strike funds and the establishment of women's 
committees, dealing with specific demands of women workers (Bayat 1987: 102- 
112; Poya 1987: 143-149). 
Soon the independent role of the shoras were undermined. The government 
declared workers' intervention in management affairs to be unIslamic. Islamic 
societies were formed and began to intervene in the affairs of the shoras and to 
support the state-appointed managers. The workers faced the danger of losing all 
their revolutionary gains and being thrown back to where they had started. In 
protest, Shoraye Moassesse Ettehadieh Sarasariehe Karegarane Iran (The 
Founding Council of Iranian Workers Union Throughout the Country) was 
formed to strengthen the individual shoran and to establish unity between them. 
On 1 March 1979, this body published a 24 point demand, including basic rights 
of workers to better wage, conditions and trade union recognition. Following this, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who for a long time had not publicly expressed any views 
about the shoras, made a speech and asked the workers to respect the Islamic 
societies (which replaced the shoras) to save Iran from capitalism, imperialism 
and communism (ibid). 
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During this period I was engaged in trade union activities with women industrial 
workers in four factories: Serum Sazi (Vaccine making) and Squibb (both 
factories part of the pharmaceutical industry); Mmoo Biscuit-making factory (part 
of the food industry) and Gherghereh Ziba (Beautiful thread) in the textile 
industry. A woman friend and I helped these women in their struggles within the 
shoras. The weakening of the shoran was particularly damaging to female 
workers. In their short life, these shoras played an important role for women 
workers. For example the setting up of work place nurseries allowed women to 
continue to work outside the home without worrying about their children being 
left in the streets or alone at home. Zahra one of the female members of the 
Serum Sazi's shora explained at the time: 
The most important problem for women workers in this factory, like 
everywhere else, is the child care problem. Most women leave their jobs 
when they become pregnant. Some will come back to work when their 
babies are older, they usually leave their children with their family, relatives 
or even sometimes with neighbours. Most women workers are either young 
women who are not married or do not have children or are middle aged 
women whose children are grown up. One of our demands is, therefore, a 
work place nursery, which we pushed through the shora and we won the 
battle with the management. The management has agreed to build a nursery 
but they said that the shora is responsible for finding appropriate land near 
the factory. We considered this a way to put us off , 
but we are actively 
looking for appropriate land. / 
The setting up of literacy classes was also important because the literacy gap 
between male and female workers meant that illiterate women were automatically 
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categorised as unskilled and therefore, low-paid workers. Fatemeh from Squibb 
factory explained: 
Equal pay legislation operates in this factory. Women are supposed to be 
paid equal to men for doing the same job, but in the majority of cases the 
lower educational status of women prevents them obtaining equal wage 
with men. For example, men and women work with machines, but only 
those who are literate get extra payment. Because there is more illiteracy 
among women they do not get the extra payment. So in reality equal wage 
for doing equal job does not exist. That is why we are demanding literacy 
classes for the illiterates. 
Health issues were particularly important for female workers, such as the use of 
chemicals in the pharmaceutical industry or the harsh conditions of work in textile 
industry which were dangerous to their reproductive system. Zahra from Serum 
Sazi explained: 
The condition of work is still very harsh. The air is extremely polluted with 
chemicals. There is no proper ventilation. Most workers suffer from weak 
eye sight, chest problems and skin diseases. We need a shora to push for 
proper ventilation, masks and spectacles to protect us. We need showers 
and sinks to wash the chemicals off our face, hands and body. There is only 
one shower and one sink in the whole factory which is not enough. There is 
never any soap. We hardly use the shower because we are not allowed to 
use it within the working hours; if we do, we have to work extra hours in 
order to cover for the time that we spent in the shower. The majority of 
workers in this factory are women and the effect of chemicals on women is 
worse than on men because if they are pregnant or if they breast feed they 
suffer more and they transfer the chemicals to their babies. 
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In this period women's trade union activities also raised gender consciousness. 
For the first time these women were engaged in independent trade union activities 
as women. This was significant in a number of ways: The shoras were under 
attack by the Islamic state. Both female and male workers were struggling to save 
the shoras. But male workers were against female representation. They believed 
that women should leave these activities to men. On the other hand women 
believed that they should be represented in the shoras as women workers, 
because they had specific demands affecting female workers. Zahra from Serum 
Sazi explained: 
In this factory 60% of the workers are women. After the revolution, men 
workers could not ignore us as our numbers were more than theirs. They 
could not exclude us from the sho as. We managed to have 4 women 
representing 60% of the workers and 11 men representing 40% of the 
workers. 
And Mehri from Gherghereh Ziba explained: 
After the revolution we wanted to create our shora. We elected a 
committee, the meeting was nearly ending and there was no talk about 
women's participation in the shora, and their representation. Suddenly one 
of the women from the back of the hall shouted that women should also be 
in the shora, we have to have our own representatives. There was a lot of 
disagreement from the men, they argued that this is not women's business, it 
is bad for women to engage themselves in these affairs, this means women 
following men's path. Women argued that how come that it is not bad to 
follow your path into work every day but it is bad for us to speak for 
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ourselves and defend our rights? Finally after a lot of argument 5 men and 2 
women were elected as representatives of the shora. 
After a few months the Islamic state began consolidating its power through 
Islamisation of the whole society. Islamic organisations, including Islamic 
societies replaced all independent organisations; including the shoras. Strikes and 
sit-ins were labelled "communist and imperialist conspiracies" and were attacked 
by armed police. It was no longer possible for us to continue to work with these 
women. However, this period was an important period for women workers and 
activists. These struggles delayed the Islamic state monopolising its power and 
consolidating its autocratic rule. This allowed women workers and activists to 
participate in political struggle, the experience of which was extremely important 
and to be useful to them at a later stage. Despite the Islamisation, the struggle for 
trade unionism continued. When I interviewed four of these women in 1989 (ten 
years later) I learned that they were still engaged in fighting for better conditions 
of work within the Islamic Societies which replaced the shoras in work places. 
Badri from Gherghereh Ziba explained: 
The condition of work is still very hard. The majority of women work in the 
morning shift which is from 6am to 2pm. We only have fifteen minutes 
breakfast time, when they give us one potato, a bowl of beans and a piece 
of bread. We have to eat our breakfast next to our machine which will be 
switched on when the fifteen minutes break is over. The air is very polluted. 
Bits of cottons hang in the air, sometimes we feel as though we have 
swallowed about a kilogram of cotton with our breakfast. We have been 
protesting for a long time demanding to be given more time and a canteen 
to eat our breakfast, but the Islamic Societies have been ignoring our 
demands. We also suffer from noise and injury to our eyesight and fingers. 
The machines are very noisy and we must keep our eyes open all the time 
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and look at every individual thread very carefully that they don't get 
entangled with each other and at the same time we must clean each 
individual buckle. This makes our eyes red and weak and makes our fingers 
injured. We have, therefore, been demanding that under such hard 
conditions of work, we should at least have a lunch break as we get up at 
4am to be able to be at work by 6am and by the time we get home it is 4pm. 
All we have had to eat is a potato, a bowl of beans and a piece of bread. So 
far we have not been successful in our demands but we are trying and we 
will not give up. 
To conclude, for women industrial workers the revolution was an instrument by 
which they could struggle for change and improve their conditions of work. These 
women, by fighting for the specific demands of women workers learned through 
their collective experience that women's rights could only be achieved through 
their own participation and representation. Furthermore, they learned that they do 
not have to be submissive to their male folk in order to improve their status. 
8.3 Women's political response to the Islamic state 
In April 1979 a referendum decided that Iran was to be an Islamic Republic under 
the leadership of -Ayatollah Khomeini. Women's response to the Islamic state 
differed according to their socio-economic status and level of religiosity. This 
section will discuss why secular women waged a political campaign against the 
Islamisation of the state and why religious women welcomed and supported the 
Islamic state. 
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8.3.1 Secular women's response 
During the revolution and after, various women's organisations were formed- 
Each published their own literature and campaigned for women's rights: Ettehade 
Melli Zanan (National Union of Women)'. It produced a paper, Barabari 
(Equality) and later a magazine, Zanan Dar Mobareze (Women in struggle)- 
Anjomane Rahaie Zan (The Emancipation of Women Society) was the women's 
organisation of Communist Unity. It produced a paper, Rahaie Zan 
(Emancipation of Women). Jamiate Bidarie Zan (The Awakening of Women 
Society) was formed by women members of a pro-China political Organisation. It 
produced a paper Bidarie Zan (Woman's Awakening). Jamiate Zanane Mobarez 
(Militant Women Society) was the women's organisation of The Union of Iranian 
Communists which also had its paper, Zanane Mobarez (Militant Women). 
Etehade Enghelabie Zanane Mobarez (Revolutionary Unity of Militant Women) 
was the women's organisation of the Maoist Communist Party of Workers and 
Peasants and its paper was Sepideh Sorkh (The Red Dawn). (Tabari and Yeganeh 
1982: 201-229). 
There was a similarity between these organisations and the women's organisations 
of the 1940s - 1960s, as these organisations were the sister organisations of 
various Marxist groups. A great celebration was prepared for 8 March of 1979 
after so many years of repression under the Shah's patriarchal state. However, it 
was on the eve of this celebration that Ayatollah Khomeini announced that 
women must wear hejabe eslami. In response to such a proclamation hundreds of 
thousands of women who had been preparing to celebrate International Women's 
Day, understood that they had to turn the day into a day of action against the 
regime. Mass meetings were organised in girls' schools, colleges and the Tehran 
University, against Khomeini's Islamic laws. The demonstrators marched in the 
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streets of Tehran to the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister's office and 
shouted the slogans: 
"In the dawn of freedom, we already lack freedom", "Down with 
dictatorship", We gave our lives for freedom, and we will fight again" 
The Hezbollahi men attacked the demonstrators with stones, shouting: 
"Our belief is not your belief. Get lost communists"; "Either you put scarf 
on your heads or we hit you on the head"; "Either hejab or tisab (acid)". 
This demonstration was the first mass demonstration of secular women after the 
revolution. They marched without wearing the chador or scarf against Ayatollah 
Khomeini and not the Shah. For a whole week there were further protest 
meetings and demonstrations against the Islamic state's anti-women legislations. 
To undermine this impressive protest movement the clergy encouraged and 
organised religious women's counter demonstrations. The state portrayed the 
demonstration of a large number of women wearing the black chador as Islamic 
women fighting ("like Zaynab") alongside their brothers in the war against the 
enemies of Islam. These women marched confidently, rejuvenated and glorified by 
the Islamic values. They condemned the secular women's demonstrations as anti- 
Islamic. They supported the Islamic political system without questioning the 
clergies rules and regulations which were imposing social control and depriving 
all women of their most elementary rights. These women were excited and moved 
not just by their belief in Islam but also by their involvement in political activities 
acknowledged and supported by the state. In our view (the secular women) the 
Islamic state exploited the participation of these women as an effective way to 
crush the secular women's movement which was struggling against the seclusion 
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of women within the home. In the eyes of religious women, the Islamic state 
provided measures for their empowerment; they were out of their seclusion in the 
home and their male kin had no objection to their participation in the activities in 
the streets as they were out marching and demonstrating for Islam and Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The Islamic state successfully exploited the participation of these 
women and instituted further attacks on women's rights. 
In order to mount an effective campaign against Ayatollah Khomeini, many 
organisations and individual secular feminists agreed with each other that a united 
women's movement had to be built. As a result Shoraye Hambastegie Zanan (The 
Women's Solidarity Council) was formed. Beside these organisations, many 
women formed women's groups in offices and workplaces and worked with the 
United Council. Whatever the women's political orientations, they all saw the 
need to build their own women's organisations and, regardless of their political 
differences, to unite against the Islamic state's attack on women's rights. 
Other organisations were set up to support the Islamic state: Tashkilate 
Democratike Zanane Iran (Democratic Association of Iranian Women) the Tudeh 
Party's women's organisation; Zanane Tarafdare Nehzate Azadie Iran (Women 
Adherents of Freedom Movement of Iran); Sazemane Zanane Jebhe Melli 
(Women's Organisation of National Front). There was also Jamiate Zanane 
Enghelabe Eslami (Women's Society of Islamic Revolution) which was not a 
secular organisation. But some women within these organisations also supported 
the Council's activities and the independent women's movement. Although they 
supported Khomeini's leadership and the formation of the Islamic state, they felt 
that women's rights were under threat and had to be fought for. 
The women who were active in the independent women's movement were 
predominantly secular and worked as teachers; nurses; students; lawyers; writers 
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and office workers. But they also participated in supporting the activities of 
female industrial workers in factories, setting up workplace nurseries and 
organising for women's participation in the election of workers' shoran: They also 
tried to engage women with the general issues and activities of the Women's 
Solidarity Council. Some went to Kurdistan to fight with the national minorities 
against the central government. 
The Council embarked on a long campaign of joint activities to culminate in a day 
of action on 25 November 1979. This period was a very critical one for the 
Islamic state. Many women were in opposition. Factories were occupied by 
workers. Demonstrations and meetings of the unemployed were taking place all 
over the country. Peasants were seizing the land and were constantly fighting with 
the regime's Revolutionary Guards. The war between the national minorities and 
the central government was reaching its highest stage. The Islamic regime was 
divided and the fight for power within different factions. of the regime was 
intensifying. It was at this point that the regime adopted its anti-imperialist 
slogans and activities. This was a successful strategy to undermine the opposition 
and to unite different forces under Khomeini's leadership and the Islamic state. 
An anti-imperialist demonstration around the occupation of the United States' 
embassy was organised for 25 November 1979 which was the same day as the 
Women's Solidarity Council's day of action. The male dominated leaders of the 
secular opposition argued that the women's day of action had to be called off. The 
Fedayeen Organisation, the biggest on the left, withdrew its support from the 
Women's Day of Action and joined the regime's demonstration. Despite this 
defection many women members of the Fedayeen's women's. organisation 
(Ettehade Melli Zanan) supported the Women's Solidarity Council's activities and 
the conference went ahead in Tehran Polytechnic. In an attempt to -stop the 
conference, Islamic Guards cut off the electricity supply of the Polytechnic but the 
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conference was held successfully by candlelight. The conference condemned the 
measures taken by the regime against women and passed resolutions for 
further activities. 
Meanwhile, as is discussed in chapter five the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran was ratified, a constitution which determined women's contemporary 
position as a mother and a wife. Sharia law replaced civil law and as a result 
women were denied the minimum reforms which they had gained under the 
Pahlavi (Paidar 1995: 256-262). 
In March 1980 The Women's Solidarity Council organised to celebrate 8 March 
as International Women's Day. Ettehade Melli Zanan, the Fedayeen's women's 
organisation, withdrew its support for Women's Day in order to disassociate itself 
from the Solidarity Council which was known as a major force against the process 
of Islamisation. As a result it held a separate rally on International Women's Day 
and this was the beginning of the end of the Women's Solidarity Council as an 
effective independent women's movement. On 6 May Ayatollah Khomeini made a 
speech in which he declared his birthday and Fatimah's (daughter of prophet 
Mohammad) birthday, which occurred in 1980 on 6 May, to be celebrated as 
Women's Day in Iran. 
In July 1980, after several months of bitter struggle by secular women against 
Islamic dress, the wearing of the Islamic hejab became compulsory. For the older 
generation of women, especially those who were involved in the women's 
movement of the 1930s - 1950s this situation brought back memories of the 
dictatorial regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi which forced women to take their 
chadors off in 1936. For many women it was ironic that the women's movement 
of the 1930s had to oppose the dictatorial regime of the Pahlavi for using violence 
and coercive measures to force women to take their chadors off and wear hats, 
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and in the 1980s the women's movement had to oppose the Islamic state for using 
violence and coercive measures to force women to wear hejabe eslami. In both 
cases the state implemented its policy by force and through violence, as large 
sections of the population opposed the compulsory nature of the policy. In the 
1930s even the secular women who were in favour of modem political and 
economic development were not too keen to take their chador off and wear 
Western style hats. During the 1979 - 1981 period even the religious women who 
sympathised with the Islamic state were opposed to the violent way the policy 
was implemented. In opposition to the compulsory implementation of hejab 
women's groups and organisations demonstrated once again in front of the 
President's Office. Thousands of women were attacked by religious fanatics, using 
knives, clubs and stones. 
In Squibb pharmaceutical factory where I was involved with women workers in 
the establishment of the shora only 20% of women workers wore chador. When 
the wearing of the hejab became compulsory, all women workers, including the 
chadori women protested and demonstrated outside of the factory, demanded 
that the wearing of the hejab should be voluntary. 
By mid 1981, all political organisations, women's organisations and workers' 
organisations had been banned and ceased to exist. There are no statistics 
available but it was widely believed that half of the political prisoners were 
women, the only form of equality given to women in the Islamic state. Women 
were raped in jail and this was justified by the Islamic law of temporary marriage. 
One family told me that they received the news of their seventeen year old 
daughter's execution, when a member of the Revolutionary Guards returned her 
belongings and gave the parents 600 Rials (equivalent to £3 in 1980). The Guard 
explained that the Islamic state's policy was not to execute virgins, because if a 
woman dies a virgin she will go to heaven. Because the young woman acted 
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against the Islamic state, she did not deserve to go to heaven. Therefore one of 
the Guards temporarily married her the night before her execution and the money 
was the price for the temporary marriage. 
For many secular women, the Pahlavi period had opened up opportunities 
(however small) to females to increase their chances of breaking the traditional 
rules and regulations. These women, however had begun to struggle against the 
patriarchal state of Pahlavi to achieve a degree of autonomy in decision-making 
about their sexuality, fertility, earning and expenditure. This was observed and 
understood by many religious women who also began to question their own status 
and what they may be able to achieve, if they risked breaking the rules and 
regulations. Azar, one of my respondents confirmed this view: 
My parents were insisting that I should marry, as it was a disgrace for them 
that I was 20 years of age and unmarried. But I resisted, I did not want to 
be married. They did not force my brother to marry who lived with his 
Iranian girlfriend in London. I wanted to be independent, earn my own 
money, go and see the world and then marry, if I wanted to. 
For many secular women, with the Islamisation of the state, they lost everything 
that they had gained under the Pahlavi and it was no longer possible to secure 
even the basic rights for women. Many chose to live in exile. Alma explained: 
I felt I was nothing but a subhuman in that society. The Islamic state in Iran 
was founded on sexual apartheid as well as dictatorship and repression. 
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Under this system of apartheid, women were directly segregated and 
secluded by the laws of the state. There was no way out. This regime was 
about absolute control over the female body and mind. Women were limited 
to the rights, roles and tasks that the state saw fit for them (Poya 
1992: 159). 
Many of these exiled women benefited from the socio-economic changes of the 
Pahlavi period. Despite this, many of them participated in the 1978-1979 
movements and played an important role in the overthrow of that system, both 
inside and outside of Iran. They therefore felt and still feel, betrayed by the 
Islamic system which has replaced it (Poya 1992) and especially when they see a 
large number of women participating in the reproduction of this Islamic 
patriarchal order. Now they use their academic work and their activities in 
campaigns for women's rights as a way of struggling with the patriarchal system 
in Iran by analysing women's position in Iran and drawing the attention of world 
public opinion to women's position in Iran. 
Secular women in Iran bravely struggled for eighteen months against the Islamic 
state's coercive measures. A combination of the use of coercion and the 
mobilisation of religious women by the state led to the defeat of the secular 
women's organisations and actions. Following mass political repression, 
imprisonment and executions in 1981-1982, any form of secular opposition, 
including women's organisations, had either disappeared, been driven 
underground or exiled abroad. Only religious women's organisations, under the 
control of the state, were allowed. 
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8.3.2 Religious women's response 
This section will analyse the reasons why religious women found the Islamic state 
liberating and how the Islamic state opened up opportunities for them to be 
engaged in organised political activities within the Islamic framework. After the 
1979 revolution and the establishment of the Islamic state, a large number of 
women, some from the deprived and others from more privileged sectors of 
society were attracted to the Islamic system. Under the Pahlavi period they had 
experienced nothing but humiliation and deprivation, because of their level of 
religiosity and commitment to Islamic values. They had felt marginalised because 
they were ideologically and materially debased, degraded and neglected. The 
modern Pahlavi state ideologically restricted their chances of having access to 
secular education and employment. Therefore, they did not benefit from the 
modern socio-economic system which undermined some aspects of the patriarchal 
gender relations. On the contrary, as is discussed in chapter four, the modern 
system was threatening to them. Because the state considered them as backward, 
if they did not give up their religious values and norms and their male kin 
prohibited them from participating in the changes which were taking place which 
required the abandonment of religious values. 
Hence they envied and detested other women who benefited from the changes 
and adopted a western lifestyle. The Islamic regime exploited such sentiments and 
won these women to its side. These women became the staunch supporters of the 
Islamic regime. The regime declared them the guardians of Islamic society and the 
upholders of that society's new morality and values. These women became the 
symbol of Islamic womanhood. The Islamic state and its hegemonic ideology 
opened up opportunities for them to have access to resources both materially and 
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ideologically and provided them with a space to exercise power. Thus, these 
women willingly and actively participated in the making of this patriarchal system 
which enhanced their sense of control and self-worth. 
From the secularists' point of view these women may be seen as actively 
participating in the reproduction-of the patriarchal order (Hendessi 1995: 12-15 
and Afshar 1994: 15-20). But for religious women, this patriarchal order has 
opened up opportunities for them to move out of the home and become engaged 
in positions of power as activists in the Islamic system. 
In the 1980s, many worked as voluntary workers for Islamic organisations. This 
brought them prestige. Some worked because of religious commitment; others to 
promote the ideology of the Islamic state nationally and internationally. Larger 
numbers, however, worked for financial reasons. They were not paid a wage, but 
were subsidised by the state. For example, they were rewarded with free 
accommodation from the confiscated houses belonging to those who fled the 
country, and a greater share of rations which they sold in the black market so as 
to earn a living. These women, despite their social differentiation, were 
committed to the Islamic state and did not question its philosophy of the women's 
place in the home. However, (as was discussed in previous sections) their 
collective political activities in the revolutionary period of 1978-1981 and (as was 
discussed in previous chapters) their participation in the paid and unpaid work in 
the 1980s gave them a sense of collective consciousness against their limited role 
in the home. Azam Taleghani a member of Majlfs in 1979-1981 explained how 
women's experiences of voluntary work politicised them: 
During the war we joined the Baaseej Khaharan organisation, we worked in 
the mosques, prepared food, blankets and medicines for the men at the war 
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front. In the war zone areas such as Ghasre Shirin, Bakhtaran and Sare 
Paule Zahab women were involved in the distribution of arms amongst the 
population and the soldiers. In these areas women set up mobile hospitals 
and looked after the injured. As the war continued, women had to return to 
their homes but they still continued their voluntary work and had to 
organise their time in a way to allow them to do their house work and their 
voluntary work in order to keep male family members happy. 
During this period, Taleghani's organisation (Women's Society of Islamic 
Revolution), voluntarily trained women, teaching them sewing, knitting and 
electronic work. This period of training allowed these women to be employed in 
textile and electronic industries. The organisation also ran support classes in 
Mathematics and Farsi for poorer students who needed help with their studies. 
Forough, another woman, described her voluntary activities during the war with 
Iraq: 
During the war we became active once again. We went to demonstrations, 
meetings and conferences. My husband couldn't, disagree, It was all for 
God. I took the children with me or left them with other women in the 
neighbourhood who agreed to look after the children while others went to 
these activities. We made trips to the Beheshte Zahra cemetery to comfort 
those who had lost their sons, husbands or fathers in the war. We helped the 
refugees from the war zone areas and in the mosques we cooked food and 
canned it and we made blankets and clothes. 
Despite a fall in the number of these voluntary workers by 1991 there were still a 
small, but nevertheless, significant number of women who worked on a voluntary 
basis for the Islamic organisations. Most of these women, however, had no 
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children or their children were grown up. I asked one active member of the 
literacy crusade the reason for her activities. She replied: 
I teach in Isfahan (central Iran) in the morning and I fly to Mashahd 
(Eastern Iran) in the evening, teaching Quran and religious education. -I do 
it for God, I hope that God will accept my services, as I feel that I am not 
doing enough for him. However, if my husband does not agree, God will 
not agree either, therefore .I will stop my activities the moment he [the 
husband] asks me to. 
In conclusion, the Islamic state provided material and ideological opportunities 
for religious women to exercise a degree of power, in comparison with their 
status under the Pahlavi. However, by emphasising women's place as in the home, 
the state ignored the responses of women in their varied ways and intensified the 
patriarchal relationship. It used the symbol of good women (Fatimah and Zaynab) 
to legitimise the political participation of women and thereby politically benefited 
from women's participation in favour of the Islamic state. Nevertheless, their 
activism in the political movements and their participation in paid and unpaid 
work raised their gender consciousness and as will be discussed in the next 
section they began to question the limitations of the state's gender ideology. 
8.4 Pragmatic state control and women's response 
In the first phase of Islamisation 1979 - 1981, the Islamic state brutally 
suppressed the secular women's organisations and activities. In the second phase 
of Islamisation, the state accommodated the activities of religious women, but 
only in the interest of the state. During this period, (as was discussed in previous 
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chapters) the Islamic state, under socio-economic pressures was unable to resist 
the laws of the integrated global market dominated by the west. It therefore 
adapted to it, to a large extent. This meant that it had to abandon the utopian 
ideal Islamic state with no or little integration to world capitalism. I also argued in 
the previous chapters that the state under economic pressure and the need of the 
families for women's earning had to reconcile its stated ideology in relation to 
women's employment and it reformed the family law, female education and 
employment. Nevertheless the state constantly reasserted patriarchal control, by 
emphasising the ideal of women's place in the home and the temporary nature of 
women's participation in the public sphere of life. 
Many women, especially religious women found a contradiction between the 
stated gender relations and their experiences of their participation in the political 
movements and their participation in the labour force. This created conflicts 
between genders within the family and the wider society and women responded. 
Their participation in the workforce and in political movements had given them a 
sense of empowerment and on the other hand had raised gender consciousness 
about the ideology of women's place in the home. As a result, in the 1990s, they 
began to question gender differential treatment, advocated by the state. In this 
section I will focus on women's activism (through media and politics) which 
forced the Islamic state towards pragmatism. 
8.4.1 Media 
In this section I shall argue that although in the 1980s religious women and 
secular women were a world apart, by the 1990s, a form of unity has come about 
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between women, despite their social differentiation and through identification of 
similar problems and experiences. This has been facilitated by the media, 
especially women's magazines and journals. These publications discuss, within an 
Islamic framework, women's issues, ranging from debates over feminism and 
patriarchy, to women's position within the family, employment, law and 
education. They also represented different forms of Muslim feminism in Iran. For 
example, women who are active around Payame Zan magazine limit their 
activities to the interpretation of the Quran and Hadith (The collected records of 
Prophet Mohammad) which are complementary to women's issues. Zane Rouz 
and Payame Hajar have put a step further and have criticised laws and 
regulations which are detrimental to women and have suggested reforms. Zanan 
have questioned gender relations through the analysis of different feminist schools 
of thought and women's issues in Islam. Farzaneh has devoted its pages to 
research feminist issues in Iran and in other countries and have made contacts 
with feminist organisations around the world (Tohidi 1996: 279-286). 
Other magazines, newspapers, television and radio also discuss women's issues 
with women's participation. One example of media intervention and response was 
in the summer of 1995. The strong and powerful presence of religious Iranian 
women, wearing black chador, who were delegates from Iran to the International 
Women's Conference in Bejing raised questions over gender issues in Iran. Many 
secular Iranian women, exiled abroad, also attended the conference. Their 
interaction raised many questions in relation to women's economic, social and 
political roles in Iran. Many important issues relating to women's role in 
education, employment and population control were raised and led to heated 
debates within the Iranian media about inequalities between women and men in 
Islamic Iran. For example, Payame Emrouz (Today's Message), a monthly 
economic, social and cultural magazine, wrote: 
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Women are half of the population but only a small percentage of them are 
employed or self employed. Their activities are mainly concentrated in 
domestic work. National development would be impossible without 
women's economic participation (Payame Emrouz no. 8 1995). 
In opposition to this view, another publication Sobh (Morning) weekly newspaper 
wrote: 
Even if we accept that women's presence in economic activities is necessary 
we must make sure that women's priority is in the home'(Sobh no 26 1995). 
The female chief editor ofMaiyar (Criterion) monthly magazine and the author of 
an article: "Would you have been in this position, if you were a woman? " based 
on interviewing a number of men in high positions, concluded that the ideology of 
women's priority in the home was an obstacle to their upward mobility (Maiyar 
no. 15 1995). 
Women's magazines and journals, in particular, have played an important role as a 
forum for the views of both religious and secular women. These publications, 
although they were set up by religious women and supporters of the Islamic state, 
decided to have a wider audience by inviting secular women to contribute to the 
debate on women's issues. For example, Shahla Shirkat the editor of Zanan 
suggested that "we should tolerate and respect each others' conviction. Even 
though we do not share the same philosophy, belief and thought, we can and 
should work together (Kian 1997: 91). In the 1980s, Mahbobeh Abbas- 
Gholizadeh (Ommi) wrote a number of articles in Zane Rouz rejecting feminism, 
especially the notion of Muslim feminism in Iran. In the 1990s, however, she 
changed her position and as the editor of Farzaneh argued that women's issues 
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and feminism must be studied systematically and her aim in Farzaneh is just to do 
this task (Tohidi 1996: 279-280). The aim of these Muslim feminists have been to 
put pressure on the Islamic state by emphasising that the inequalities between men 
and women are not initiated by the Quran, but rather by the interpretation of 
religious authorities of the divine laws. More importantly, by taking this position, 
they have succeeded to force the state to reforms the family laws, the employment 
legislations and constitutional law. 
In the process of parliamentary elections in 1996 and the presidential election in 
1997, Zanan magazine published different views by women on women's demands 
for reforms of the family law; female education and employment regulations. 
Moreover, in the summer of 1997, in a series of articles in the form of a round 
table discussed the question of "What is the most important problem facing 
women in Iran? ". The magazine also sent the following questions to be discussed 
at a round table at the 1997 International Conference on Middle Eastern Studies 
at the University of Oxford in Britain: 
1. What was the most important problem facing women in Iran? If there was 
a list of burning issues, what issues came on top of the list? 2. Having 
defined what the problems were, how far the problems were related to the 
wider political context and how far were they related directly to the position 
of women? 3. Whether women in Iran had a problem which united them 
all?. If so, how much of these problems were specifically related to the 
Iranian context and how much are they related to the universal context? 4. 
What was the root problem? 
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Considering this wide agenda and time constraints, the participants, including 
Kaar, a woman lawyer from Iran, decided to discuss the important issue of 
women's political participation in Iran and the struggles of women to seek formal 
political influence within the legislature. 
Kaar emphasised that in the 1990s both secular and Muslim feminists in Iran 
rejected the institutionalised inequalities and increasingly demanded further 
changes. More importantly, she argued that the legal reform which had taken 
place was the result of women's activities inside and outside of the country and 
that this situation is irreversible. 
This discussion raised the whole issue of whether women's demands in Iran were 
"feminist issues". Kaar explained that these demands might be feminist demands 
within the global context, but not in the Iranian context. Under the Islamic state 
such labels were not used. These issues were however debated and discussed as 
part of the issue of equality of humanity. 
The importance of media in expressing women's activism is also evident in the 
increasing number of female journalists in Iran. Despite enormous restrictions 
imposed on them by the process of segregation (discussed in chapter six), in the 
1990s, there are far more female journalists in Iran than in the 1970s, the height 
of Westernisation and the reforms which were made by the Pahlavi state 
(Farhadpour 1998). In 1972 there were 2000 journalists in Iran and only fifty of 
them were women. In other words, 2.5% of the total journalists were women. In 
1997 the total number of journalists reached 4000 and 400 of them were women 
or 10% which shows an increase of 7.5% during this period. Iranian women 
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journalists are on average five years younger than their male colleagues, but they 
are considerably better educated - with 50% at graduate level, while the average 
for the entire profession is 35% (Shahidi 1997). This was facilitated by Muslim 
feminists who were in position of power. Shahla Habibi, advisor on women's 
issues under president Rafsanjani argued: 
We need more reporters, producers and directors with expertise on 
women's issues. Just as economics needs to be covered by a journalist who 
knows about economics, journalists covering women's issues should be 
aware of women's mentality, language, literature, and their desirable status 
form the point of view of religion and tradition ... 
journalists have to be 
educated about women's issues and special women's groups have to be set 
up within the various media organisations (Shahidi 1997). 
In conclusion, urban working women, regardless of their social differentiation 
have used the media to interact with each other on feminist issues and demands, 
despite restriction imposed by the Islamic state. Moreover, they used the media as 
a medium to struggle for change. This was also evident in their political 
participation. 
8.4.2 Politics 
Under the Islamic state no form of secularism is tolerated. Secular organisations 
do not exist, but Islamic political parties and organisations operate and express 
different opinions about economic, political, social and foreign affairs. Within 
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strict bounds, there are universal suffrage and freedom of speech, press and 
assembly. Many people feel they are participating in political life, eagerly 
following the debates in the Majlis, the judicial system and the government 
through media. This form of Islamic pluralism and parliamentary rule is different 
from the autocratic state under the Pahlavi in which no opposition was tolerated, 
even within the ruling class. The Islamic state has no other choice but to 
accommodate this limited pluralist system. The 1979 revolution which led to the 
overthrow of the Pahlavi system and the impact of the different movements which 
opposed the establishment of the Islamic state are not forgotten and the majority 
of the people still demand democratic change. 
Women's role in this process has been significant. They have been actively 
participating in the political arena, on gender issues, as voters and as elected 
members of the Majles. In the parliamentary election of April 1996 and the 
presidential election of May 1997, women's participation showed that gender had 
become an important part of shaping politics in Islamic Iran. One important 
feature of the parliamentary election in 1996 was that 190 women competed with 
3010 men for 270 seats. As was widely reported in the media, especially women's 
magazines, the-majority of women voted for female candidates on the ground that 
only women could change women's situation. Even in conservative regions 
(Isfahan and Malayer) women competed with men and in some cases with the 
clergy and either they won the election or won a large number of votes (Keyhan 
28.3.1996; Iran Focus, February-April 1996). 
In 1996 1 interviewed a number of men and women about this matter. There were 
at least three different explanations. For example, a middle aged man from 
Malayer who voted for the female candidate said that he voted for that zaifeh (the 
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weak half) because "her programme was better than others". A young woman's 
response was that "only women can do things for women". And an older woman's 
response was "women are less corrupt and work better when they get to positions 
of power" The women's issues and the question of female candidates were 
debated within family circles. Faezeh Rafsanjani who stood as Tehran candidate 
against the prominent conservative clergy Nateghe Nouri became extremely 
popular among young women of both religious and secular middle classes, for 
suggesting that if elected she would create women-only sport grounds, including 
horse riding and women only cycling lanes. Not only religious women voted for 
her, but secular women too, despite the fact that she was the daughter of a 
clergyman (ex-president Rafsanjani). In the election she came second. It was 
widely believed that the way the votes were counted was rigged, as it would have 
been embarrassing for the Islamic state that a young women competed with a 
prominent clergyman and won the election. Nevertheless thirteen women were 
elected to the Majles. 
In the 1997 presidential election once again women's issues were at the centre of 
political debates. Despite the fact that according to the religious law and the 
article 115 of the constitution women could not become president, nine women 
stood for the presidential election (Iran Focus May - June 1997; Payame Emrouz 
no. 19: 1997; Zanan no. 34 1997). This action was a form of protest, forcing the 
state to admit to its own limitations. This was explained by one of the candidates, 
Azam Taleghani - the head of Women's Society Of Islamic Revolution and the 
editor of Payame Hajar (one of the women's magazines). She announced that her 
intention was firstly "to sort out the interpretation of the term rejal (statesmen)" 
which is ambiguously defined in the constitution. Secondly she said "It was my 
religious duty to stand for the presidential election. Otherwise, the rights of half 
of the population of this country would have been wasted and I would have been 
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responsible and accountable to God for such an injustice". Thirdly, she explained 
"I have discussed the issue of whether women could be the president of the 
Islamic Republic or not with a number of clergymen in order to pave the way for 
the future, even if this may cause problems for me at present" (Payame Emrouz 
and Zanan ibid). 
Despite these attempts, all female applicants were rejected by Shoraye Negahban 
(the Council of Guardians). But women's issues were still at the heart of the 
debate and the main question was who will be Iran's next president. Zanan 
magazine asked a number of questions from Khatami (the pragmatic candidate) 
and Nateghe Nouri (the conservative candidate who had competed with Faezeh 
Rafsanjani in the 1996 parliamentary election) about their views on women's 
issues. Khatami's answers were sympathetic, but Nateghe Nouri refused to answer 
them. The magazine also interviewed a number of women in academic, artistic, 
political and scientific positions about their demands from the candidates (Zanan 
ibid). 
As a result of these campaigns, the majority of women and youth, (especially 
young women) voted for Khatami who won a landslide victory against Nateghe 
Nouri. Once again women played a decisive role. Gender consciousness 
determined the outcome of the election. They voted for Khatami, because they 
believed that under his presidency women's issues could be fought for more easily 
than under conservative Nouri. It was expected that two women would be 
included in Khatami's cabinet. Fatemeh Ramazanzadeh, a Majles deputy and 
Iran's representative at the Cairo Population and Development Conference in 
1994 was expected to be the minister of health and the popular Faezeh Hashemi 
was nominated to be the minister of sport, a new ministry to be created for youth 
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(Iran Focus June 1997). However, in response to the pressure of conservative 
clergy, president Khatami refused to include any female ministers in his- cabinet 
which was formed in August 1997. But two women, Masoomeh Ebtekar and 
Zahra Shojaie were appointed to the vice president positions. 
In the first and the second phases of Islamisation (1979-1989) the Islamic state 
isolated secular women and only favoured the participation of religious women in 
the interest of the patriarchal state. In the third phase of Islamisation (1990s), 
however, especially in the 1996 and 1997 elections and especially in urban areas, 
women participated in politics on a mass scale, despite their social differentiation. 
This was because women, regardless of their class and levels of religiosity, had 
experienced shared problems: Islamic family law enforced male domination and 
interest at the level of family, work and the wider society, despite the fact that 
they generated income for their families, saved expenditure for the state. The 
religious women especially felt that they had accommodated to state patriarchy by 
supporting it, but their interests were ignored by the state: This raised women's 
consciousness about the limitations of gender ideology advocated by the state. 
Although, the gender-based subordination of women was deeply ingrained in the 
consciousness of both men and women, women (and men) also saw from their 
own experiences, that the state and the family - benefited from women's 
employment. 
Moreover, these shared problems and experiences had closed the gap between 
religious women who were the supporters of the Islamic system and the secular 
women who opposed the Islamic system. They were both aware that despite their 
economic and political participation, the institutionalisation of patriarchy had 
strengthened male domination and women's subordination. They both wanted 
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changes to their circumstances and they had made the men and the state accept 
their participation and their demand. 
Under the Islamic state where no form of secularism is tolerated, only Muslim 
feminists have access to political spheres. Female political activists such as Shahla 
Habibi (daughter of Ayatollah Habibi); Fatimah and Faezeh Rafsanjani (daughters 
of ex-president Rafsanjani) and Azam Taleghani (daughter of the late Ayatollah 
Taleghani) within the Islamic state apparatus have tried to re-interpret Islamic 
laws and regulations in favour of women's participation in the economic and 
political spheres. Taking into consideration the limitations of the-theocratic state, 
many secular feminists in Iran feel that although the real change should come 
from an end to theocracy of the state, these reforms are not in contradiction and 
conflict with their demands for the right to equal treatment of men and women 
within the family, employment and the wider society. More importantly, the unity 
between secular and Muslim feminists has challenged Islamic theology and 
thereby the Iranian theocratic state with the result that the state has been forced 
to adapt its ideological position and practices. 
To conclude, in the 1990s, in urban areas a degree of collaboration between 
religious and secular working women was taking place. Through the media they 
were interacting and through this interaction they had identified their shared 
problems and experiences. Despite their views on the Islamic nature of the state, 
they were questioning their subordination. 
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8.5 Women's individual responses 
In the previous sections of this chapter I explained the importance of women's 
organised responses and their struggle to shift the position of the state. I argued 
that the evidence for the change in the ideological position and the practices of 
the state can be found through material factors which are measurable such as 
women's participation in politics and the use of media by women as well as the 
reformed family law, education and employment regulations which were 
discussed in chapter seven. I also argued (in chapter seven) that despite these 
reforms, patriarchal relationship had been strengthened and the Islamic state still 
tightened its control on women in employment, within the family and the wider 
society. In this section I will argue that beside the organised forms of struggle by 
many women, the majority of women also struggle on an individual basis against 
patriarchal gender relations at home, at work and in the wider society. This form 
of struggle is equally important because as was discussed in chapter three 
(literature review) the form of gender relations and women's subordination to men 
is not static, it can be changed under economic conditions. But any real change in 
women's subordination must come from changes in social relations rather than 
change in the law. Therefore, women's individual responses to patriarchal 
relationships could also have great impact on the position of women within the 
family and employment. I will further argue that women's individual responses 
differ according to their class and levels of religiosity. 
Kandiyoti (1991; 35-38) argues that individual women interpret and reinterpret 
patriarchal ideology and use it as a form of struggle. This shows that women are 
not passive victims of ideology. This analysis is important because it explains why 
in Iran, many women accepted their subordinate position and some participated in 
the reproduction of their own subordination by policing the patriarchal state and 
241 
its rules and regulations. For many women their involvement in policing the 
patriarchal state, was the source of their empowerment. In this sense the ideology 
had a material basis which women used to improve their status. thus, the 
acceptance of the ruling ideology was not just as a result of false consciousness 
(Molyneux 1985: 227-254). In effect it was a way of bargaining with patriarchy. 
In previous chapters I have argued that the ideology of seclusion as the desirable 
objective of the Islamic state; and the process of segregation created constraints 
in the way of women's mobility within the labour force and the labour market. 
However, the degree and the level of constraint, varied for different women as 
their access to material resources, and the ideological constraints, were different. 
Thus, women chose different strategies: sometimes they rebelled against the 
stated gender ideology and at other times they conformed to it. They chose these 
strategies to achieve a particular goal: to survive, to secure a better future and 
even improve their economic and social status. 
This analysis also provides a historical understanding of a particular form of 
patriarchy in a particular society. Moreover, it shows that it is the impact of the 
level of access to material resources and ideological constraints on patriarchal 
relationships which produces different complexities in terms of women's 
strategies. 
Grown and Sebstad (1989: 941), in the context of analysing women's poverty and 
livelihood activities, argue that women mobilise their resources and opportunities 
and use a mix of survival strategies to achieve their goals. They identify three 
different goals: For the poorest, survival is the goal, as they cannot risk the 
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survival of themselves or their families to go any further. For those whose basic 
survival is assured, their goal may shift to security. The available resources allow 
a degree of flexibility and risk. Finally, for those who have achieved basic 
security, the goal may change to growth. Over time, women may move between 
different levels of achieving one goal or the other. (ibid: 941). 
I, therefore, use these concepts alongside with Kandiyoti's concept of bargaining 
with patriarchy to analyse how women in Iran struggled on an individual basis 
against the conflicts arising from the Islamic gender ideology and the material 
reality of their lives. I have used this approach within the context of indigenous 
class system combined with different levels of religiosity to show how, the 
ideological dependence on men, especially for poorer women, restricted the range 
of options available to them. For some women survival or higher status was 
achieved through observing the traditional Islamic rules. For others, it was 
achieved through rebelling against the rules. But in the majority of cases women 
chose a mix of strategy to survive the gender conflicts and only in this way they 
were able to improve their circumstances. 
8.5.1 Bargaining with patriarchy by breaking its rules 
In urban areas, some women are in an advantaged position materially and are less 
constrained by ideological pressures. Therefore, they are in a position to bargain 
with patriarchy by breaking its rules. 
According to official statistics, the female population of Iran in 1991-1992 was 
27,068,713 in comparison with the male population which was 28,768,454. 
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15,401,354 or 56% lived in urban areas (Iran Statistical Year-book 1996: 35). In 
urban areas women had better access to resources in comparison with rural 
women. As is discussed in chapter seven the level of literacy; further and higher 
education was higher for female in urban areas than in rural areas. Secular 
women, who had more access to material resources and were less constrained by 
religious values had the option of not getting married or marrying after they had 
completed their higher education. Many of these women resisted patriarchal 
gender relations by breaking its rules, even though this may resulted in losses on 
the family front for them. Unmarried women and divorced women paid a heavy 
price for clinging to their independence from men by finding empowerment in a 
career, in employment. They may be labelled as "not good women" or, in the case 
of divorced women, may even faced the loss of custody of their children, but this 
was their way of bargaining with patriarchy. Their access to material resources 
combined with being less constrained by the values attached to the ideology of 
Shia Islam enabled them to struggle against the conflicts and secure a better 
future and or improve their status in their chosen way. 
Single women had a greater degree of autonomy to make decision about their 
sexuality, fertility, their earning and the disposal of their income. Even if they did 
not need to go out to work out of economic necessity, they chose to have a 
career in order to be independent and as a way of upward mobility. However, the 
norm did not allow them to live on their own, hence they usually lived with their 
parents and chose to give them a portion of their earnings to ensure their 
independence from them. Their motivation, despite the Islamic gender ideology, 
was to improve their status, their place and power in comparison with men within 
the wider society. Simin, a 33 year old accountant identifying herself as middle 
class with low level of religiosity explained: 
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I have no intention of getting married. Segregation does not allow me to 
meet a suitable person. I cannot marry someone who is in lower position in 
terms of education and employment. Men don't like women who are in 
higher position than themselves because this makes it harder for them to 
have control over women. I live with my parents to keep people's mouth 
shut. I work for the state sector in the morning and in a private company in 
the afternoon and evening. I leave the house at lam and return home at 
9pm. The state sector gives me the security and I earn a lot of money in the 
private sector. 
To conclude, in urban areas, there were a minority of women who had more 
access to material resources and wage employment and were less constrained by 
the pressure of ideology. Therefore they were able to bargain with patriarchy by 
breaking its rules. 
8.5.2 Bargaining with patriarchy by conforming to its rules 
This section will discuss the response of many religious women especially those 
who had less access to material resources and wage employment and, therefore, 
bargained with patriarchy by conforming to its rules. This was especially apparent 
in rural areas. In 1991-1992 the female population of rural areas was 11,491,693. 
That is in comparison with urban areas 42% lived in rural areas (Iran Statistical 
Year-book 1996: 35). They were amongst the poorest and were most affected by 
gender inequality. The reform of the family law, education and employment 
regulations had not affected these women greatly. As is discussed in chapter 
seven, despite education reform and increase in the percentage of literacy rate still 
64% of the female rural population is illiterate (Iran Statistical Year-book 1996: 
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432). They married at young age, usually in their mid teenage years. They had 
high rate of fertility and they started working on the land and as carpet weavers 
when they were five or six years of age. Their work was important for the 
household, national and international markets. However, the majority of them 
were not recorded in the statistics as part of the work force. 
Thus, the majority of female agricultural workers whose access to material 
resources were limited and were constrained by gender ideology achieved their 
goal by conforming to the rules of separate spheres for women and men. This was 
their way of bargaining with patriarchy because as Kandiyoti argues "in situations 
where the observance of restrictive practices is a crucial element in the 
reproduction of family status, women will resist breaking the rules" (1991: 33). I 
would therefore agree with Kandiyoti's analysis that under classic patriarchy 
women accommodate to the system and "their passive resistance takes the form 
of claiming their half of this particular patriarchal bargain - protection in exchange 
for submissiveness and propriety, and a confirmation that male honour is indeed 
dependent on their responsible conduct" (ibid: 36). 
The labour of these women had always been demanded, but it is secluded and 
segregated labour. In this sense they were not exposed to the same conflicts that 
women who were drawn into wage labour were. Hence these women were not 
acting against those conflicts. Nevertheless, they were aware of their contribution 
but under the pressure of gender ideology they believed decisions had to be made 
by men. The only time that they participated in decision making was in their old 
age. Especially when their daughters get married. The preparation of jahizieh 
(trousseau) was the responsibility of women, especially older women. Ameh 
Khanom, a 57 year old carpet weaver and agricultural worker and mother of eight 
children explained: 
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We have a good annual income from the production of grapes, cumin, 
barley, cotton, wheat, pistachio and carpet -weaving. These" are mostly 
women's jobs, especially carpet weaving. Boys up to age of ten weave 
carpets and then they go to school but girls remain carpet weavers and 
work on the land. Women also produce milk, yoghurt, butter, cheese and 
bread. A large part of our income pays for raw materials, machinery and 
access to water. Men take the products to the market and sell them to 
government agents. We never go to the market, as this is men's job. My 
husband gives me a lot of money to prepare jahizieh for our daughters. 
For Ameh Khanom the most important issue was that she achieved her goal and 
ultimately gained power by conforming to what was expected from her. 
Therefore, she was not simply submitting to her subordinate position, her survival 
and the survival of her family depend on her acceptance of her position. 
The case of Akhtar in a village in the north of Iran was also similar. She left 
school when she was ten years old and continued carpet-weaving and working on 
.. the land. She married when she was sixteen. She followed her husband, who was 
a soldier, to Chahbahar in the south of Iran. She had four children. She also found 
survival and security through conforming to an ascribed role, although she was 
totally aware of her ability to earn money. She explained: 
I finish all the housework in the morning. I then spend the rest of my time 
knitting, sewing and doing embroidery. My husband sells them all. Every 
summer I come back to my village and weave carpets. In a good month I 
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could earn up to 200,000 rials. My husband sells the carpets. He is very 
happy with me and appreciates my work. 
In these cases women were outside wage employment. But even in the case of 
industrial workers in Margarine factory (see appendix one, interview b) a similar 
form of patriarchal bargain was evident. These women, although wage earners, 
could not build on their experience of wage labour as a mean to challenge 
patriarchy. Thus their strategy was to secure their honour and pride for their 
families and community by refusing to use contraceptives until they produced 
sons and they even attempted to give up their jobs in favour of their male kin, in 
order to gain respectability. 
In conclusion, in cases where women were outside wage employment or the 
observance of restrictive practices were crucial elements in the reproduction of 
family status, women had no choice than to observe the rules even if this led to 
the reproduction of their own subordination. But they were also actively 
participating in cultural negotiations to reinterpret the rules and regulations to 
their advantage, rather than passively accepting the patriarchal rule. They were, 
therefore, mobilising their material resources and ideological constraints in order 
to achieve their goals. Some were able to move from survival to security and 
others to move forward and improve their own and their families' status. 
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8.5.3 A mix of strategies 
Those who rebelled against the patriarchal rules were a small section of the 
society. Those who conformed to the rules were also not the majority. The 
majority of women, both in rural and urban areas bargained with patriarchy by 
using a mixture of conformity and rebellion. The degree of access to material 
resources and ideological constraint determined to what extent they conformed or 
rebelled and their ability to achieve a particular goal. 
In urban areas where there was greater access to material resources and less 
constraint of gender ideology, women attempted in various ways to resolve 
gender conflicts within the home and within employment and improve their status. 
As is discussed in chapter seven, in some cases women took the whole 
responsibility for domestic work to keep the family and their husbands satisfied. 
At the same time, they also worked doubly hard within their profession to prove 
that they were as good as men. As a result women's average daily hours of work 
increased up to seventeen hours (see appendix 1: interview c). 
In other cases, as many of my respondents pointed out, women had to deny their 
greater access to resources and mobility in order to maintain the honour of the 
husband and the family. They had to pretend to the members of their families and 
community that the husband was in charge, he was the bread-winner and the 
property and belongings were his. This is similar to Mernissi's concept of "sexual 
anomie" (1987: 148-153) where men are frustrated and humiliated at being unable 
to fulfil their role as the bread-winner. In order to reduce the tension and conflict 
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women bargained with patriarchy by denying their greater access to material 
resources, because this was the only way they could gain respectability. 
In rural areas those women who had some access to material resources but were 
heavily constrained by gender ideology also attempted to achieve their goals by 
using a mix of strategies. For example, Maryam who lived in a small village was 
not exposed to economic hardship and insecurity as much as Zahra (her step 
mother, see appendix one, interview c). She had cousins and brothers in the big 
cities, who were examples of choice and possibility of change. From the moment 
that we arrived, Maryam tried hard to convince her cousin who lived in the city to 
negotiate with her father in order to allow her to leave the village and go to a 
nearby city, to continue her education: 
I have been working as a carpet weaver and agricultural worker since I was 
ten years old. I have just finished primary school education this summer. It 
took me such a long time to achieve this level of education because during 
school-time, I had to leave school and concentrate on working on the land 
and weaving carpets. I live with my father, step-mother (Zahra) and my 
step-brother. I have four brothers and three sisters who are all married and 
live in big cities. My father sells the carpets and the agricultural products 
that my step-mother and I produce. In return for the work that I do, my 
father prepares Jahizieh (trousseau) for me, clothes and household 
appliances for when I get married. I don't want to get married. I want to go 
to Kashmar and finish my education and later, hopefully, go to Tehran and 
work as a nurse. But my father does not allow me. He says If I go he has to 
hire labourers who will cost him a lot of money. Also if I go to the cities 
without being married people will talk and I'll be a disgrace for my father. 
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One of my brothers lives in Kashmar. I could go and live with him and his 
family. This way people won't talk. I want to get my cousin to mediate, if he 
does, my father may agree. 
This way, Maryam also actively participated in cultural negotiations with her 
father, her extended family, and her community through her cousin. It was a risk 
for her but she succeeded. As a result of mediation she secured a better future for 
herself by leaving the village, moving to a city and continuing her education. The 
experience of one side of the family doing better by moving to the city was a 
contradiction for her and everyone else in the village. Our visit stirred up this 
contradiction. Maryam used the confusion which was created as a result, broke 
the rules and achieved her goal of securing a better future. However, she could 
only rebel against one set of rules by conforming to another set of rules. She had 
to accept to be under the control of her brother in a city in order to be free from 
being under the control of her old father in a village: Only, this way she could 
finish her education and work as a nurse, which was her goal. 
Similarly, in a village in Mazandaran, Golrang who was a carpet weaver and 
agricultural worker, managed to continue her education, achieved a high school 
diploma and began to work as a teacher in the school village. This allowed her to 
... escape the pressure 
from her family to get married. She explained: 
It is unusual in the village that I am twenty three years old and have not 
been married yet, but there is no real pressure. My father and my mother 
agree with my work as a teacher. But I don't think the people in the village 
value my teaching job, because nobody ever says anything, while they value 
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the carpets that I weave, because they talk about it. I continue with both 
and I like both jobs and I also help my mother and father with the 
agricultural production. My father sells the carpets that my mother, my 
sisters and I weave and also the agricultural products that we produce. But 
most of the time I keep my earnings from teaching. If my family need 
money, I give my salary to my father, but if they do not need it, I keep it for 
myself. . 
In this case Golrang was able to mobilise the ideological constraints to her 
advantage, in comparison with her sister Akhtar. On the one hand she was 
conforming to the norm by working as an agricultural worker and a carpet weaver 
and accepting the appropriation of her labour by her father. On the other hand, 
she took the opportunity of making a choice not to get married, continued her 
education, worked as a teacher, earned a wage and, most importantly, made 
decisions about whether to save her money or help her family with her earnings. 
Thus, in the majority of cases, the strength of male authority in the family and at 
the level of the state, did not allow much rebellion against the norm. In order to 
survive poverty or to achieve a sense of righteousness and self-worth, total 
conformity is more wide-spread than rebellion. However, the further economic 
integration of Iran to world market in the late 1980s and 1990s and a relative 
improvement in female education and employment opportunities and the reform 
of some aspects of the family law have led to a further integration of material and 
ideological factors. As a result in the majority of cases women chose a mixture of 
conformity and rebellion to struggle against the conflict arising from material and 
ideological integration. 
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Although the patriarchal bargain was based on women's individual responses 
against patriarchal relations, nevertheless it was a pattern which could be 
observed throughout the society. This form of struggle, combined with different 
forms of organised and collective responses of women (discussed in the first part 
of this chapter) has increased gender consciousness and had affected the state's 
gender relations. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the political participation of women in Iran since 1979 
revolution. It has been argued that women responded to patriarchal gender 
ideology in both an organised and on an individual basis. Within this framework, 
their responses were different according to their social class and levels of 
religiosity. The mass participation of women in the revolution of 1979, and 
women's struggles within the shoras, expressed how women, in their varied ways, 
initially took the revolution as a liberation. The Islamic state suppressed the 
secular women's movement. It only favoured the religious women's organisations 
and actions. This created a world apart between these two groups of women in 
the 1980s. Secular women's opposition (both inside and outside of Iran) to state 
patriarchy continued and kept women's issues alive and kicking. Religious women 
experienced the gender differential treatment by the state that they gave their 
support to. As a result in the 1990s, a form of unity had come about between 
these women, despite their social differentiation. Women's participation in 
economic and political activities had increased gender consciousness, especially 
among the new generation who had not experienced the secular way of life which 
was experienced by their parents. Thus they constantly put pressure on the state's 
patriarchal relations. This has produced dynamism within Islamic society as the 
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material and ideological basis of the Islamic state had been brought under 
question. 
Beside organised struggles women had also responded to the patriarchal control 
of men and the state on an individual basis by choosing different strategies to 
negotiate with different forms of patriarchy. I have argued that the availability of 
resources or lack of them, both ideological and material, provided different bases 
from which women struggled to survive, to secure a better future or even 
improve their status. 
More importantly, women's organised and individual responses had been 
complementary to each other. Together they had generated gender consciousness, 
and within the Islamic framework had transformed gender relations. 
Notes 
1. Ettehade Melli Zanan (National Union of Women) was the biggest women's 
organisation. It was the Fedayeen women's organisation. 
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Chapter nine 
Summary and conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the changes in women's employment in Iran under the 
Islamic state (1979-1997). The preceding chapters established that the Islamic 
state, under pressure from socio-economic factors and women's struggles for 
change, was unable to abolish women's labour. Women's level of employment in 
this period did not fall, in comparison with pre 1979 period - even though the 
Islamic state strengthened the patriarchal relationships which are detrimental to 
women's employment status. Women's participation in the labour force and the 
labour market politicised many women and challenged Islamic theology and 
thereby the Islamic state. 
In analysing women's employment in Iran, I have drawn on two existing gender 
scholarships: 
Firstly the general debate on gender and employment in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America offered insights to analyse women's employment in Iran. A comparative 
evaluation between the analytical approaches offered by this debate and the 
specifities of the Iranian situation demonstrated similarities and differences 
between women's employment in Iran and elsewhere. An analysis of sexual 
division of labour under the Islamic state showed that the inclusion or exclusion 
of women from the labour market and the labour force is significant as women's 
access to employment could enhance their standard of living, their contribution to 
the upward mobility of their families and their ability to struggle against 
patriarchal gender relations within the family and the wider society. An analysis of 
social relations of gender under the Islamic state also allowed me to focus on the 
relationship between women's employment experiences and gender relations in the 
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home and the wider society; the way women are integrated into the workforce 
differently from men; even when women have access to employment they are 
treated differently from men in terms of wage rates and promotion practices. This 
analysis also shed light on the question of capitalism and patriarchy in Iran. That 
is in the process of economic development patriarchal gender relations, a set of 
power relations between genders, has great impact on women's employment. 
The main contribution of the empirical work to this debate, however, is that 
economic policy alone does not determine the inclusion or exclusion of women. 
The role of the state and its gender ideology is also significant, but it is dynamic 
and changes under economic circumstances determined by indigenous and global 
circumstances. The Islamic state despite its criticisms of the Pahlavi system has 
remained the agent of economic development, it has maintained capital while 
strengthening patriarchal relationships in accordance with its gender ideology. 
However, analysing the specific form of state sponsored patriarchal relationships 
within the context of the indigenous class system and different levels of adherence 
to religious ideology (religiosity) revealed the dynamic and contradictory nature 
of patriarchal relations. I have argued -that ideological controls on women 
interacted with material aspects of gender in the family and the wider society and 
resulted in contradiction and gender conflict. If under the Pahlavi state, the 
contradiction of modernisation and Westernisation were the cause of conflicts in 
the 1970s, it is the contradiction of Islamisation in the 1990s which is the cause of 
conflicts. This is particularly apparent in the women's struggle for change in their 
varied ways and the unity between the secular and Muslim feminists. 
The second significant area of enquiry which I considered in order to analyse 
women's employment in Iran is the debate between the Iranian secular and 
Muslim feminists on the role of ideology, determining women's position in Iran. 
This debate offered an insight into the oppressive nature of gender roles and 
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relations in Iran. More importantly, it had the, advantage of engaging the two 
opposing feminists inside and outside of Iran. 
However, this debate is limited in two ways. It is mainly focused on the 
interrogation of religious ideology based on textual analysis and therefore, is 
lacking social investigation. More importantly, the analysis of women, gender and 
economic life in Iran under the Islamic state is missing from these studies. I, 
therefore, hope that this analysis of women's employment which is grounded in a 
concrete setting, as it is based on material circumstances of women, will fill this 
gap. As I have argued throughout the thesis in different phases of Islamisation, 
women's employment was determined by the interaction between economic and 
ideological forces and most importantly by women's responses, in their varied 
ways, to these forces. 
The contribution of this thesis can be summarised in three broad sections: The 
impact of economic factors on women's employment, the impact of ideological 
factors on women's employment and women's responses to economic and 
ideological factors. This chapter will discuss these three threads which ran 
through the preceding chapters. 
9.1 The impact of economic factors on women's employment 
In the period 1979-198 1, the clergy attempted to exclude women from the labour 
force. They used the Sharia as a source of authority and justification to establish a 
traditional interpretation of gender roles and relations. Accordingly laws and 
regulations were designed to minimise the demand for female labour and to 
control women's participation in the public sphere of life. On the basis of the 
patriarchal mandate of the Sharia, women's activities were to be restricted to the 
arena of the private sphere of the family which was believed to be the basic unit of 
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society. Therefore, the Islamic state's initial programme of action (legal changes, 
decrees, forms of implementation) was based on the goal of a minimal demand for 
female paid labour. 
In the period 1981-1988, the Iran-Iraq war changed economic circumstances. 
One important change was the need of families for women's earnings. I examined 
the factors which determined the demand (from employers, public and private) for 
female labour in this period. I demonstrated that the state over time, in response 
to pressures of war, economic dislocation and rigidities in the labour market (male 
inability or unwillingness to do jobs categorised as 'women's jobs') had to replace 
its initial hard ideological line with expediency and consequently accepted the 
increase in female labour force. The private sector of the economy exploited this 
situation and increased its demand for female labour, which compared with male 
labour was cheaper, more flexible and easily disposable because of women's 
exclusive responsibility for domestic work. 
I have argued that the material factors, arising from economic circumstances of 
the war years, had a powerful impact on Islamic ideological attitudes to female's 
participation in the workforce. The process of segregation which had aimed at 
exclusion of women from employment, paradoxically, opened up opportunities 
for many religious women to enter employment. 
In the period 1989-1997 female employment continued to rise, as a result of 
economic expansion and rising inflation. By comparing the statistical data for 
women's employment in the 1990s and pre 1979 I demonstrated that far from 
being marginalised, women's participation in the workforce in 1997 was no 
different from that of 1979. Despite a rigid sexual division of labour imposed for 
ideological reasons by the Islamic state, women actively participated in a variety 
of ways as wage earners and non-wage earners. Their contribution was absolutely 
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necessary for the well being of their families and the product of their labour was 
sold on the national and international markets. 
Hence I have argued that the Islamic state's powerful attempt to exclude women 
from the labour force did not succeed. On the contrary socio-economic pressure 
and women's struggle for change forced the state to make major concessions. 
This was reflected in the reforms of family law; the education system and the 
employment laws and regulations which improved female employment. For 
example, the leaders of the Islamic Republic were forced to advocate birth control 
which had been banned by the same clergy in the first phase of Islamisation. Also 
the same clergy who in the 1980s argued that, according to Sharia, women had 
no right to be judges, and consequently sacked female judges, stated, in the 
1990s, that in principle there is no barrier for women to work as judges. As a 
result women began to work as judicial councillors. 
An analysis of sexual division of labour under the Islamic state provided a ground 
to investigate women's employment within the context of the impact of economic 
factors and the role of the state. I have concluded that during 1979-1997, the 
Islamic state, as the main agent of economic development and social control, 
under pressure from economic circumstances, largely adapted to the world 
economy. Its position on women's employment also changed partly as a result of 
socio-economic factors such as the war economy, inflation, the rigidities in the 
labour market. This led to women's participation in the economy, despite the 
Islamic ideology. More importantly, women's employment led to contradictions 
between the theory and the practice of Islamic gender ideology based on Sharia. 
The state had to accommodate economic necessities which determined women's 
employment. Thus, under economic pressure, state action, even backed by a 
powerful ideological hegemony was frustrated in its ability to implement its 
gender policy. 
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9.2 The impact of ideological factors on women's employment 
Under economic pressure the state failed to seclude women within the private 
domestic domain. However, it imposed sex segregation - the creation of separate 
spheres for women in the public domain. The state also used different perceptions 
of Fatimah and Zaynab as successful accommodating mechanisms to justify 
women's employment within its ideology. 
The policy and practice of segregation created space for many religious women to 
enter and remain in employment (the secular women workers were coerced into 
observing the process of segregation). But this also became a source of their 
subordinate position to men in workplaces because the state and the employers 
used segregation to impose social control on women in work and thus controlled 
and restricted women's movements and their upward mobility prospects. 
Many women who could not have access to large state -enterprises which 
observed sex segregation fully, had to work in small private enterprises. But 
although this meant that under economic pressure ideology became a secondary 
factor determining women's employment, the pressure of ideology was still 
detrimental to women. The majority of women workers who work for these small 
firms are not registered as workers. Therefore, they are not protected by the 
labour law, they are hired and fired easily and they had to accept low-paid and 
low-position jobs because of the demands of domestic work, child care and / or 
care of elderly relatives. 
The poorer the women, and the more they are constrained by religious values, the 
more devalued is their labour. In rural areas where half of the population live, 
they supported the Islamic state and hoped that the process of Islamisation would 
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improve their circumstances. But Islamisation reinforced gendered labour 
relations. The products of female unpaid family workers continued to be 
appropriated by the male members of their families. This was because men were 
the heads of households and women were prohibited from dealing with money 
and the market. Women's products were sold on the national and international 
markets but they were not even counted and recorded in the statistics as 
participants in the labour force. 
In urban areas where women had better access to permanent employment and 
were less constrained by the traditional values attached to Shia Islamic ideology, 
their labour was devalued because they were not considered bread-winners. The 
ideology of femininity and domestic responsibility meant they did not work shifts; 
and women in the professions did not become involved in additional activities 
such as going to conferences and meetings, which were essential for promotion 
and reaching higher positions. At a time of economic restructuring women's hours 
of work increased which was the expression of unequal gender relations within 
the home. 
The policy and practice of women obtaining permission from their husbands, 
fathers and other male kin to go out to work; men granting permission only if the 
honour of the family is maintained and if the domestic work is given priority; were 
among many factors which put constraints on female labour and made women's 
position vulnerable. Under these circumstances, women were forced to accept 
unfavourable labour relations in the labour force. 
Despite the reforms of family law, which to some extent released women from 
their total domination by men, the cultural value attached to the importance of 
marriage and total compliance with the practice of mater and nafaghe increased. 
These ideological factors, combined with economic problems arising from post- 
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war reconstruction and inflation weakened nuclear family relationships. Many 
families became financially dependent on the older generation for their survival. 
As a result, extended family relationships strengthened and the authority of the 
men as the bread-winners increased. 
An analysis of gender relations within the context of the impact of ideological 
factors and the role of state on women's employment enabled me to assess 
patriarchal relations under the Islamic state. I have demonstrated that women are 
not confined and isolated within the domestic space, but they are integrated into 
the workforce differently from men. The state, under the pressure from economic 
and ideological forces maintained both patriarchy and capital by allocating power 
relationship within the family and the wider society. Therefore, despite reforms 
women's participation in employment and women's physical predominance in 
decision-making are effectively controlled. Women, even when they have access 
to employment and material resources had to adapt to the ideological needs of the 
male-dominated family and society which dictated unequal gender relations and 
placed women in a disadvantageous position in employment. 
9.3 Women's responses 
In preceding chapters I have also addressed the response of women to the 
material and ideological factors which shaped their employment status. I argued 
that historically the uneven economic development in Iran involved foreign 
domination and the influence of Shia Islam ideology which determined the 
process of class formation and produced different levels of religiosity which tied 
in with their class. Two different groups of women participated in the 1979 
revolution: secular women who were dissatisfied with the Shah's reform and 
religious women who were the supporters of the Islamic leaders. This was an 
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urban movement and the majority of the women who participated in the 
revolutionary movement (1979-1981) were engaged in waged employment. 
In the first phase of Islamisation, the Islamic state suppressed secular women's 
organisations. A combination of severe coercive measures against secular women 
and the mobilisation of religious women against them led to the defeat of the 
secular women's movement. The state also suppressed the industrial workers 
shoras where many women workers were struggling for trade union rights. Many 
of these women workers were religious and supporters of the Islamic state, but 
their organisations and their struggles for trade union rights were threatening the 
stability of the state. The Islamic state only allowed the participation of religious 
women who unconditionally supported the state and it exploited their 
participation as "Zaynabs", performing a temporary duty in favour of the Islamic 
state. 
In the second phase of Islamisation (1981-1988) a large number of religious 
women were attracted to the Islamic state. The image of Zaynab was attractive, 
which allowed their participation in the labour force and the political movement. 
They supported the Islamic state, without at first questioning the Islamic gender 
ideology based on traditional interpretation of Sharia. However, in the third 
phase of Islamisation (1988-1997) their participation in the labour market 
politicised them and gave them a sense of collective consciousness against the 
limited role which was assigned to them by the Islamic state. They felt that the 
state that they gave their unconditional support to had ignored them. Although 
they continued to support it, they became more critical of it. 
Through the study of the media I showed that in the third phase of Islamisation 
(1988-1997) the demand of many women for reform, especially religious women, 
led to a collaboration between Muslim and secular feminists in Iran who used the 
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media to discuss women's issues and the limitations of the state's gender ideology. 
These debates reflected the voices of many women, despite their class and levels 
of religiosity, who wanted change and objected to the conservative clergy who 
wanted to retain the status quo. This was also reflected in women's participation 
in politics as voters and candidates in parliamentary and presidential elections in 
1996 and 1997. This movement highlighted the development of gender 
consciousness on a scale which has never existed in the modern history of Iran. In 
urban areas where half of the population lived, women of different classes and 
with different levels of religiosity, despite their disagreements on the nature of the 
Islamic state, had come together and demanded reforms. More importantly, they 
succeeded in forcing the state to re-interpret the Sharia from a pragmatic stance. 
An analysis of indigenous class system combined with different levels of secularity 
and religiosity also enabled me to examine women's survival strategies. Through 
women's work histories and life histories I demonstrated their struggle for change 
on an individual basis against the conflicts arising from the stated gender ideology 
and the material practices of their lives. I showed how women mobilised their 
available material resources (wealth, employment, money, education, law) and 
against the ideological constraints (traditional values attached to Islamic rules and 
regulations) to struggle in different ways and to improve their position and power 
in comparison with men. I have suggested that women's access to resources and 
the level of ideological constraints determined their chosen survival strategies. 
The different forms of individual and organised responses evidently showed a 
widespread development of gender consciousness which challenged the Islamic 
state's gender relations. This is a very important development which is largely as a 
result of women's participation in the labour force and the labour market, 
conditioned by the Sharia. It is important to recognise that women's individual 
responses have had an impact on patriarchal power of men, even backed by state 
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power, as many men now realise the importance, of women's economic 
participation. Also it is important to celebrate the unity of Muslim feminists and 
secular feminists in Iran, that through their collective struggle they forced the 
Islamic state to enact a degree of reform and created opportunities for female 
education and employment. This new women's movement has also had a 
significant impact by restricting the state power to exclude women from 
participating in the labour force. 
In conclusion: in an attempt to explain women's employment under the Islamic 
state I was able to consider the relationships between the workings of capital, 
state, patriarchy and class system in Iran. I have argued that their operations have 
been antagonistic as well as collaborative. The role of state has been crucial as 
affecting and being affected by economic circumstances and ideological factors. 
This study based on field work demonstrates that patriarchal social relations were 
dynamic. The Islamic state's determination to regulate gender roles and relations 
based on traditional interpretation of Sharia failed and was forced to be 
pragmatic. Gendered laws and beliefs which played an important role in 
determining women's employment were changed in response to change in 
economic circumstances and women's struggle. 
More importantly, the interaction between economic and ideological factors led 
to gender consciousness and women's struggle for change. The indigenous class 
system, combined with different levels of religiosity and conflicting interests 
determined the different ways women rebelled against state sponsored patriarchal 
system. This is important because despite extensive critique of Western ahistorical 
ethnocentric depictions of Muslim societies, the case of women in Iran is 
frequently presented as the ultimate manifestation of women's oppression. 
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This case study has demonstrated that the level of gender consciousness is much 
greater now in the - 1990s under the Islamic state than at the height of socio- 
economic transformation and Westernisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, 
the subordination of women in Iran can not be attributed solely to Islamic 
ideology and practice. It has to be analysed within a wider perspective which 
involves material circumstances and change in gender relations. 
The overlap between secularity and religiosity and the unity between the secular 
and religious women has produced reforms. These reforms are limited, they are 
made within the patriarchal Islamic framework where the state is strongly 
committed to women's subordination to men within the family and the society. 
The Islamic state, despite its dynamic nature, is a system which severely limits 
secular women's struggle for a better society, free from religion, and it will hold 
on to its patriarchal gender relations, as its survival depends on it. Thus, there is 
still a long way to go. This issue is clearly outside the scope of this thesis and is 
an important area of future research and investigation. Nevertheless, as long as 
women's struggle will continue the deeply rooted patriarchal nature of the Islamic 
state cannot be secured and the women's movement can play a key part in 
changes which may encompass the entire society. 
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Appendix 
1: Interview 
There are four stories here to show the different ways that individual women, 
according to their class and levels of religiosity, struggle to survive the pressure 
of economic circumstances and gender ideology. 
a) Zahra a carpet weaver and agricultural worker 
b) A group interview with women assembly workers at Margarine cooking oil 
factory 
c) Zohreh a pharmacist and a manager in a chemical industry 
d) Monireh a journalist 
Case Study 1. Zahra a carpet weaver and agricultural worker in a village in 
Khorasan, August 1991. 
Zahra was a young woman. She was not sure how old she was - may be 20 or 30. 
Four years ago her father married her to an old man, age 70 or 80, because he 
was too poor and could no longer afford to keep Zahra. Zahra's parents were 
carpet weavers and agricultural workers. But unlike Zahra's husband they did not 
own their small plot of land. They were labourers and worked for those who 
owned their land. After marrying the old man, Zahra became pregnant and had a 
baby. Zahra's step-daughter, Maryam who was twenty years of age also lived with 
them. Maryam was the old man's daughter from his previous marriage. 
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Zahra could not remember very well but she said that she has been working since 
she was four years of age, as a carpet weaver and an agricultural worker for her 
father. She never went to school and she could not read and write. 
She worked from dawn to dusk. When I visited the village, she, alongside many 
other women, was picking grapes. Zahra took her child with her to work. He 
played on the land with other children. Older children looked after smaller 
children. In the mornings women picked grapes and put them into the baskets, 
men took them to special rooms to be washed and cleaned. In the afternoons, 
women washed the grapes and prepared them to be put on the wires, to be dried. 
At other times of the year Zahra alongside other women in the village worked on 
the land producing barley, wheat, cumin, Saffron and pistachio nuts. Zahra, like 
all other women in the village, weaved carpets in the evenings and in the winter 
where there was little agricultural work. Zahra's husband sold the agricultural 
products and the carpets that she produced. Once a year, he bought clothes for 
Zahra and took her to the holy city of Mashhad, in the same province, to visit 
Imam Reza's (Descendant of Ali and Fatimah, a leader of the Shia community) 
tomb. Twice a week he also took Zahra to the nearby village, where her family 
lived. They travelled by her husband's motorbike. Zahra and her little boy sat 
behind him. She enjoyed this ride and thought that it was fun. She never went to 
visit her family without her husband as it is a disgrace for a woman to go from 
one village to another village, on her own. 
Like all the women in the village, after the sun set Zahra went home and did all 
the house work with the help of her step-daughter. She thought that house work 
must be done by women, as it is a disgrace for men to do the house work. She 
thought that her husband, even though is very old, was a good man, because he 
was looking after her. She did not want to have any, more children because her 
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husband was so old. But she said that her husband says that whatever is the wish 
of Allah. She felt that she had to respect the God's wish and her husband's wish. 
Case Study 2: A group interview with women assembly workers at Margarine 
cooking oil factory. Varamin, August 1991 
This factory is an old plant. It is a state-private joint venture. Women work with 
old machinery, performing a number of tasks on the assembly line. The tasks 
included: filling the oil cans by pressing a handle; closing the door of the oil cans 
by pressing another handle; to seal the can by pushing a handle; clean the can; to 
weigh the can to make sure that it is the right amount; and to move the filled and 
weighed cans and put them out of the rail. The hours of work was from lam until 
3.30pm. The factory employed 700 male workers and 40 female workers. 
Because of lack of space it has not been possible to segregate the workforce, but 
women were mainly concentrated in packaging and administrative work. The 
women workers were from the nearby villages and were mostly illiterate. Some 
had primary education. 
It was near lunch time, the foreman asked women workers to stop work and 
assemble in the factory's mosque to listen to the health visitors about the use of 
contraception. The health visitors explained to the women about the importance 
of not having too many children, as the country is in economic difficulties. 
Therefore too many children means more poverty, more bad housing, more bad 
education and more unemployment. They also explained that different forms of 
contraception are available free of charge and assured them about their safety and 
that it is permitted by the religious authority. Most women were between 40 - 50 I- I 
years of age and on average had 5 -6 children who were grown up and had their 
own family. Most women didn't think they would, get pregnant and found the 
discussion irrelevant. One of them was really interested in how a woman could 
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become pregnant because her daughter-in-law has failed to get pregnant. After 
this session, it was my turn to interview the women workers. The foreman chose 
a women to answer my questions. Fatimah was 53 years of age, married with five 
children. She has been working in this factory for the last 15 years. She has 
worked in a number of capacities: as a telephone operator, controlling oil cans 
and now delivering letters from one section to another section within the factory. 
At this point other women began to talk about their job. They explained that most 
of them worked on the packaging line and each of them had a task which was 
repeated all day. Their task was hard, as each worker had to fill 37 plates, each 
plate had 5 cans of oil, each can of oil had the capacity of 7 kilograms of oil. They 
had all been working for 15 -16 years. 
They were all full time workers. They said that under the Shah there were more 
women workers. Now because the factory produces less than before, a number of 
women and men have been laid off. The situation was the same everywhere, most 
of them said that their husbands, sons and brothers were unemployed. They found 
this situation intolerable. Because they went out to work everyday and their men 
sat at home which was a disgrace. This was so hard to cope with, that at different 
occasions they had pleaded to the management to give their jobs to their men. But 
the management had refused because the work which was performed by women 
was considered a woman's job and could not be done by men. In some cases men 
were not willing to do packaging and administrative work because these were 
women's jobs. 
Their lunch break was divided into one half hour to have lunch and the other half 
hour to go to the factory's mosque and pray. Most of them, however, did not pray 
at lunch time and instead had a rest. When they went home they washed and 
cleaned and in peace prayed five times, to cover for the whole day. 
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When I asked whether their husbands and fathers agreed with their work, they 
laughed, they did not think the question was relevant as there was no choice, their 
family could not manage without their earnings. 
They travelled to work and returned home by the factory's bus service, they 
usually arrived home at 4.30 and began the house work until late at night. They 
did not believe that men should work in the house, they thought this was a 
disgrace. Two of them had their daughters and/or their daughters-in-law living 
with them and they helped them with their housework but not sons or sons-in- 
law. 
Case Study 3: Zohreh a pharmacist and the manager of a laboratory in a chemical 
industry, August 1991. 
This modem factory employed 150 workers and employees, 80 women and 70 
men. Women mostly worked in the laboratory and in the packaging department. 
Zohreh was 30 years of age, married with two children. She has been working for 
14 years as a scientist within different firms of the pharmaceutical industry. She 
worked from lam - 3.30pm. Her responsibility was the control of the whole 
production . process - which involved numerous and sensitive tasks: to control the 
size of the moisture in different forms of tablets; to control the formulas; to 
control the raw materials; to supervise the production units, the work of other 
laboratory workers and the packaging department. The work of the laboratory 
was team work, she was the head of the team and 11 specialists worked under her 
supervision. Thus she had to specialise in a number of tasks such as production, 
technology and packaging. 
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Zohreh said that if she was a man with all these specialisations and work 
experiences, she would have been in a much higher position. To prove her 
abilities she had to translate 20 formula or recent research about the most up-to- 
date ways of producing medicines until they recognised the importance of her 
work, while a man in her position proved his ability by saying a few words at 
meetings and conferences. 
This company was one of those private companies which had been confiscated by 
the Islamic state when the owner escaped the country after the revolution. It 
operated under the ministry of industries. Men and women earn equal pay for 
equal work; subsidies and benefits at high level of earnings are nearly the same for 
men and women. 
However, Zohreh had lost some benefits. A male manager, after a year of work 
experience had received a company car. After seven years, she had not received 
one, instead they had given her access to a car with a driver as a means of 
transport for coming to work and going back home. She had been told that she 
was a woman, she did not really need a car, because her husband had a car. 
Zohreh explained the way men sat together, talked and joked, they enjoyed 
working together, while women could not, as it was bad for women to talk and 
joke. Men were cliquish, they made a support system among themselves from 
management positions to the security officers at the gate, this way they managed 
all their affairs and stepped up the ladder of promotion and success much quicker 
than women. Women were not able to do so, because their mobility was limited. 
Furthermore because of her sensitive position, she was not popular with the 
managing director, as her job was, sometimes to criticise in order to promote the 
quality control. 
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Zohreh said that women were never sent abroad to conferences and they hardly 
went out of the company to meetings and conferences. However, she thought that 
although segregation discriminated against women and created obstacles in the 
way of their promotion, the atmosphere in the workplaces was healthier, there 
was much less sexual harassment. Under the previous system, women's 
specialisation and expertise were not important, their looks, their hair style, their 
clothes and their femininity were important and were criterion for their progress 
and promotion. Also there was a great degree of sexual harassment, if women did 
what the boss wanted them to do they would be promoted, otherwise they could 
have lost their job. These things did not happen any more. She said she preferred 
this system, although she was a modern middle class woman and not religious and 
very unhappy that she was forced to wear the Islamic cover. 
Zohreh earned 350000 rials a month which was the highest salary for a woman in 
her position. Her salary paid for half of the household expenditure. Her children 
went to private school, they travelled to school and back by the school's private 
bus service. She also provided them with private language tutors and physical 
education. When they were younger her mother looked after them and later they 
went to a private nursery school. 
Zohreh arrived home in the afternoons around 4.30pm. After a little rest she did 
the house-work: cleaning; washing; cooking and shopping. Some days she 
worked until lam. Her husband did not touch the house-work, he was a 
businessman and usually did not return home until 10pm. After finishing the 
house-work Zohreh had dinner with her children and helped them with their 
home-work. After children had gone to bed she attended to her private study, to 
catch up with the latest information, knowledge and technology, in relation to her 
job. 
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She said that for her husband it was not important that she was a doctor, an 
academic and a manager, he wanted a wife, so to avoid troubles at home she tried 
to be a wife. She finished all her house-work, children's work including helping 
them with their home-work and all her own private study before her husband 
came home. When he arrived she brought his dinner and kept his company. She 
even danced for him, if he wished. She was in a much higher position than her 
husband academically and professionally. But if she did not do what he wanted 
her to do, she would have been in trouble and he could have refused to agree to 
her work outside of the home. Zohreh thought that many women who worked 
outside the home had many problems with their husbands. The only way to avoid 
trouble was to do what they want a woman to do and keep them happy and quiet. 
She said that she was a very lucky woman that her husband did not come home 
until late at night. If he came home earlier, she could not have finished all the 
house-work, children's work and her own research. This was the only way that 
she could have had her husband's agreement to go out to work, as long as he was 
not involved with the house-work, children's work and she devoted her time to 
him when he came home. For Zohreh this was a small price to pay for hanging on 
to her career. 
Case Study 4: Monireh, a journalist. Tehran, August 1991. 
Monireh is 34 years of age, single and had no children, she had a BA in media 
studies and journalism. She had been a journalist for seven years, working for 
different newspapers. 
Monireh started her career as a 'sitting' journalist, this term is used for those 
journalists who worked from the office and gathered news and information 
around the country by telephone and by letters. She was responsible for the 
exclusive news of small cities. This was not very dynamic, it was rather very static 
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job. After a while, she moved to another section dealing with the news of the 
Majlis, (the parliament). She hated the Islamic cover. She could not refuse to 
wear it but she refused to wear it properly, always either showing a bit of her hair 
from under the scarf or putting her hair up under the scarf, looking odd. She 
became known as a bad hejabi, an abusive term used for women- who were 
ridiculing the Islamic dress by not observing it fully, according to the rules. 
She was under a lot of pressure by men and women who were religiously 
committed. She was not sacked because her work was too good and they could 
not do without her. But she was discriminated against and was treated very badly. 
She remained a 'sitting' journalist. She was not sent out of the office to gather 
news and information. She had to listen to the radio station which broadcasted 
speeches and debates from the parliament, and prepared articles on the latest 
economic and political issues. She worked very hard, most days she worked from 
lam until 7-8 pm, to prove that she was a good journalist. 
Her specialisation was in economic and political affairs but they refused to send 
her to the parliament. Instead they sent a woman with chador (full black cover) 
who knew nothing about these issues. Monireh prepared the appropriate 
questions for her to ask at the parliament, and on the basis of the information that 
she brought back she wrote the articles. She worked very hard to fill the gaps by 
listening to the debates on the radio and tried to make sense of the incomplete 
materials that she received from the Islamic woman. 
Her salary remained low, in comparison with the number of hours that she 
worked and her responsibilities. Her duties were equal to the responsibility of the 
head of the section. In all newspapers, this position belonged to men and not 
women, even though women did all the work. Only in Zane Rouz, the weekly 
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national women's magazine, where most journalists were women, the head of 
sections were also women. 
Women were not usually sent to other cities or abroad. Unmarried women were 
in a more difficult situation. Very few responsibilities were given to them in 
comparison with married women. This was another problem that Monireh had, as 
she was not married. She was very angry that most women accepted this 
situation, there was no attempt by women to change their circumstances, as a 
result pressure on women and discrimination against them was becoming more 
intense. 
Married women with children usually had to leave early and to come late to work 
because of their domestic responsibilities. They welcomed not being sent out to 
other cities and abroad, because they believed that if they went, they would be 
under pressure and would be scrutinized. All these allowed the male managers 
and heads of sections to look at women as inferiors and assumed that they were 
not able to do their job as well as men. 
Monireh complained that according to the new labour law women could retire 
after 20 years of service. Many women welcomed this new law, because they 
found working outside of the home intolerable. She thought that this was a wrong 
attitude because it allowed men to push women back to the homes more severely. 
She believed that if women want to have a better position in society, they have to 
fight for it and not to accept whatever they want them to be. 
The official hours of work was from 7.30 am until 2.30 pm. But Monireh worked 
much longer hours to prove that she was a good journalist. From 7.30 - 12.30 she 
listened to the radio station which reported live from the parliament and she took 
notes. If there was an important issue, she wrote an article. From 12.30 - 2.30 she 
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produced analytical reports and news. Usually there was very little information, 
therefore her task was hard but she did her best with the limited resources at her 
disposal. Articles were mainly in the form of news and reports, questions had to 
be formulated in a way that is understandable for different people with different 
levels of education. Economics and legal issues had to be written in simple and 
popular form. She was also responsible for head-lines and. sub-headings which 
could have been critical for a national newspaper which was distributed widely 
inside the country and for an audience outside of the country. As a result, she 
worked until 4.30 - 5.30 pm and sometimes when it was very busy she worked 
until 8-8.30 pm. 
Some days there was less work, especially, when the policy was not to report too 
much. Under these circumstances she read and studied to be up-to-date with news 
and analysis. At other times there was too much work, for example, around the 
financial year and the debate over the budget, the parliament's sessions were 7.30 
am - 12.30 pm, 2.30 - 5.30 pm and 7- 10.30 pm. She had to report and produce 
articles for each session. Under these circumstances she worked 15 - 16 hours a 
day. Sometimes she went home at 10.30 and she worked at home until early 
hours of the morning to be able to deliver the articles on time for the next day. 
Monireh also complained that in the eyes of the labour law, men and women 
received equal wage for equal work. But in reality, men received more than 
women for less work, because they were considered to be the bread-winners. The 
benefits and subsidies were based on 'writing commission'. Men automatically 
received this commission, as being the head of families and bread-winners, even if 
they did not write as much as women. Men travelled to other cities and abroad 
and received large amounts of money, as travel expenses, but women were not 
allowed to travel and therefore do not receive this allowances 
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Journalists have to go to places, hear people and get engaged in discussions and 
debates, women were not sent to places. Even when they were, they were not 
allowed to get involved in discussions and debates, because this was considered 
to be undignified for women. When men do the same, it was considered to be part 
of their knowledge, their specialisation and efficiency. Women accepted this state 
of affairs. They put their heads down and they did as they were told, in order to 
prove their dignity. A good woman was the -one who was quiet and her head was 
down. A bad woman was the one who argued and got involved in discussions and 
debates. Monireh was working hard to prove that it was possible to do a good job 
as a journalist and have dignity. This was a hard task but she believed it was 
possible, she was trying hard but she felt that unfortunately she was the only one, 
other women, even if they agreed with her, did not have the courage to do what 
she did. 
In this work place because of lack of space, women and men work next to each 
other in different offices. But segregation is in another form. For example, if men 
joke, women were not allowed to laugh, because this might have harmed their 
dignity. This had created such a problem for women, as men worked in a relaxed 
atmosphere while women worked under enormous stress and pressure because 
they were not even allowed to laugh at jokes. Sometimes women were even 
warned for looking around. 
After 7 years of hard work, Monireh received 70000 rials a months. She lives 
with her mother and paid 1/4 of the household expenditure. Her mother did all the 
housework and did not let Monireh to do any house work. She was very proud of 
her and agreed with her work, but she was worried that sometimes she got home 
late at night. 
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Monireh worked very hard and under enormous pressure, but when she wrote a 
worthwhile project and article, she was satisfied. She felt that her relatives, friends 
and her colleagues recognised and appreciated her work. At work they had 
realised the importance of her work, because whenever she was ill and did not go 
to work, they kept calling her because no one worked as hard as, and as good as 
her. 
She believed that women were seen as a threat to men's jobs, because women did 
a better job, they worked faster and more efficiently. But they usually ended up 
doing static jobs which had little promotion. She also believed that if she was 
allowed to go out to the parliament, to other cities or abroad, she could have 
produced much better work, but they would not allow her. So there was a limited 
amount of work that she could have done, both in terms of quality and quantity. 
Despite all the problem, she loved her job and her profession and she had devoted 
her life to it. She did not want to get married. She felt very lonely and isolated but 
she could not possibly marry someone who she did not know. Segregation did 
now allow men and women meet freely and to get to know each other. If she was 
going to get married he should have been someone who would not stop her 
career and her personal interests. Once she met a man who she would have liked 
to many, but he wanted her to be at home at 2.30 pm and not working late. This 
was impossible for Monireh as her work and her battle at work to change the 
attitudes towards women's work was too important for her. On the other hand an 
unmarried woman had a hard time. Unmarried women become the victim, men 
assumed that they were waiting to be used by them. Therefore limitations, 
restrictions and confinement was enormous. 
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2: Questionnaire 
The skeleton of this questionnaire was designed in London in 1990. When I 
decided to use it in Iran, with the help of my daughter, my sister and other female 
members of my family and friends we changed some parts of it to fit with the 
Iranian situation. The aim was to obtain the maximum amount of information. For 
example we had to put the heading "In the name of the God" as all official 
documents have such a heading and without it nothing would be processed. 
Question number 20 was to find out what percentage of women received their 
salary themselves. Salaries were received in cash or in the form of a cheque by 
signing a document. Many women's salaries or wages were received by male 
member of their family. Question number 22 and 23 tried to find out how 
important was a woman's wage or salary to her family's expenditure. Usually 
women at the first instance, said that it was not important and it was for their 
personal use. But when the question was opened she revealed that it was very 
important. 
I have chosen three of the questionnaires to show the different ways women had 
treated the questions and had answered them. 
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In the name of the God 
The aim of this questionnaire is merely to collect statistical information for an 
academic purpose. This information will not be used to determine an individual 
women's social and economic status. Therefore it is not necessary for women to 
put their name and the name of their work place. Your co-operation is greatly 
appreciated as you help a PhD student to write her thesis on the social and 
economic status of women in Iran. Please read the questions very carefully and 
answer them as clearly and accurately as possible. I thank you in advance. 
1. Date of completion of the questionnaire. 15.2.1991 
2. Age: Under 18 
40-50 50-60 
3. Education: PrimaryX 
Post DiplomaBA 
4. Marital status: Single 
Widowed Date 
18-25 25-30 X 30-40 
Over 60 
Pre-Secondary Secondary Diploma 
MA PhD Other 
Married X Date Divorced Date 
5. If you are divorced? Give reasons: Financial Personal 
Family interference Unable to have children Other 
6. No. of Children 5 Their age: 5,8,9,12,15. 
7. Are you engaged in social and economic activities other than your work in the 
home? Yes X No Explain the kind of activity. 
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Are you working outside the home? Yes X No 
Are you a housewife and perform your social and economic activities at home? 
Yes No 
Is your work voluntary? For example working for the Literacy Corp or 
Mobilisation Organisation? Yes No 
8. In case you are employed or engaged in voluntary work outside the home and 
have children please state what do you do with your children during your hours of 
absence from home: Work place nursery X State nursery Private 
nursery 
Nanny Leave with friends Neighbours Family and relatives 
x 
9. Do you get paid for your work? Yes X No 
10. Do you have any other source of income? Yes No X 
If yes please state what is/are the source/s of your income. 
11. Why do you work: Financial needs X Social or cultural needs 
For Charity and religious purposes To be independent 
To help the family Other 
12. Why have you chosen this work? Financial needs X Personal choice 
Family's choice Social prestige In relation to your 
specialisation 
Other 
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13. In case your work is a voluntary work? do you get any expenses and bonuses 
such as: Travel expenses Social promotion Or purely to 
help others 
14. If you get paid for your work, what does your salary pays for? Rent 
Food and clothes X Children's expenses X Saving 
Own personal expenses X 
15. Does your family agree with your work? Yes X No 
Does your husband agree? Yes No 
16. In your opinion what kind of work is suitable for women? 
Health service Teaching Doing productive work at home 
Management Directorship Administrative work 
To be a Karmand X Other 
17. In your opinion which sector of the economy is more suitable for women to 
work in? State enterprises X Private enterprises Self- 
employment 
18. Are you the only wage earner in your family? Yes No X 
If yes, is your wage enough to run the family? Yes No X 
If no, how do you manage, do you have other jobs? Explain 
If no, who are other wage earners in your family? Husband X 
Mother Father Brother Sister Son 
Daughter X Other? 
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19. To what extent is your wage important to the family, in comparison with 
other members of the family? More than others The same as others X 
Less than others Has no effect 
20. Who receives your salary? Yourself X Your husband 
Your parents Your children? Your male children? 
21. Who decides about how your salary or wage should be spent? Yourself 
In consultation with your husband or your parents 
Collectively with other members of the family X 
22. How much of your salary is spent on personal expenses? All of it 
Most of it Half of it Less than half of it A small amount of it X 
None of it 
23. What is your salary spent on? Travel expenses 
Children's nursery Clothes X Children's education X Other 
24. Who does the housework in your absence? Mother Mother-in-law 
Sister Sister-in-law Husband Children No-one X 
Other 
25. What is your present occupation? Assembly worker 
26. Date of employment? 1975 
27. What is your position at work? 
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28. Type of work? 
29. Which sector of the economy do you work for? State X 
Private Self-employed 
30. Hours of work: Full-time X Part-time Normal hours X Shift 
work 
Which shifts? Day Evening Night 
31. How many hours a day do you work? 48X 12 Other 
32. What form of salary do you receive? Full-time X Part-time daily 
Part-time contract work Hourly paid Other 
33. How much salary or wage do you receive per month? 5230 rials 
34. Do you receive any form of bonuses or benefits? Yes X No Explain 
35. Your previous employment : 
Date of employment The date that you left this job The reason that you left this 
job 
1- 
2- 
3- 
4- 
Other explanation? 
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36. If you have left any of your jobs, what was the affect of that on your 
retirement and pension funds?. 
37. Please explain any work experience. 
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In the name of the God 
The aim of this questionnaire is merely to collect statistical information for an 
academic purpose. This information will not be used to determine an individual 
women's social and economic status. Therefore it is not necessary for women to 
put their name and the name of their work place. Your co-operation is greatly 
appreciated as you help a PhD student to write her thesis on the social and 
economic status of women in Iran. Please read the questions very carefully and 
answer them as clearly and accurately as possible. I thank you in advance. 
" 1. Date of completion of the questionnaire. 
2. Age: Under 18 
40-50 50-60 
3. Education: PrimaryX 
Post DiplomaBA 
18-25 25-30 30-40 
Over 60 X 
Pre-Secondary Secondary Diploma 
MA . PhD Other 
4. Marital status: Single Married Date Divorced Date 
Widowed Date My husband disappeared in the war in 1980-81. 
5. If you are divorced? Give reasons: Financial Personal 
Family interference Unable to have children Other 
6. No. of Children 5 Their age: Two daughters 22 and 32, three sons 
35,40,50. 
7. Are you engaged in social and economic activities other than your work in the 
home? Yes X No Explain the kind of activity. 
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Are you working outside the home? Yes No 
Are you a housewife and perform your social and economic activities at home? 
Yes X No 
Is your work voluntary? For example working for the Literacy Corp or 
Mobilisation Organisation? Yes X No 
8. In case you are employed or engaged in voluntary work outside the home and 
have children please state what do you do with your children during your hours of 
absence from home: Work place nursery State nursery Private 
nursery 
Nanny Leave with friends 
9. Do you get paid for your work? Yes 
Neighbours Family and relatives 
No X 
10. Do you have any other source of income? Yes X No 
If yes please state what is/are the source/s of your income. 
Because my husband disappeared in the war, I receive 30,000 rials per 
month from the Martyred Foundation 
11. Why do you work: Financial needs 
For Charity and religious purposes X 
To help the family Other 
Social or cultural needs 
To be independent 
I work voluntarily to please the 
God 
12. Why have you chosen this work? Financial needs Personal choice X 
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Family's choice Social prestige In relation to your 
specialisation 
Other 
13. In case your work is a voluntary work? do you get any expenses and bonuses 
such as: Travel expenses Social promotion Or purely to 
help others 
14. If you get paid for your work, what does your salary pays for? Rent 
Food and clothes Children's expenses Saving 
Own personal expenses 
15. Does your family agree with your work? Yes No 
Does your husband agree? Yes No 
16. In your opinion what kind of work is suitable for women? 
Health Service Teaching doing productive work at home 
management directorship Administrative work 
To be a Karmand Other 
Whatever the God approves of 
17. In your opinion which sector of the economy is more suitable for women to 
work in? State enterprises Private enterprises Self- 
employment 
18. Are you the only wage earner in your family? 
If yes, is your wage enough to run the family? 
If no, how do you manage, do you have other jobs 
If no, who are other wage earners in your family? 
Mother Father Brother 
Daughter Other? 
Yes X No 
Yes No X 
;? Explain 
Husband 
Sister Son 
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19, To what extent is your wage important to the family, in comparison with 
other members of the family? More than others The same as others 
Less than others Has no effect 
20. Who receives your salary? Yourself Your husband 
Your parents Your children? Your male children? 
21. Who decides about how your salary or wage should be spent? Yourself 
In consultation with your husband or your parents 
Collectively with other members of the family 
22. How much of your salary is spent on personal expenses? All of it 
Most of it Half of it Less than half of it A small amount of it 
None of it 
23. What is your salary spent on? Travel expenses 
Children's nursery Clothes X Children's education Other 
24. Who does the housework in your absence? Mother Mother-in-law 
Sister Sister-in-law Husband 
Other 
25. What is your present occupation? 
26. Date of employment? 
Children No-one 
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27. What is your position at work? 
28. Type of work? 
29. Which sector of the economy do you work for? State Private Self- 
employed 
30. Hours of work: Full-time Part-time Normal hours X Shift 
work 
Which shifts? Day Evening Night 
31. How many hours a day do you work? 4X 8 12 Other 
32. What form of salary do you receive? Full-time Part-time daily Part- 
time contract work Hourly paid Other 
33. How much salary or wage do you receive per month? 
34. Do you receive any form of bonuses or benefits? Yes No Explain 
35. Your previous employment : 
Date of employment The date that you left this job The reason that you left this 
job 
1- 
2- 
3- 
4- 
Other explanation? 
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36. If you have left any of your jobs, what was the affect of that on your 
retirement and pension funds?. 
37. Please explain any work experience. 
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In the name of the God 
The aim of this questionnaire is merely to collect statistical information for an 
academic purpose. This information will not be used to determine an individual 
women's social and economic status. Therefore it is not necessary for women to 
put their name and the name of their work place. Your co-operation is greatly 
appreciated as you help a PhD student to write her thesis on the social and 
economic status of women in Iran. Please read the questions very carefully and 
answer, them as clearly and accurately as possible. I thank you in advance. 
1. Date of completion of the questionnaire. 23.9.1991 
2. Age: Under 18 
40-50 50-60 
3. Education: Primary 
Post DiplomaBA 
18-25 25-30 30-40 X 
Over 60 
Pre-Secondary Secondary Diploma 
MAX PhD Other 
4. Marital status: Single Married X Date March 1979 Divorced 
Date Widowed Date 
5. If you are divorced? Give reasons: Financial Personal 
Family interference Unable to have children Other 
6. No. of Children 2 sons Their age: 7 and 10. 
7. Are you engaged in social and economic activities other than your work in the 
home? Yes X No Explain the kind of activity. 
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Are you working outside the home? Yes X No 
Are you a housewife and perform your social and economic activities at home? 
Yes No 
Is your work voluntary? For example working for the Literacy Corp or 
Mobilisation Organisation? Yes No 
8. In case you are employed or engaged in voluntary work outside the home and 
have children please state what do you do with your children during your hours of 
absence from home: Work place nursery State nursery Private 
nursery 
Nanny Leave with friends Neighbours Family and relatives 
My children go to school, whenever necessary my family and my husband's 
family will help me. 
9. Do you get paid for your work? Yes X No 
10. Do you have any other source of income? Yes No X 
If yes please state what is/are the source/s of your income. 
11. Why do you work: Financial needs X Social or cultural needs X 
For Charity and religious purposes X To be independent X 
To help the family X Other All of these are reasons for me to go out 
to work 
12. Why have you chosen this work? Financial needs Personal choice X 
Family's choice Social prestige In relation to your 
specialisation X Other 
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13. In case your work is a voluntary work? do you get any expenses and bonuses 
such as: Travel expenses Social promotion Or purely to 
help others 
14. If you get paid for your work, what does your salary pays for? Rent X 
Food and clothes X Children's expenses X Saving 
Own personal expenses 
15. Does your family agree with your work? Yes X No 
Does your husband agree? Yes X No X 
Yes and No because he agrees in some ways and he does not agree in other 
ways. 
1 6. In your opinion what kind of work is suitable for women? 
Health service Teaching Doing productive work at home 
Management Directorship Administrative work 
To be a Karmand Other 
Why? In my view all of these professions could be suitable or not suitable, 
depending on an individual's choice and ability 
17. In your opinion which sector of the economy is more suitable for women to 
work in? State enterprises X Private enterprises Self- 
employment 
18. Are you the only wage earner in your family? Yes No X 
If yes, is your wage enough to run the family? Yes No 
If no, how do you manage, do you have other jobs? Explain 
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If no, who are other wage earners in your family? Husband X 
Mother Father Brother Sister Son 
Daughter Other? 
19. To what extent is your wage important to the family, in comparison with 
other members of the family? More than others X The same as others 
Less than others Has no effect 
At present more than others 
20. Who receives your salary? Yourself X Your husband 
Your parents Your children? Your male children? 
21. Who decides about how your salary or wage should be spent? Yourself 
In consultation with your husband or your parents 
Collectively with other members of the family X 
22. How much of your salary is spent on personal expenses? All of it 
Most of it Half of it Less than half of it A small amount of it X 
None of it 
23. What is your salary spent on? Travel expenses X 
Children's nursery Clothes X Children's education Other 
24. Who does the housework in your absence? Mother Mother-in-law 
Sister Sister-in-law Husband Children No-one X 
Other 
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25. What is your present occupation? University lecturer 
26. Date of employment? 1990 
27. What is your position at work? Lecturer 
28. Type of work? Teaching 
29. Which sector of the economy do you work for? State X 
Self-employed 
30. Hours of work: Full-time X Part-time Normal. hours 
work 
Which shifts? Day Evening Night 
Shift 
31. How many hours a day do you work? 4'8X 12 Other 
I work 8 hours a day at the university and I work between 8 -10 hours a day 
at home doing the house-work So I work between 16-18 hours a day. 
32. What form of salary do you receive? Full-time X Part-time daily 
Part-time contract work Hourly paid Other 
33... How much salary or wage do you receive per month? 200,000 rials 
34. Do you receive any form of bonuses Or benefits? Yes X No Explain 
Only through over-time 
35. - Your previous employment: Bank employee, ä private enterprise 
employee, administrative officer at the university 
Private 
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Date of employment/ The date that you left this job/The reason that you left this 
job 
1-1974-1975 /I left this job to continue my higher education. 
2- 1976-1979 /I left this job to go and work for the state sector 
3- 1979-1990 /I left the administrative work and started my academic career 
4- 
Other explanation? 
36. If you have left any of your jobs, what was the affect of that on your 
retirement and pension funds? 
All the years that I worked in an private company does not count towards 
my years of service whether in terms of salary scale or pension fund. My 
years of work in the state sector is only counted towards my pension fund 
but not my salary scale. 
37, Please explain any work experience. 
Women's contribution to family and society is extremely important. They 
work harder than men and they carry a heavy responsibility on their 
shoulders. A woman's work within the home is considered her natural duty, 
while if a man helps with the house-work, he has performed a great favour 
to his family. This has such a deeply psychological affect that many women 
believe in this state of affair. Women work outside of the home under 
massive pressure, employers are not sympathetic to women's domestic 
problem and child care. If women have to leave early or arrive late because 
of child care problem, they are treated as someone who is not serious in her 
work. Although women's earning is important for the family, if children 
become ill or something goes wrong in the house, women are blamed 
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because they have not treated their domestic responsibility seriously, This 
creates many problems within the family, between husband and wife and 
even between children and the mother. Other problems such as shortage of 
nursery schools, short maternity leave and looking after children under 3 
years of age, which are critical age, are added problems for women. 
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